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Introduction: Governance, Social Accountability, 
and Sectoral Service Delivery
Derick W. Brinkerhoff, Jana C. Hertz, and Anna Wetterberg
CHAPTER 1
International development agencies recognize that socioeconomic 
development depends upon a complex array of interconnected processes, 
resource and capacity endowments, historical pathways, and sociopolitical 
structures. However, these donors have often promoted socioeconomic 
development through policies and operations in discrete sectors. In practice, 
development efforts are packaged into sectorally focused programs and 
projects, what Albert O. Hirschman famously termed “privileged particles of 
the development process” (1967, p. 1). 
Historically, donors and academics have sought to clarify what makes 
sectoral projects effective and sustainable contributors to development. Among 
the key factors identified have been (1) the role and capabilities of the state and 
(2) the relationships between the state and citizens, phenomena often lumped 
together under the broad rubric of “governance.” Given the importance of a 
functioning state and positive interactions with citizens, donors have treated 
governance as a sector in its own right, with projects ranging from public 
sector management reform, to civil society strengthening, to democratization 
(Brinkerhoff, 2008). The link between governance and sectoral service delivery 
was highlighted in the World Bank’s 2004 World Development Report, which 
focused on accountability structures and processes (World Bank, 2004). 
Since then, sectoral specialists’ awareness that governance interventions can 
contribute to service delivery improvements has increased substantially, and 
there is growing recognition that both technical and governance elements are 
necessary facets of strengthening public services.
However, expanded awareness has not reliably translated into effective 
integration of governance into sectoral programs and projects in, for 
example, health, education, water, agriculture, or community development. 
The bureaucratic realities of donor programming offer a partial explanation: 
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1 Most definitions of social accountability exclude voting; however, we share the view expressed 
by Grandvoinnet et al. (2015) that the conceptual line between social accountability and 
political participation is a fuzzy one. 
organizations structured along sectoral lines create operational stovepipes, 
sector specialists’ training reinforces disciplinary boundaries, and dedicated 
funding streams drive attention to achieving specific sectoral outcome 
indicators. 
Beyond bureaucratic barriers, though, lie ongoing gaps in practical 
knowledge of how best to combine attention to governance with sector-specific 
technical investments. What interventions make sense, and what results can 
reasonably be expected? What conditions support or limit both improved 
governance and better service delivery? How can citizens interact with public 
officials and service providers to express their needs, improve services, and 
increase responsiveness? Various models and compilations of best practices 
have been developed, but debates remain, and answers to these questions are 
far from settled. This volume investigates these questions and contributes to 
building understanding that will enhance both knowledge and practice. 
In this book, we examine six recent projects, funded mostly by the United 
States Agency for International Development and implemented by RTI 
International, that pursued several different paths to engaging citizens, public 
officials, and service providers on issues related to accountability and sectoral 
services. Case studies include both sectorally focused projects in health and 
education (Chapters 3, 4, 5) and governance projects (Chapters 6, 7, 8). The 
six cases illustrate the multiple ways in which social accountability—the array 
of actions and mechanisms beyond the ballot box through which citizens can 
hold the state to account—can lead to positive effects on governance, citizen 
empowerment, and service delivery (see Ackerman, 2005).1 The analysis 
focuses on both the intended and actual effects, and unpacks the influence of 
context on implementation and the outcomes achieved. 
Overview of the Book
This introductory chapter presents the intent and contents of the volume and 
previews some of the key findings and their implications for program design 
and implementation. In Chapter 2, Derick Brinkerhoff and Anna Wetterberg 
provide an analytic framework and background for the six cases. Each case 
study is constructed around two dimensions: (1) the types of actions that 
citizens can undertake to hold state actors accountable and (2) the purposes 
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for which social accountability can be pursued (see Chapter 2, “Framing Social 
Accountability”). Concisely summarized, social accountability actions related 
to transparency include citizens engaging in the collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of information on public policies, programs, and services. Those 
focused on coproduction engage citizens in policy making and service delivery 
planning and implementation. Compliance-focused social accountability 
actions comprise monitoring and oversight of public policies, programs, 
and services in cooperation with officials and providers. Confrontational 
social accountability actions are those in which citizens question or contest 
government policies and practices by holding demonstrations, organizing 
protests, or pursuing legal challenges in courts. Social accountability 
actions aim to improve service delivery, citizen empowerment, and/or 
governance.
In Chapter 3, F. Henry Healey summarizes the case of the Northern 
Education Initiative in Nigeria, which targeted improving state-level 
education-sector management systems and increasing access to schooling for 
orphans and vulnerable children in two states. He notes the significance of 
powerful institutional actors, such as high-level officials, in limiting prospects 
for sustained citizen empowerment in the education sector.
Alyson Lipsky, in Chapter 4, recounts the story of joint citizen–provider 
partnership committees in district health facilities in Rwanda as one of the 
interventions supported by the Twubakane project. Derick Brinkerhoff and 
Felicity Young, in Chapter 5, recap the Health Policy Initiative’s HIV policy 
and advocacy effort in China. They point to the challenges facing members of 
marginalized populations lobbying an authoritarian government for expanded 
access to services and protection of rights, but also underscore elements of 
success. In Chapter 6, Jana Hertz presents the Kinerja program’s experience 
with Indonesian local governments in combining sectoral strengthening and 
governance-enhancing interventions. She highlights how the program paired 
demand-side social accountability mechanisms and tools with supply-side 
support to enable local governments to respond to citizens with improved 
services. 
Wetterberg, in Chapters 7 and 8, reviews Morocco’s Local Governance 
Program (LGP) and Nigeria’s Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy, and 
Development (LEAD) project. Her analysis of LGP focuses on the program’s 
facilitation of citizen participation in improving local government planning 
and performance monitoring systems in a setting in which local officials and 
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citizens viewed each other with distrust. Similarly, LEAD built citizen capacity 
to participate in state and local government systems for planning, budgeting, 
and monitoring, but unlike LGP, it included a focus on service improvements 
in health, water, and education. In Chapter 9, Wetterberg and Brinkerhoff 
assess the common elements across the cases, as well as noting differences; 
explore contextual factors; and tease out a set of implications and practical 
considerations for effectively integrating social accountability interventions 
into development projects.
Key Findings and Implications: A Preview
Each case offers insights into the challenges in applying social accountability 
mechanisms and tools in particular country contexts and associated enabling 
environments. Each project faced situation-specific factors and unique 
contextual influences that shaped its ability to integrate governance and service 
delivery interventions and that affected the outcomes the project achieved. Yet 
all the cases revealed some commonalities and shared features. These enable 
us to look across the six cases and extract a number of findings, conclusions, 
and implications that offer applicability beyond our small sample of experience 
with social accountability. Here we highlight some of the most salient findings 
emerging from this volume.
First, the cases underscore the importance of an iterative approach 
to social accountability. Complementing other scholars’ emphasis on 
locally defined problems, experimentation, experiential learning, and 
broad stakeholder engagement (Andrews et al., 2013), these six case studies 
demonstrate nuances in applying an iterative approach specifically to social 
accountability. By combining varying types of social accountability tools 
and actions with different actors across time, projects can gradually achieve 
improvements in empowerment, governance, and service delivery.
An iterative approach should be applied in the design of the social 
accountability intervention through use of flexible menus and incorporation 
of different types of social accountability actions (transparency, compliance, 
coproduction, confrontation), selectively and repeatedly, depending on 
changing micro-contexts—such as local personnel, power relations, customs 
and practices, or resources. For example, due to a local champion, government 
may be open to the use of compliance-focused social accountability tools 
such as a complaint-handling survey and/or a service charter (an agreement 
between service providers and citizens on providers’ responsibilities and 
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response times). However, with a change in local leadership, the willingness to 
be held accountable by citizens may dissipate, and a coproduction approach 
may make more sense. Creative incorporation of flexible menus and the use, 
reuse, and exchange of different social accountability tools throughout the 
life of a project to adapt to changing circumstances could make a significant 
difference in social accountability programming. 
An iterative approach can also be applied at implementation through 
capacity development of both citizens and service providers—not just in the 
technical capabilities of how to implement social accountability tools, but more 
importantly in how to assess a situation, read the micro-context, decide which 
tools should be used under which circumstances, and recalibrate the social 
accountability strategy based on responses to the tool. Training and capacity 
development exercises could target how to critically analyze micro-contexts 
and how to flexibly apply a range of social accountability tools to assist citizens 
and providers in leveraging their options.
Finally, on the evaluation end of the project cycle, an iterative approach 
should be included in the theory of change, and a learning environment 
consisting of various cycles of trial and error should be built into the 
evaluation plan and implementation. This would be a significant departure 
from many international development partners’ monitoring plans, which are 
focused on very specific quantitative indicators and short-term results that 
must be achieved for reporting purposes to justify funding sources. Instead, 
having incremental indicators that show gradual but significant shifts in 
social accountability linked to governance systems for service delivery would 
represent a monumental change in assessing and demonstrating attribution to 
social accountability efforts.
A second main theme that emerged throughout the case studies was 
the importance of both close integration between governance approaches 
and sectoral interventions and the interconnectedness of interventions to 
strengthen state capabilities with those to empower citizens. The sectorally 
focused programs included in the study incorporated designs and approaches 
to social accountability that were very similar to those of the programs that 
focused on governance. Both types of programs incorporated a combined 
supply and demand approach emphasizing interaction between citizens and 
providers and linking public service delivery outcomes (in all cases but one) to 
the interaction of both. 
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As described in Chapter 9’s overview of the study findings, however, a 
persistent disconnect exists between providers’ and citizens’ views of social 
accountability. In some cases, providers remain reluctant to recognize the 
rights of citizens to monitor services and to use compliance-based social 
accountability tools, preferring instead coproduction modes of social 
accountability. This finding highlights the importance of governance in 
framing the incentives for public officials and providers to pay attention to 
citizens’ inputs to assessing service delivery performance.
To influence the incentive structures for service providers to acknowledge 
and incorporate strong social accountability mechanisms in their work, the 
provider–citizen interaction must be continually at the forefront of project 
activities. Interventions to strengthen providers’ technical capacities should 
be channeled to providers who demonstrate a willingness to identify and 
respond to citizen needs. Changing attitudes and behaviors requires extended 
interactions, to influence both providers’ and citizens’ long-held attitudes and 
establish new behavioral patterns.
A third theme that warrants more exploration is the link between social 
accountability and public service delivery outcomes. In the case studies, we 
found frequent reports of public service delivery improvements at the level of 
the service provider (also called a service delivery unit) and mixed political 
and budget support for service delivery at the next higher level of government. 
Attribution is challenging, especially given the combination of technical 
interventions with social accountability mechanisms in many of the case 
studies. Nonetheless we found evidence that social accountability mechanisms 
contributed to service delivery, empowerment, and governance changes in 
communities and in stakeholder relations. 
Even in unlikely macro contexts, such as semi-authoritarian regimes in 
China, Morocco, and Rwanda, there was evidence of social accountability 
influence on public services. For example, in Rwanda, citizens, providers, 
and government officials all agreed that social accountability mechanisms 
“impacted service organization and delivery,” and some government officials 
stated that social accountability mechanisms “were critical in helping to solve 
service delivery problems and guaranteeing provider accountability” (Chapter 
4). Links between social accountability and public service delivery fluctuate 
depending on macro- and micro-contextual influences during the life of a 
project (Chapter 2). These links and the influence of context on delivering 
results warrant further exploration since the quality of ongoing interaction 
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between providers and citizens is crucial for both short-term and long-term 
impact. 
A fourth theme that emerged from the studies was the importance of 
government response for the sustainability of social accountability, after 
projects activities scale back. Throughout the book, we use “sustainability” 
to refer to the continuation of social accountability efforts by local actors 
after project activities conclude. A number of the user committees and civil 
society organizations supported by the case study projects successfully gained 
recognition through their activism and served as catalysts for service delivery 
improvement. When project funding and facilitation ended, some civil 
society actors succeeded in gaining state recognition for their role—in terms 
of funding, institutionalization of the social accountability mechanisms (i.e., 
through legislation), or routine access to decision makers. However, others 
struggled to continue social accountability efforts, and reluctance from service 
providers to be held accountable by citizens continued to be a hindrance. The 
case studies show that response from state actors is crucial to ensure sustained 
involvement from citizens, who otherwise may see their activism and 
monitoring efforts as futile. In addition, in several case studies, citizen groups 
did not have as much leverage at higher levels of government as they did at 
the service delivery units. However, in cases where they did, the replication of 
social accountability mechanisms was remarkable, often covering all service 
delivery units in the jurisdiction.
Conclusion
The general themes highlighted in this introduction represent a taste of the 
findings that emerge from the six cases. The recurring themes are an iterative 
approach to social accountability, close integration between governance 
approaches and sectoral interventions and the interconnectedness of 
interventions to strengthen state capabilities with those to empower citizens, 
linkages between social accountability and public-service delivery outcomes, 
and the importance of provider response for the sustainability of social 
accountability. 
The overview in Chapter 9 distills the findings from the cases in more 
detail and discusses a number of strategies and programmatic considerations 
for incorporating social accountability into international development 
efforts. Readers interested in particular country experiences can skip over 
the distillation of the findings and go directly to the individual case studies, 
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each of which offers a more richly hued narrative of the experiences with 
social accountability, governance, and service delivery. We hope this volume 
will generate further discourse on social accountability in practice. Our 
intent is for the experiences, analysis, and lessons presented in this book 
to enable future programs and projects to better incorporate governance-
strengthening approaches and tools in improving access, availability, quality, 
and responsiveness of sectoral services for the benefit of citizens in developing 
countries.
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Cross-Sectoral Social Accountability in Practice: 
Analytical Framework and Background
Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Anna Wetterberg
CHAPTER 2
Social accountability comprises the array of actions and mechanisms—beyond 
the ballot box—that engage citizens in holding the state to account. Viewed 
normatively, providing citizens with options and opportunities to engage 
with the state is desirable in and of itself, contributing to good governance 
and enacting democratic values. From an instrumental perspective, social 
accountability serves as a means to achieve particular ends, such as better 
service delivery. In the field of international development, social accountability 
interventions build on a long history of participatory projects, where citizens 
express their views, needs, and preferences to public officials; but they also 
go further by marrying participation with answerability and sanctions to 
increase the likelihood that those officials will respond to citizens and be held 
to account for their choices and actions. Social accountability complements 
and reinforces state institutions and processes that oversee other forms 
of accountability: electoral, legal, financial, and programmatic. Today, 
international development projects that focus on governance and public sector 
reform, or on service delivery across a range of sectors, frequently include a 
social accountability component.
This study examines six projects, mostly funded by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), that have incorporated social 
accountability approaches and tools to improve governance and/or increase 
service delivery. The six cases vary in their relative emphasis on pursuing 
governance or sectoral service delivery outcomes. However, they all illustrate 
development actors’ growing attention to employing governance approaches 
as a means to improving service delivery through the application of social 
accountability. The analyses and lessons are intended not simply to catalog 
a retrospective commentary on the aims, achievements, and issues related 
to the six cases, but also to offer observations and suggestions relevant for 
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future project designs with social accountability components, and for their 
implementation. 
Each of the six cases addresses a common set of research questions: 
• How were social accountability tools and approaches integrated into the 
project design? What effects were they expected to have? 
• What evidence was found of social accountability approaches improving 
service delivery? Was there evidence of increased citizen empowerment? 
Was there evidence of improvements in governance?
• To what extent were interventions involving social accountability 
accepted, institutionalized, and replicated by local actors?
• What factors contribute to the sustainability of social accountability 
interventions, demonstrated by continued commitments by local actors?
The remainder of this chapter outlines the social accountability analytic 
framework that structures the case studies, describes the study methods, 
and offers brief summaries of the six projects and their country contexts. 
Chapters 3 through 8 draw on the analytical framework and should be read 
with the country contexts in mind.
Framing Social Accountability
Social accountability is a broad concept, subject to a variety of definitions 
and framings (Brinkerhoff & Wetterberg, 2016; Grandvoinnet et al., 2015).2 
Here, we characterize social accountability along two dimensions. First, we 
unpack social accountability in terms of the types of actions that citizens, as 
individuals or collectively in civil society organizations (CSOs), can undertake 
to hold state actors accountable: transparency-related, collaborative (including 
coproduction and compliance), or confrontational. The second dimension 
distinguishes the purposes for which social accountability can be pursued, 
building on McNeil and Malena (2010) and McGee and Gaventa (2011): 
• to increase the effectiveness of the delivery of public goods and services 
that respond to citizens’ needs and preferences
• to improve the quality of governance and democracy by strengthening 
the integrity of public institutions and actors, reducing corruption, and 
promoting citizen engagement in public affairs
2 This section draws on Brinkerhoff and Wetterberg (2014). See this working paper for further 
discussion and detail. 
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• to increase citizen empowerment through the expression of voice, 
realignment of state–society relations, and reduction of horizontal 
inequality. 
Notably, other project activities may also be designed to contribute to the 
same purposes as social accountability interventions. For example, technical 
support to service providers is also intended to strengthen service delivery and 
may be undertaken in parallel or in combination with social accountability 
actions. Similarly, accountability tools other than those controlled by citizens, 
such as audits, are intended to improve the quality and integrity of governance.
Table 1 creates a typology of social accountability actions and purposes 
and provides an illustrative list of mechanisms and tools for each type. The 
typology is stylized in the sense that in practice, the boundaries between 
the categories are not necessarily clear or firm. Further, actors’ aims may 
change, or several aims may be pursued simultaneously. Prior research also 
has demonstrated that each type of social accountability action may result in 
varying constellations of outcomes (see, for example, Gaventa & Barrett, 2012). 
Each of the six case studies situates the discussion of social accountability 
according to this typology and identifies barriers between different types of 
actions and expected outcomes.
International donor perspectives on social accountability, operationalized in 
country programs and projects, have tended to concentrate on the mechanisms 
and tools illustrated in Table 1. As a consequence, evaluations of effectiveness 
of social accountability have been tools-centered as well, which has led to a 
substantial collection of randomized controlled trials that offer donors and 
country counterparts evidence in support of the application of one or another 
of the tools (Williamson, 2015). However, a growing chorus of analysts 
cautions that this narrow emphasis on tools underestimates the importance of 
contextual factors, particularly political ones, in mediating the effectiveness of 
social accountability (Joshi & Houtzager, 2012). 
As the most comprehensive and synoptic assessment of relevant contextual 







• global dimensions. 
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Source: Adapted from Brinkerhoff and Wetterberg (2014).
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The author divided each of these into specific subdimensions (see also 
Bukenya et al., 2012). For our purposes, we have selected from among these 
domains, focusing on the first three in the list, and have used available external 
data sets to characterize the macro-contexts—i.e., national influences—for 
each of the project cases. In the literature on social accountability, increasing 
attention is being paid to the importance of micro-contexts—immediate local 
surroundings and actors—in explaining outcomes (Joshi, 2014). Thus, each 
case study offers some observations on its project’s local setting.
Study Methodology
Cases were selected from the universe of recent international development 
projects with social accountability components for which RTI International 
was either the lead implementer or an implementing partner. Eleven possible 
cases were originally identified, of which six met the selection criteria, 
including 
• availability of data,
• sufficient duration and scope of social accountability activities to achieve 
results,
• balance between sectoral service delivery and governance objectives, and
• geographic distribution. 
Data were gathered through document reviews along with interviews with 
current or former project staff by phone, in person, and/or by email. Case 
researchers followed a common protocol for data collection on the research 
questions listed in the introduction to this chapter to ensure comparability 
across the cases. The protocol (included in the appendix to this chapter) 
covered the following topics:
• general social accountability approach
• specifics on social accountability approach
• implementation of social accountability interventions
• effects of project’s efforts to promote social accountability
• sustainability of social accountability after project activities conclude.
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Each draft case study was reviewed by two other researchers to ensure 
consistent attention across the topics and depth within each. After cases were 
finalized, the editors of this book conducted the comparative analysis—using 
the framework presented in this chapter—on which other team members 
provided feedback.3 
Project Overviews
Case selection yielded a sample of six projects from five countries: three 
projects in sub-Saharan Africa, two in Asia, and one in North Africa. 
As indicated earlier, most of the projects were funded by USAID.4 Two 
projects focused primarily on sectoral service delivery with a secondary 
concentration on governance. The Northern Education Initiative (Nigeria) 
targeted increased access of orphans and vulnerable children to primary 
education, in conjunction with improvements in education-sector financial 
and management systems. The Decentralization and Health Program, known 
as Twubakane (Rwanda), provided improved services for maternal and child 
health, family planning, nutrition, and prevention and treatment of malaria, 
along with support to the decentralization of Rwanda’s health system and to 
local governments to plan, budget for, and deliver health services. 
Two projects integrated sectoral service delivery and governance 
objectives in relatively equal combinations. The Kinerja project (Indonesia) 
offered subnational governments a menu of sectoral service performance 
improvements in health, education, and economic development, accompanied 
by a governance toolkit to enhance transparency, accountability, and 
responsiveness. The Health Policy Initiative in the Greater Mekong Region and 
China supported the implementation of an HIV comprehensive prevention 
service package through improving the governance enabling environment. 
Finally, two projects concentrated almost exclusively on governance and 
public sector reform, with lesser direct attention to sectoral services. The 
Local Governance Program (Morocco) sought to improve local government 
performance by expanding citizen participation, increasing local governments’ 
transparency and accountability, and supporting collaboration between local 
officials and deconcentrated service agencies. The Leadership, Empowerment, 
3 We are grateful to the RTI Press for additional suggestions for improvement received during 
peer review.
4 The Health Policy Initiative in the Greater Mekong Region and China was funded by PEPFAR 
(President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief).
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Advocacy, and Development Project (Nigeria), as the name suggests, targeted 
local governments’ capacity to plan, budget, and engage with citizens and 
local organizations in order to increase transparency and accountability and 
to improve management of selected sectoral services. Table 2 provides basic 
details on each project.















• Strengthen strategic planning systems
• Improve financial resource management and budgeting
• Strengthen education management information systems
• Strengthen teacher education systems
• Improve teacher management, support, and supervision 
systems
• Improve performance management and accountability
• Increase access of orphans and vulnerable children to 







• Increase access to and quality/utilization of family 
planning and reproductive health services in health 
facilities and communities
• Increase access to and quality/utilization of malaria, 
nutrition, and child health services in health facilities and 
communities
• Improve the capacity of the ministries of health and of 
local administration and national systems to put policies 
and procedures in place for decentralization, with an 
emphasis on health services
• Strengthen capacity of districts to plan, budget, mobilize 
resources, and manage services, with an emphasis on 
health services
• Strengthen capacity of health facilities, including health 
centers and hospitals, to better manage resources and 
to promote and improve the functioning of community-
based health insurance (mutuelles)
• Increase community access to, participation in, and 
ownership of health services
Health Policy 










• Adopt and implement HIV policies, plans, and programs 
based on international best practices at national and local 
levels
• Develop, strengthen, and support effective public sector 
and civil society champions and networks to assume 
leadership of the policy process
• Use timely and accurate data for evidence-based decision 
making
(continued)
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• Create incentives for local governments to improve service 
delivery 
• Encourage the adoption of innovative service delivery
• Replicate improved management systems and disseminate 
them through intermediary organizations









• Promote more effective representational bodies
• Improve capacity of local government to respond to 
citizen priorities











• Strengthen local government capacity to build community 
relations and improve management of services
• Increase transparency of local government operations 
• Strengthen capacity of local organizations for service 
planning, budgeting, and monitoring
• Support improvements in selected local government 
services (water and sanitation, education, and health)
Source: Project documents.
(continued)
All six projects combined supply-side and demand-side interventions 
as the means to achieve both sectoral and governance objectives. These 
interventions reflect the lessons of experience, well documented in the 
literature, that paying attention to state capacity and incentives—the supply 
side—to respond effectively to citizen demand is among the keys to achieving 
sustainable results in reforming public entities, improving governance, and 
delivering services (see, for example, Agarwal & Van Wicklin, 2012). Effective 
social accountability thus blends the two sides. The projects’ theories of change 
reveal this understanding, as shown in Table 3, which also lists the social 
accountability tools and mechanisms that each project introduced.
Country Contexts
Data from various governance and civil society indices facilitate drawing 
a general picture of the macro-context for social accountability in each of 
the case study countries (O’Meally, 2013). On the supply side, governments’ 
effectiveness at making policy and providing public services is important. 
If governments are incapable of managing public affairs and services, then 
social accountability interventions will have limited success in increasing 
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Table 3. Projects’ theories of change and social accountability tools
Project name Theory of change





In combination with stronger 
capacity for responsive service 
delivery, organized, targeted, and 
well-informed citizen pressure on 
government systems will result in 
improved education services. 
• Participatory Medium-Term 
Sector Strategy
• Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) training
• Snapshot of School Management 
Effectiveness interview and 
observation instrument
• Information analysis and 
advocacy skills for school-based 
management committees
• Community education forums 
(district and state)
Twubakane Strengthening the capacity of local 
governments, health facilities, and 
communities to ensure improved, 
decentralized health service 
delivery will increase access to, 
quality, and use of family health 
services in health facilities and 
communities.
• Community partnerships for 
quality improvements (PAQs) 
• Local government open-house 









Success of the comprehensive 
prevention package for people 
with HIV and key affected 
populations depends upon 
creating and maintaining the 
enabling environment—policy and 
advocacy, community mobilization, 
stigma and discrimination 
reduction, strategic information, 
capacity building, and livelihood 
development—of laws, policies, 
regulations, and plans supported 
by sufficient resources, systems, 
structures, and capacities.
• Training to build advocacy 
capacity for people with HIV and 
other key affected populations 
and civil society organizations
• Small grants for advocacy 
campaigns
• Mentoring for grantees
• Operational policy assessments
• Reviews of regulatory 
environment
(continued)
responsiveness and improvements in service quality. Positive state–society 
relations are also critical; these are affected by factors associated with 
democratic governance, such as citizens’ ability to participate in selecting 
their leaders, media independence, and basic freedoms of expression and 
association. On the demand side, the culture, history, structures, capacities, 
resources, and impacts of civil society are key to social accountability taking 
root and yielding its potential results for service delivery, governance, and 
empowerment.
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Government Effectiveness
As a proxy for the supply-side quality of public services across our cases, 
Figure 1 shows a longitudinal comparison of the World Governance Indicators 
government effectiveness index values for the case study countries. This 
index reports on perceptions of the quality of public services, independence 
of the civil service, and the quality of policies and state commitment to their 
enforcement (Kaufmann et al., 2015). For the period covered by the index 
(1996–2013), all the case study countries generally scored in the bottom half of 
the index, which ranges from weak government effectiveness at −2.5 to strong 
at 2.5. By the end of the period, there was a convergence among four of the 
countries, with China, Rwanda, Morocco, and Indonesia around the midpoint 
Table 3. Projects’ theories of change and social accountability tools
Project name Theory of change
Social accountability tools and 
mechanisms
Kinerja Combining technical interventions 
to strengthen service provision 
(supply) with governance 
interventions to identify citizen 
priorities and hold providers 
accountable for inputs (demand) 
will improve service delivery in 
health, education, and business 
development.
• Multistakeholder forum (at 
service delivery unit [health 







Improved local government 
transparency, as well as better 
performance and greater citizen 
participation, will lead to greater 
citizen confidence in their 
commune (local government).
• Internal audits
• Communal Development Plans 
(CDPs)
• Communal Performance 
Framework (CPF)










Addressing both the demand and 
supply side of local government 
services will increase accountability 
and development, resulting in more 
effective local government systems 
and partnerships. 
• Community priority-setting
• Town hall meetings for planning 
and budgeting, as well as 
reporting on implementation
• Community-based strategic plans 
• Service improvement plans
• Public expenditure tracking
Note: Not all case study projects referred to the listed tools as social accountability mechanisms.  
These characterizations are the authors’.
Source: Case studies.
(continued)
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* Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Estimates range from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 
(strong) governance performance.
Source: Adapted from Kaufmann et al., 2015. 
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of the index (zero). At a very broad level, these four countries are therefore 
relatively comparable in terms of government effectiveness, with Nigeria being 
the outlier.
The patterns over time differ substantially, however. From 1996 to 2013 
(Figure 1), China and Morocco hovered around zero, and Nigeria showed little 
change from its estimated score of -1.0. Indonesia showed slight improvement 
in government effectiveness over the period. Rwanda stands out as having 
substantially strengthened government effectiveness, from the lowest score 
among the case study countries in 1996 to the highest (equivalent to China) in 
2013. This achievement is attributable to the Kagame autocracy, in place since 
the 1994 genocide, which has demonstrated a strong commitment to improved 
service delivery and has introduced performance-based measures—such as 
public and closely monitored contracts for mayors, citizen report cards, and 
performance-based financing—into the lower tiers of government. It has 
also encouraged participatory planning, drawing on traditional practices 
for voluntary social contributions of funds and labor, and encouraged 
accountability through “open house” and accountability days, during which 
citizens can hear from and question officials directly (Brinkerhoff et al., 2009).
State–Society Relations
The Worldwide Governance Indicators database also provides estimates 
of voice and accountability in each country, which can be seen as a rough 
measure of state–society relations. This index, presented for the case study 
countries in Figure 2, reflects perceptions of electoral accountability, as well 
as rights to express voice through freedom of association, expression, and the 
media. These estimates are much more dispersed for the case study countries 
than those for government effectiveness, although all estimates are similarly in 
the lower half of the index. Indonesia stands out as the only country to have 
steadily improved between 1996 and 2013, reflecting the fall of the Soeharto 
dictatorship in 1998 and increased democratic freedoms since. Nigeria also 
saw an improvement between 1996 and 2000 but suffered a decline afterward. 
Rwanda’s estimates increased somewhat. In Morocco and China, however, 
opportunities for voice and accountability declined overall. 
Perhaps the most notable feature of the estimates in Figure 2, however, 
is their stability over the decade 2003 to 2013. All the countries underwent 
remarkably little change in the voice and accountability estimates during the 
years that the case study projects were active. This pattern does not reflect 
negatively on the case study projects, as country-level estimates include both 
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Figure 2.  Comparison of voice and accountability in case study countries
* Reflects perceptions of the extent to which citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, 
as well as freedoms of expression, association, and the media. Estimates range from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 
(strong) governance performance.
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electoral and social accountability. Further, as each of our case studies was 
active at the subnational level and only in selected areas of each country, no 
project impacts would be expected at the country level. For example, NEI 
operated in two states, Bauchi and Sokoto; LGP in three regions of Morocco; 
and Kinerja in four Indonesian provinces. 
Civil Society
The CIVICUS World Alliance for Citizen Participation has conducted civil 
society assessments in many countries, which enable broad comparisons of the 
demand-side of the social accountability equation. The CIVICUS methodology 
assesses civil society on four dimensions: 
• Structure/level of organization: strength and depth of citizen participation, 
diversity, number and nature of formal/informal organizations, and 
availability/adequacy of resources 
• Values: extent of commitment to, and practice of, values related to 
democracy, transparency, equity, inclusiveness, gender, nonviolence, 
environmental sustainability, and poverty reduction
• Impact: level of civil society influence on public policy, responsiveness to 
societal needs, and empowerment
• Degree of engagement: extent to which environmental constraints impede 
or facilitate civil society actors’ engagement with state actors.
Table 4 draws upon the CIVICUS assessments for the case study countries 
to sketch the broad contours of civil society in each of these dimensions. Based 
on this admittedly macro-level picture, we would expect varying degrees of 
receptivity and ability regarding social accountability.
For Indonesia, with relatively strong scores for government effectiveness 
(Figure 1) and for voice and accountability (Figure 2), coupled with these 
CIVICUS ratings indicating a capable and engaged civil society, we would 
expect a supportive context for social accountability. Nigeria has similarly 
high ratings for civil society, but with its relatively weak index scores for 
government effectiveness and for voice and accountability, the context for 
social accountability looks less conducive to success. Morocco also looks 
relatively unconducive; although government effectiveness is fairly high, voice 
and accountability scores are weak and there are few opportunities for civil 
society to engage. 
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Table 4. Civil society ratings for case study countries
Civil society 


























































































































Source: Authors’ interpretation of CIVICUS assessments (Action Aid Nigeria et al., 2007; Akesbi, 2011; 
CCOAIB, 2011; Ibrahim, 2006; NGO Research Center, 2006).
Although China scored high on government effectiveness, given the 
authoritarian nature of the Communist state reflected in the low rating on 
voice and accountability, and the weaknesses in civil society revealed in 
the CIVICUS rankings, the context looks unsupportive and strongly state-
dominated. Thus, anticipated prospects for independent citizen collective 
action for social accountability would be low; particularly for the contentious/
confrontational type of social accountability, opportunity appears limited. 
Rwanda, as noted, has made impressive gains in government effectiveness 
and stands above China on voice and accountability, according to the World 
Governance Indicators, although it is well-recognized as a top-down, centrally 
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managed state. It has capable community-level organizations with a tradition 
of self-help; thus, we might expect some social accountability within a narrow 
range of state-controlled options, likely excluding contentious/confrontational 
actions.
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Appendix. Data Collection Protocol
This appendix consists of the internal protocol that the study team used to 
ensure some degree of consistency in gathering information across all the 
cases that were originally considered for the research. The data collected were 
used to refine case selection as well as to inform the analyses. The questions 
grounded and drew out concrete information on the concepts outlined in the 
analytic framework developed for the cases (described earlier in this chapter). 
In the following table, social accountability is abbreviated as SA.
Questions (probes/follow-up information in bullets) Analytic Element
General SA Approach
What are the project’s overall objectives and how do the SA 
mechanisms relate to them? Where do the SA interventions fit in the 
hierarchy of interventions and objectives? 
• Are the SA interventions a central part of the project and its key 
objectives? 




Describe how the SA interventions are expected to contribute to the 




Specifics on SA Approach
What mechanisms, tools, and approaches does the project use to 
encourage citizens to hold state actors (service providers, local officials) 
to account for service delivery? 
• Describe each and its characteristics (How frequently used? By whom? 
For what services? Which citizens are involved? Which state actors?)
Characterizing SA 
approach
Do the project’s SA approaches provide citizens with new information? 
• What information? How is it provided?
• Which citizens are supposed to receive it (elites, poor people, specific 
social groups, specific organizations/committees)? 
• How is information intended to be used? 
Characterizing SA 
approach: types of 
SA action




• How do they monitor?
• What do they monitor?
Characterizing SA 
approach: types of 
SA action
Do the project’s SA approaches bring citizens and state actors together 
for planning policies, programs, and/or specific aspects of service 
delivery? 
• Which state actors?
• Which citizens?
• How do state actors and citizens interact?
• On what are these interactions intended to focus? 
Characterizing SA 
approach: types of 
SA action
(continued)
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Questions (probes/follow-up information in bullets) Analytic Element
Specifics on SA Approach (continued)
Do the project’s SA approaches involve citizens confronting state actors 
to challenge existing policies, programs and/or specific aspects of 
service delivery? 
• Which citizens? 
• Which state actors?
• How do citizens confront state actors?
• On what issues?
Characterizing SA 
approach: types of 
SA action
What are the SA approaches intended to achieve? 
• Are they expected to directly improve service delivery? How?
• Are they expected to directly improve how state actors carry out their 
duties? How?
• Are they expected to enhance citizens’ sense of agency and 
empowerment to engage with state actors and insist on their rights? 
How?
• Are they intended to institutionalize new mechanisms for citizens and 
state actors to interact? How?
Characterizing SA 
approach: SA aims
Are the SA mechanisms novel in this context? 
• Have similar approaches been attempted before? 
• Are there parallels in the political system or in traditional governance 
structures? Are there policies that support or undermine SA efforts? 
Does the project’s mechanisms build on or try to change these? 
• Prior to the project, how did citizens communicate with providers 
or state officials? Were there means of channeling complaints? Were 
these effective? 
Context
Before the project began, had there been examples of citizens and state 
actors (providers/officials/political actors) interacting to improve service 
delivery? Describe these interactions.
• Did these experiences lead to intended outcomes? 
• Who were the key proponents and opponents? 
Context
Implementation of SA Interventions
Have the SA interventions been implemented as intended (per SA 
actions above: providing information, citizen monitoring, citizen–state 
interaction/confrontation)?
• What has worked well? Why?




What challenges did the project staff face in implementing the SA 
interventions as designed? 
• Were any modifications made to address these challenges? 





Appendix. Data Collection Protocol (continued)
 Analytical Framework and Background 29
Questions (probes/follow-up information in bullets) Analytic Element
Implementation of SA Interventions (continued)
How willing have citizens been to engage in the project’s SA 
mechanisms? 
• Why? 
• Do citizens fear repercussions if they are involved in the SA 
mechanisms? 
• Has there been variation in willingness to engage across project sites/
services? 




SA approach (also 
relates to context)
How have providers reacted to SA efforts? How willing have providers 
been to respond to the project’s SA mechanisms? 
• Why?
• Has there been variation in willingness to respond across project sites/
services? 




SA approach (also 
relates to context)
How have officials reacted to SA efforts? How willing have officials been 
to respond to the project’s SA mechanisms? 
• Why?
• Has there been variation in willingness to respond across project 
sites? 




SA approach (also 
relates to context)
Effects of Project’s Efforts to Promote SA
Did the SA interventions lead to the expected outcomes (service 
delivery, governance, and/or empowerment)? Which outcomes? 
• Did the SA interventions lead to changes in how providers deliver 
services? What types of changes? Are services better aligned with 
citizens’ needs?
• Did the SA interventions lead to changes in how state actors carried 
out their duties? Did the changes involve new/reorganized duties or 
enforcement of existing ones? Did they reflect greater responsiveness 
to citizens’ needs? Did state actors’ attitudes change?
• Did the SA interventions lead to changes in citizens’ perceptions of 
their rights? Capacity to organize for collective action? Capacity for 
communicating with state actors? Relationships with which state 
actors? Which citizens?
Effects of SA 
approach: 
SA aims and 
outcome of citizen 
engagement
For each expected outcome:
• Why/why not? 
• How can these outcomes be attributed to the SA interventions? 
• How were contributions to expected outcomes assessed?
• Were there variations across the program’s implementation areas 
(geographic, sectoral) in the effectiveness of the SA interventions)?
Effects of SA 
approach: SA aims 
(specifics on each 
aim)
(continued)
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Questions (probes/follow-up information in bullets) Analytic Element
Effects of Project’s Efforts to Promote SA (continued)
 Were there any negative effects of the SA interventions:
• On service delivery?
• On how officials carried out their duties (refusal to acknowledge 
citizens’ input, denials of service, violent state response)?
• On citizens’ empowerment (reliance on intermediaries, 
disempowerment, reduced sense of agency, tokenistic participation, 
exclusion of specific groups, etc.)?





Did the SA interventions affect sectoral outcomes (mortality, morbidity, 
enrollment, dropout, literacy, numeracy, etc.)? 
• Which outcomes? 
• Why/why not? 
• How can these outcomes be attributed to the SA interventions?
• How were contributions to expected outcomes assessed?
• Were there any negative effects?
Effects of SA 
approach
Have the SA interventions contributed to the project’s overall objectives 
as expected? 
• In what ways?
• Why or why not?
• How can these outcomes be attributed to the SA interventions?
• How were contributions to overall objectives assessed?
• Were there any negative effects?
Effects of SA 
approach
Were there any other positive outcomes from the SA interventions? 
Were there any other negative outcomes?
Effects of SA 
approach
Sustainability
Is there any indication that SA interventions will be sustained after the 
project? If so, what are these indications (funding, political support, 
etc.)?
• What aspects of the SA interventions will be sustained? By whom? 
• What are the plans for sustaining them? Have there been policy 
changes to institutionalize SA mechanisms/practices?
Effects of SA 
approach
Is there any indication that the outcomes will be sustained after the 
project? If so, what are these indications?
• What outcomes are likely to be sustained? By whom? What are the 
plans for ensuring they are sustained? 
Effects of SA 
approach
SA = social accountability.
Appendix. Data Collection Protocol (continued)
Social Accountability in Education:  




The Nigeria Northern Education Initiative (NEI) was a 5-year (2010–2014) 
program funded by the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID). It was designed to strengthen state and local government education 
systems in Bauchi and Sokoto states, to support orphans and vulnerable 
children, and to lay the groundwork for high-quality, state-led delivery of basic 
education that addressed the needs of the citizens in those states. Within those 
two states, NEI operated at all administrative levels of the education system: 
state, local government, and school. It also operated outside the education 
system, among the citizens impacted by that system. Each state had 10 NEI 
districts, amounting to nearly half of all the districts; within those districts, 
NEI worked with 120 formal schools and 80 Non-Formal Learning Centers 
(Creative Associates International, 2014a, 2014b).
The goal of NEI was to achieve the following seven results:
1. strengthened strategic planning systems
2. improved financial resource management and budgeting 
3. strengthened education management information systems (EMIS)
4. strengthened teacher education systems
5. improved teacher management, support, and supervision systems
Note: The author derived most of the content of this chapter from personal experience, 
conversations, and e-mail exchanges with RTI technical staff members Alastair G. Rodd and 
R. Drake Warrick, who were significantly involved in the Nigeria Northern Education Initiative; 
as well as from the project reports cited in the reference list. The narrative and analysis in this 
chapter represent the views of the author alone and are focused on NEI’s social accountability 
interventions. They do not reflect the project’s overall achievements.
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6. improved performance management and accountability
7. increased access of orphans and vulnerable children to basic education 
and other services (e.g., health information, counseling, referral) 
(Larcom et al., 2013).
Sokoto and Bauchi were targeted because they are regularly among the 
poorest performing states in Nigeria regarding such indicators as girls’ 
education access rates, dropout and repetition rates, pupil–teacher ratios, the 
percentage of unqualified teachers, and the number of vulnerable children, 
including boys leaving home to become almajirai (a Hausa-language term for 
mendicant children, often affiliated with religious schools). 
Although the government of Nigeria is institutionally committed to 
universal basic education (Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
2004), its delivery systems are weak, owing to a number of factors. First is 
an overabundance of education structures, which makes delivering—or 
improving—education services complicated and inefficient. At the federal level 
are the Ministry of Education, the Universal Basic Education Commission 
(UBEC), and 21 parastatal organizations, many with overlapping functions. 
At the state level are the State Ministry of Education and the State Universal 
Basic Education Board (SUBEB). Below these is a local government structure 
composed of Local Government Authorities (LGAs), which encompass local 
councils and local government education authorities (LGEAs), the latter with 
formal ties to both the education system and the local government system. 
In other words, LGA is the term used to describe the whole of the district 
government, its governing body, the local council, and its administrative 
bodies, which for education is the LGEA. Finally, below the district level are 
two additional jurisdictions: areas and wards. All of this creates a situation in 
which each state has a unique education system (Larcom et al., 2013).
NEI Social Accountability Approach
NEI was designed such that social accountability factored into the 
programming expectations, formalized as NEI Results 1, 6, and 7. Specifically, 
to help strengthen strategic planning systems (Result 1), NEI was (1) to 
improve civil society participation in the government-led Medium-Term 
Sector Strategy (MTSS) planning and budgeting process5 by identifying 
legally mandated opportunities (Government of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 2007, Section 13) for public participation in MTSS conception, 
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budget approval and execution, and evaluation; and (2) to empower civil 
society organizations (CSOs) involved in advocacy efforts to conduct public 
information campaigns focusing on how citizens can access education system 
performance information and so make demands on the system for improved 
performance.
NEI was also expected to work toward improved civil society participation 
in budget development and reporting by training civil society members to 
contribute to public hearings, monitor the budgetary process and use of funds, 
and provide budget execution feedback. In these regards, NEI facilitated 
coproduction in an effort to further the social accountability aim of improved 
service delivery.6 
To help improve performance management and accountability (Result 6), 
NEI’s strategy was to employ a participatory data collection-and-use model. 
Actors from the state level, local governments, schools, and communities 
were to use a School Performance Kit to collect data (such as student and 
teacher attendance, and availability of textbooks) that the LGEA would then 
use to prepare EMIS-generated school report cards. The report cards could 
be disseminated at various levels for purposes of advocacy, capacity building, 
accountability, and planning. 
NEI would also develop and promote low-cost mechanisms for community 
participation in decision making, such as policy dialogues, community 
education forums (CEFs, described later in this chapter), and community 
coalitions (see next paragraph), taking into account information generated 
through the School Performance Kits and report cards. Through a number 
of CSOs and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), NEI was to engage 
traditional leaders and community members in pilot LGEAs to demand better 
services for schools, including leveraging support for improved infrastructure, 
5 The MTSS is a key component of the country’s Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 
process, authorized by the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2007, Sections 11–17 (Government of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2007). The stated goal of the MTSSs is to better link government 
spending with agreed-upon needs in sectors such as education, health, transportation, 
agriculture, commerce and industry, and tourism. See Obadan (2015) for a summary of the 
overall budgeting process, the history of the MTEF, and the role of the MTSSs, as well as a 
commentary on the 2015–2017 MTEF. Also see the 2010 Nigeria Millennium Development 
Goals report (Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2010, pp. 9–10).
6 For an explanation of the various types of social accountability purposes (service delivery, 
governance and democracy, and empowerment) and actions (transparency, coproduction, 
compliance, confrontation) described in these case studies, refer to “Framing Social 
Accountability” in Chapter 2.
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scholarships, boarding schools, and latrines. Here, NEI was to further the 
social accountability aims of citizen empowerment and improved service 
delivery.
Finally, with regard to increased access of orphans and vulnerable children 
to basic education and other services (e.g., health information, counseling, 
referral), Result 7, NEI was to establish community coalitions to serve as 
information sources for community resources and referrals; to support and 
advise on referrals and access to services for orphans and vulnerable children; 
and to monitor orphan and vulnerable children activities in their LGEAs, voice 
concerns to the LGEAs, and report to NEI and USAID (Larcom et al., 2013). 
Through this work, NEI’s social accountability efforts sought to enhance both 
citizen empowerment and improved service delivery. 
The overarching theory of change driving NEI was that organized, 
targeted, and well-informed citizen pressure on government systems will 
result in improved education services, if combined with stronger capacity for 
responsive service delivery. It was well recognized that building the capacity 
of government systems alone would yield limited positive changes in overall 
system accountability and responsiveness regarding the quality of services 
delivered. In addition to this capacity building of government systems, 
concomitant capacity building of civil society is necessary to make its voice 
heard, pressure the government to act in accordance with this voice, and hold 
the government accountable for doing so. 
Accordingly, NEI invested considerable energy in social accountability, but 
as is often the case, this work did not necessarily unfold as planned. In the end, 
NEI’s social accountability efforts focused largely on two distinct fronts. First 
was giving civil society an informed voice in the MTSS process. Second was 
NEI’s efforts to get the government supply of educational resources to meet 
citizen “demand” for how that money should be spent.
Implementation of Social Accountability Interventions
Informed Civil Society Voice in the Medium-Term Sector Strategy Process
NEI found that the legislation that outlines the entire MTEF process calls for 
the inclusion of civil society. Specifically, as mentioned earlier, NEI identified 
legally mandated opportunities for public participation in MTSS conception, 
budget approval, budget execution, and evaluation processes. Moreover, as 
noted by A. G. Rodd (personal communication, May 5, 2015), the project 
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team succeeded in getting civil society involved within these areas by first 
sharing this information with its two major civil society partners, Civil Society 
for Action Coalition on Education for All (CSACEFA) and the Federation of 
Muslim Women Associations of Nigeria (FOMWAN). CSACEFA engages in 
advocacy and policy advising at all levels; its membership consists of over 600 
CSOs and NGOs from all 36 Nigerian states and the Federal Capital Territory 
(CSACEFA, 2016). FOMWAN, with equally wide geographical coverage and 
over 2,000 affiliates, focuses on Muslim women and girls’ health, education, 
and economic status (FOMWAN, 2016). NEI also shared the information 
about mandated MTSS participation with the Basic Education Steering 
Committee (BESC), an NEI-created body comprising key government officials 
from the State Ministry of Education, the State Ministry of Planning, and the 
LGEAs, designed to try to get many of the things that NEI did woven into the 
institutional and/or systemic fabric of the education system. 
Armed with this information about the inclusion of civil society into the 
MTSS process, CSACEFA and FOMWAN nominated potential candidates 
to serve as advisors. They gave this list to the BESC, which chose two people 
from each state to be involved in the MTSS process. NEI then trained the four 
people on their roles and responsibilities as persons at the “MTSS table” and 
gave them the skills they needed to participate effectively in all phases of the 
MTSS process.
All that said, having a guaranteed seat at the MTSS table is one thing; 
having an informed seat at the table is quite another. As described in the next 
section of this chapter (“Improved Planning and Budgeting”), NEI did a lot to 
gather data and information, develop the capacity of people within the system 
and within civil society to analyze the data, and use these analyses to advocate 
for improved performance and better decision making over how resources 
should be used to address both need and inequity across the system. Much of 
this information found its way into the dialogue around the MTSS through 
the four members of civil society who began participating in the overall MTSS 
process. Additionally, with NEI support, CSACEFA and FOMWAN would, 
together with participants from among the CSOs and NGOs they represented, 
meet with the Basic Education subcommittee of the state assembly during its 
budget review process and lobby on behalf of orphans and vulnerable children 
and other issues that surfaced through the information that was collected and 
analyzed, such as teacher placement. 
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It is worth mentioning here some comments made by the Chairman of the 
Bauchi Basic Education subcommittee. As reported by A. G. Rodd (personal 
communication, May 5, 2015), the Chairman said that the subcommittee 
ordinarily used the MTSS and the State Education Sector Operational Plan to 
carry out the mandated oversight function. But through NEI, his committee 
had gained access to the NEI/EMIS-generated school profile for every school 
in Bauchi State, as well as the action plan of the State Community Education 
Forum (S-CEF), both of which, he said, greatly enhanced his committee’s 
ability to exercise this oversight function.
As this MTSS effort was unfolding, in May 2011, Nigeria’s first-ever 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was passed by Parliament. NEI studied 
this act and trained CSACEFA and FOMWAN on the Act such that they came 
to know what civil society’s rights were with regard to access to education-
related information. In particular, NEI pointed out the specific information 
they had access to, how best they could access it, and what to do with it once 
they had accessed it. NEI also trained government officials and politicians 
(members of various assemblies’ education committees at state and local levels) 
on the FOIA and, in so doing, strove to improve the social accountability aim 
of improved governance. 
The FOIA and the NEI training on the FOIA were an important aspect of 
NEI’s social accountability efforts because before the FOIA, when CSACEFA, 
FOMWAN, or anyone else went to a ministry to ask for data—in particular, 
financial data or school construction/renovation plans—ministry officials 
could either refuse to release the data, stating that they were not allowed to 
share it; or they could drag out the process for so long that the people asking 
for the data would simply stop asking. Or, in those cases in which the ministry 
did provide the data, especially budget data, the data were aggregated to the 
point of being largely useless to anyone wanting to know how resources were, 
or were to be, allocated at lower levels of the system. 
With the advent of the FOIA, CSACEFA and FOMWAN could gain access 
to more detailed data, which they could use to better inform the members of 
civil society who now had a seat at the MTSS table. From that vantage point, 
they could strive to influence how MTSS money might be better spent as 
per the wants and needs of their membership within the education sector. 
However, although NEI succeeded in giving civil society representatives an 
informed seat, their voice had limited influence. After all, two seats at the state 
level not backed by any significant political-economic force cannot carry much 
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weight compared with others at the table who do wield a considerable amount 
of political-economic power.
Improved Planning and Budgeting: Striving to Match Supply to 
Citizen-Expressed Demand
NEI gathered a lot of data, analyzed it, and endeavored to insert local civil 
society representatives into the planning and budgeting processes. NEI also did 
much training in these areas, both for relevant government actors and for civil 
society. It did this largely to try to ensure that data could be used to influence 
the supply of government resources (funding, teacher assignments, etc.) at 
state, district, and subdistrict levels to better match the demand, especially 
given the informed democratic deliberations on how those resources should be 
spent, which NEI helped to foster. At this point, engagement in all seven NEI 
results came together, making it very difficult to speak about the activities that 
took place under each result separately. Accordingly, in this section I present 
an account of the work that NEI did under all of the result areas to help make 
supply meet demand. 
NEI strongly attempted to put relevant, timely, and meaningful data 
into both the system and the democratic deliberative processes that took 
place at the school, district, and state levels. Specifically, NEI used several 
administrations of the Early Grade Reading Assessment (EGRA)7 as well as 
the Snapshot of School Management Effectiveness (SSME).8 NEI also created 
student and teacher surveys, the EMIS-generated school report cards, and 
a report on teacher allocation and distribution. All of this was done to help 
both decision makers within the system and civil society to know about the 
myriad specific needs at all levels throughout each district in which NEI was 
operating. Moreover, NEI trained both government decision makers and civil 
society on how to act on this data. The former were trained to use the data for 
better and more targeted decision making, planning, and budgeting. The latter 
were trained to deliberate over the data, identify needs, reach a consensus over 
priorities, participate in the development of better plans, and advocate for a 
7 RTI International led the development of the EGRA in partnership with the World Bank and 
USAID; the tool came into widespread use via the USAID Education Data for Decision Making 
(EdData II) project. See Dubeck & Gove (2015) and Gove & Wetterberg (2011).
8 The RTI-developed SSME instruments aid school, district, provincial, or national administrators 
and policy makers in understanding school and classroom contexts. See Crouch (2008) for a 
description of the tool and findings from pilot studies. Like the EGRA, the primary vehicle for 
its dissemination and use has been the EdData II project.
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better match of educational resource supply and educational resource demand 
within the political arena and among administrative decision makers.
At the grassroots level, NEI worked with school-based management 
committees (SBMCs). SBMCs are government-formed entities meant to be 
both a governing and a deliberative body—one in which the educational 
wants and needs of the school and the community that it serves are discussed 
and prioritized in an informed manner. Accordingly, SBMCs are social 
accountability vectors that can, if properly trained and organized, empower 
citizens to play a substantive role within the education sector and to help 
improve overall governance and service delivery. NEI helped make this happen 
in four SBMCs in each of its targeted LGEAs, while UNICEF expanded this 
work to all of the remaining SBMCs in Bauchi and Sokoto. Specifically, NEI 
trained SBMCs to examine all of the data that NEI was producing, and also to 
use the data to assess how well their school was performing and to see where 
their school stood across a number of indicators relative to other schools in 
the district. This “transparency of information” enabled the SBMCs to see what 
their relative strengths and weaknesses were vis-à-vis government-led service 
delivery. NEI also trained SBMCs to use the data to prioritize their needs and 
then to (1) address those priority needs locally and/or (2) inject those needs 
into democratic forums where the SBMCs believed decisions could be made 
around targeting the supply of resources to the citizen-expressed demand for 
how those resources should be used. 
With regard to addressing those educational needs locally, NEI supported 
the SBMCs and the schools in the development of school improvement plans. 
These plans often called for various types of community support—such as 
in-kind labor, donations of materials or equipment, and money—and much 
support of this nature was, in fact, mobilized as a result of these plans. The 
problem, however, was that the communities themselves could address only 
a small fraction of the needs plaguing their school. Furthermore, the schools 
had scant government resources and little authority to address these needs. 
This being the case, NEI initially supported the SBMCs to advocate for 
their school’s priorities through the local government system—especially in 
those districts where the USAID Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy, and 
Development (LEAD) project also was operating.9 As explained by A. G. Rodd 
9 LEAD (2009–2016), managed by RTI for USAID, was designed to strengthen local governments 
to forge relations with communities and improve management of services; increase 
transparency through participatory budgeting and monitoring; strengthen CSOs for service 
planning, budgeting, and monitoring; and improve delivery of such local government services 
as water and sanitation. It is the subject of another of the case studies in this book (Chapter 8).
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(personal communication, May 5, 2015), this route was initially chosen in large 
part to take advantage of LEAD’s similar aims regarding local governance in 
Bauchi and Sokoto: matching the supply of government resources to citizen-
expressed demand. 
NEI developed the capacity of the SBMCs to express their needs in the 
ward-level deliberative process. Specifically, NEI trained SBMC members on 
how the ward deliberative process operated and how, within it, to inject the 
needs of the school. Once the SBMCs had expressed these needs within the 
ward deliberative process, the requests would, theoretically, work their way 
up to the area-level deliberative process, where area-wide issues (inclusive of 
the ward-level issues) were discussed and priorities were set; and then would 
be passed on to the district-level deliberative process taking place within the 
local council, where district-wide cross-sector issues would be discussed and 
decisions made over priorities and how funds would be spent. The intent was 
to have citizen demands for how resources should be used expressed within all 
the decision making arenas. 
This local government 
deliberative pathway, however, 
accessed only a subset of funds 
that a school could use to address 
its needs—that is, funds for water 
and sanitation facilities, classroom 
construction, rehabilitation, and 
material provision. In order for 
local governments to gain access 
to potential additional funds that 
they could use for building new 
schools, refurbishing classrooms, 
adding a junior secondary school 
classroom block to a primary school, 
employing new teachers, training 
teachers, supplying materials, 
and supplying welfare packages, 
another “deliberative” pathway had 
to be forged within the education 
system (see Figure 3). To amplify 
the voice of the schools within this 
Figure 3. Pathways for deliberation of 
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new pathway, NEI developed its most significant piece of social accountability 
work: the Community Education Forums (CEFs). The next section describes 
the CEFs in detail.
Community Education Forums
NEI established and supported the CEFs in every NEI district (R. D. 
Warrick, personal communication, April 15, 2015). Their purpose was to 
give stakeholders in primary education an opportunity to come together 
and raise issues of concern in planning and delivering high-quality primary 
education within their districts.10 It was anticipated that the CEFs’ sharing of 
NEI-generated information about schools and schooling in a democratically 
deliberative manner would help to improve local planning and resource 
allocation, promote public participation in education, and provide an 
opportunity to monitor and evaluate governmental resource-allocation 
decisions. The CEFs were, then, another way to facilitate matching the supply 
of government educational resources to citizen-expressed demand.
The CEFs involved a series of formalized meetings, usually two to four 
each year, between the LGEA and Bauchi/Sokoto State officials on one hand 
and community members on the other hand, who had a stake in the quality of 
education and the school system. The CEFs therefore brought together all the 
relevant stakeholders in education within a given community with a view to 
addressing the following issues, as per the CEF guidelines: 
• Identify problems affecting primary education in the area.
• Deliberate over prioritizing those problems.
• Deliberate over possible solutions to those problems.
• Reach a democratic agreement over how best to approach the problem.
• Seek the resources needed to address those problems.
Civil society membership in a CEF was upwards of 120 people, with 
representation of all facets of community life: business leaders, politicians, 
traditional leaders, religious leaders, community leaders, artisans, males, 
10 In terms of support, NEI paid for the food and participant transport for two community forums 
(approximately 100 people per forum), but this proved to be unsustainable. By the end of the 
project, the forums were being subsidized by the LGEA (food), with participants self-funding 
transport. A few participants who traveled long distances were given funding by wealthy 
members of the Local Implementation Committee. In Bauchi, costs were supposed to be paid 
by the Social Welfare Department of the SUBEB, but the funds were never budgeted or released.
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females, NGOs, boys, girls, the elderly, etc. The CEF elected a subset of 
its membership to the Local Implementation Committee (LIC), which 
was initially formed to oversee local plan implementation but which soon 
morphed into an organization that represented the CEF to the government 
and the local government councils. Through an open election process, the 
forum members nominated and then voted on LIC membership. The LICs 
were composed largely of people who either came to the CEF as citizens but 
who, as professionals, worked for the government; or retired public servants. 
Based on anecdotal evidence, these people were seen as natural candidates 
for election to the LICs because of their presumed understanding of how the 
system functioned, administratively and politically. Each LIC had about 10 
members, one of whom acted as a chair (A. G. Rodd, personal communication, 
May 5, 2015). 
Through the CEF and LIC, NEI forged a deliberative advocacy link between 
the schools and the LGEA, with a pathway similar to the one created between 
the SBMC and LGA in the local government apparatus. As shown in Figure 
3, along the education path, SBMCs formulated plans and needs that they 
shared with the CEFs. The CEFs discussed and prioritized these needs and 
plans. Next, the LIC shared the plans with LGEAs in an attempt to influence 
their decision making, such that resource supply might better address resource 
demand. Along the local government path, the same thing was done, albeit 
through a different set of actors. By activating both paths, NEI was trying 
to get civil society to tap two sets of district-level resources—those flowing 
through the local government system and those flowing through the education 
system.
However, it soon became apparent that the neither the LGA nor the LGEA 
had the money to address the needs expressed through the local government 
path or the education path. Nor did they have much say over the resources 
allocated by the state. The fact was that state-level politics prescribed how 
these allocated resources would be spent, in spite of decentralization—a 
clear indication that, while the federal government might have prescribed 
decentralization, there was little political will to fully implement it, a situation 
referred to as incomplete decentralization. For decentralization to be complete, 
actors at all levels must have not only the authority to make various decisions, 
but also the funds to act on those decisions. Moreover, those decisions should 
be aligned to the needs of the people in the jurisdiction within which the 
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decisions are being made, and those making and acting on those decisions 
ideally should be accountable to that same jurisdiction.
The situation in both Bauchi and Sokoto was such that state-level decision 
makers tied up the money that was intended for the districts. By way of 
example, because road construction yields significant political benefit to 
many politicians, a sizable amount of local-level funding was directed to 
road construction. According to state decision makers, roads would better 
link, say, three districts to each other and to the state center, and because this 
involved three districts, the matter became an inter-district issue that required 
state intervention. The allocation of teachers, decisions regarding which 
teachers would be trained, and the use of classroom construction and school 
rehabilitation money also had political benefits; consequently, the districts 
proved not to have much say over these matters, either.
After much discussion with the CEFs about the state governments’ 
dominance over funding decisions, the CEFs asked NEI if it would help them 
form a State CEF (S-CEF). This was done in both Bauchi and Sokoto. The 
S-CEF was composed of the 10-person LICs from each CEF. The fundamental 
role of the S-CEF was to interact directly with the State Universal Basic 
Education Board, the major actor in basic education at the state level, and to 
lobby it for resources to be allocated as expressed by the CEFs it represented. 
Initially, the SUBEB relayed to the S-CEFs only information about what the 
SUBEB had asked the federal government for in terms of budget figures and 
the numbers driving them: the number of teachers they asked to be trained, 
the number of classrooms they asked to be built, and the number of schools 
they asked to have refurbished. 
The S-CEF took this information back to the CEFs and, through the 
CEFs, worked out which teachers at which schools would be trained, which 
classrooms at which schools would be built, and which schools would be 
refurbished. To do this, the CEFs used all of the data and information that 
NEI had gathered. Also, the S-CEF and the CEFs devised a way to allocate the 
resources across the districts that was agreeable to all. There was a fair amount 
of “horse trading” going on, and although the determinants were somewhat 
opaque, the jurisdictions themselves dictated who would get what, and it was a 
highly deliberative process that led to detailed district allocations that all actors 
felt were correct and fair. 
Once the final universal basic education budget was approved and the 
SUBEB knew exactly what it could do with the money, the S-CEFs took their 
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detailed allocations to the SUBEB and asked that it be spent in the manner 
prescribed by the CEFs. However, in the end, the SUBEB chose not to address 
those prescriptions. Instead, it chose which teachers to train and where to 
build classrooms and refurbish schools. This effectively put a stop to much of 
the planning and progress that NEI had so carefully laid out. 
Nevertheless, in Bauchi, by the time NEI came to an end, the SUBEB was 
targeting some resources according to S-CEF prescriptions. This change can 
be attributed to the fact that the S-CEF intervened in a teachers’ strike. The 
S-CEF included a teachers’ union representative, a retired civil servant, and 
a representative of the Emir of Bauchi. Acting on behalf of the children, they 
called a meeting of the government, teachers, and politicians and insisted 
on a compromise. Their dedication gained the S-CEF respect and “a sense of 
obligation” on the part of the SUBEB chairman, who was then more willing to 
listen to their requests. Also in Bauchi, the S-CEF members asked the SUBEB 
to tell them exactly where classroom construction and school rehabilitation 
were to be carried out so that the CEFs could monitor the work and hold 
the building contractors accountable. However, when the CEFs reported 
delays and other implementation concerns to the SUBEB, the SUBEB did not 
respond, again dispiriting the CEFs. In the end, most CEFs morphed into 
district-level fundraising organizations (RTI International, 2012), which then 
channeled the money to schools in need, as per the decisions made within 
the CEFs. 
NEI and Social Accountability Outcomes
Although NEI did much to further the social accountability aim of improved 
government service delivery by (1) giving civil society an informed seat at the 
MTSS table and (2) supporting the efforts to make the government supply 
of resources better meet citizen-expressed demand for how those resources 
should be used, in the end, little changed in this regard—in other words, 
government service delivery did not improve much. The fact is that civil 
society’s voice was not well heard within the MTSS process, and state-level 
decision makers paid little heed to the demands that percolated up from the 
schools and districts. 
Education service delivery in Nigeria is poor because the political economy 
within which the education system operates is replete with very powerful 
actors whose primary interests do not align well with improved education 
service delivery. And while NEI might have made these actors more aware 
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of the needs, wants, and demands of the people as they related to improved 
education service delivery, decision-makers were not impelled to address their 
demands, largely because the people making the demands were not powerful. 
Sustainability of Interventions and Outcomes 
This is not to say that NEI did not succeed in achieving the social 
accountability aim of citizen empowerment. It did, to some extent. NEI 
trained a lot of citizens, taught them how to advocate, and created civil society 
structures in which citizens could examine information, deliberate over 
needs, prioritize needs, develop plans, and inject those needs and plans into 
the decision making machinery of Nigeria. But was this truly empowerment? 
A well-informed seat at the MTSS table must be closely tethered to real and 
substantial political-economic power if the voice at that informed seat is to 
be heard. So too, the wants, needs, and demands of the people who want 
improved education service delivery must be closely tethered to substantive 
political-economic power, else those voices will not be heard. 
In many countries, the voices of teachers’ unions are heard because they 
have significant political-economic power. They can represent hundreds of 
thousands of potential voters, who can go out on strike if need be. Moreover, 
teachers’ union actors are adept at playing the political-economic game and 
they have the financial resources to play it well. Civil society organizations, 
parents of school-age children, and ordinary citizens who want improved 
education service delivery struggle to generate the same amount of leverage, 
which proved to be a challenge to sustaining social accountability efforts in 
the NEI case. When a donor-supported social accountability effort comes to 
an end without having generated concrete results (or without an institutional 
actor supported by a financing mechanism to expand upon nascent changes 
over time), citizens become dispirited, donor-initiated structures may morph 
into fundraising organizations, and the status quo prevails. 
It is clear that donor-supported social accountability projects wield some 
political-economic force; witness all that was accomplished under NEI. But 
also witness what was not accomplished: government service delivery was 
not much improved. If citizen empowerment is a fundamental aim of social 
accountability, it must come wrapped in more than training and fleeting 
structures. To persist, these structures must connect to mechanisms of 
genuine, sizable, and sustainable political-economic power in the arenas within 
which demands for improved government service delivery are being made. 
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Social Accountability in Health Facilities:  
The Twubakane Decentralization and  




Implemented between 2005 and 2010, the Rwanda Twubakane 
Decentralization and Health Program, funded by the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), intended to strengthen the country’s 
decentralization efforts, improve responsiveness to local needs, and promote 
sustainable use of high-quality health services (Brinkerhoff et al., 2009). The 
ultimate goal was to “increase access to and the quality and use of family health 
services in health facilities and communities by strengthening the capacity 
of local governments, health facilities and communities to ensure improved 
health service delivery at decentralized levels” (IntraHealth International, 
2010, p. 6).
IntraHealth International led a team of partners that included RTI 
International, Tulane University, the Rwandese Association of Local 
Government Authorities, EngenderHealth, VNG (Netherlands International 
Cooperation Agency), and Pro-Femmes (IntraHealth International, 2006). 
All of the Twubakane documentation went to great lengths to emphasize 
that all project activities were carried out in partnership with the Rwandan 
government as well, represented by the Ministry of Local Government and the 
Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé, or MINISANTE; see Brinkerhoff et 
al., 2009; IntraHealth International 2006, 2009e, 2010). Twubakane received 
US$28,379,327 from USAID, and leveraged an additional US$6,491,899 in 
Note: RTI colleagues Derick Brinkerhoff, Anna Wetterberg, and Catherine Fort contributed 
helpful comments, insights to project operations, and access to project documents. The 
narrative and analysis in this chapter represent the views of the author alone and are focused 
on Twubakane’s approach to social accountability. They do not reflect the program’s overall 
achievements.
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cost share, resulting in a total project effort of US$34,871,226 (IntraHealth 
International, 2010).
Twubakane’s overall strategies were to improve capacity to offer services 
at decentralized levels; and to provide selective support for improving health 
and decentralization policies, protocols, and strategy guidelines at the central 
level. The program worked closely with ministries and other partners to 
invest in nationally adopted manuals and programs, and supported the use of 
those materials in Twubakane-supported districts (IntraHealth International, 
2006). Twubakane had three broad types of activities that worked across six 
integrated components (see Figure 4).
*Mutuelles: Community-based health insurance scheme
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Twubakane featured one particular intervention within the “community 
engagement and oversight” activity—highlighted in a different shade in 
Figure 4—that was a social accountability intervention: Partenariat pour 
l’Amélioration de la Qualité (PAQs), or Community Partnerships for Quality 
Improvement. (Other community 
engagement and oversight interventions 
concentrated on strengthening 
MINISANTE management tools, 
integrating community-level data into 
national data systems, and strengthening 
the capacity of community health 
workers.) Therefore, this case study 
focuses on this one component of the 
project. 
While Twubakane was originally 
designed to work in four provinces—
Gikongoro, Gitarama, Kibungo, and 
Kigali City—Rwanda reformed its 
territory and reorganized its provinces 
into 30 districts before the project began 
implementation. To adapt to this change, 
Twubakane proposed focusing in 12 of the 30 districts in Rwanda (see box), 
which aligned closely with the original four provinces that had been selected 
(IntraHealth International, 2006).
In 2000, the Rwandan government began implementing a three-phased 
decentralization strategy. Phase 1, which lasted from 2000 to 2003, focused 
on devolving functions and responsibilities, supporting legislation and policy 
reforms, and designing intergovernmental transfers. Phase 2, 2004–2010, 
strengthened districts11 and local resource management and mobilization, 
participatory planning, and the design of accountability mechanisms. The 
final phase, 2011–2015, was to decentralize functions to the sector level and 
below, and expand and deepen local citizen participation and accountability 
(Brinkerhoff et al., 2009).
As Twubakane was starting up in 2005, Rwanda had entered the second 
phase of decentralization, which involved all levels of government receiving 
11 Rwanda’s subnational government structure now consists of provinces, districts, cities, 
municipalities, towns, sectors, and cells.












Ruhango, Southern Province 
Source: IntraHealth International, 2006.
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new roles and responsibilities. For the health sector, this meant that health 
districts became part of administrative districts, and district health officials 
began to report to locally elected officials (IntraHealth International, 2009a). 
All administrative levels, from national to the community (umudugudu), 
became responsible for ensuring the delivery of high-quality health care 
services (IntraHealth International, 2009a).
 Citizen engagement and participation have played important roles in the 
Rwandan government’s unity and reconciliation agenda. Brinkerhoff et al. 
(2009, p. 6) explained how Rwanda practices citizen engagement:
Rwanda’s Government of National Unity has operationalized citizen 
participation through decentralized consultations for needs assessment and 
planning at a variety of levels. Participatory planning is a hallmark of district 
development plans, which build from bottom-up consultations at the cell 
and sector levels. As with the imihigo,12 traditional community practices 
and structures have been incorporated into governance and service delivery. 
These include: 1) umusanzu, the notion of voluntary social contribution to 
the public good; 2) ubudehe, originally the practice of shared cultivation of 
an individual community member’s fields, which has been adapted to frame 
cell-level, poverty-focused project development to feed into district plans and 
is the most used practice for soliciting citizen input into local and district 
plans; 3) umuganda, community public works teams that contribute labor 
and materials for repair, maintenance and/or construction of infrastructure; 
and 4) gacaca, a traditional justice and dispute resolution mechanism that has 
been adapted to help deal with the large numbers of genocide crimes through 
fostering community reconciliation and mediation. 
While Rwanda emphasizes citizen engagement, it faces common challenges 
such as skill levels, resources for citizen engagement, citizen knowledge of 
rights and avenues for engagement, motivation to engage, and access to 
decision making processes, including political connections (Brinkerhoff et al., 
2009). Further, participation in Rwanda is largely state-driven, and space for 
civil society to initiate dialogue or exchange with the government is limited 
(Brinkerhoff et al., 2009). The Rwandan government circumscribes a specific 
role for citizen participation, and there is little to no deviation from that role. 
This heavy-handed approach to citizen participation undermines spontaneous 
or unanticipated feedback from citizens.
12 Imihigo is a customary practice in Rwanda where “groups or individuals would make public 
commitments to particular actions and then strive to live up to their pledges, with failure being 
associated with shame and dishonor” (Brinkerhoff et al., 2009, p. 5).
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The Rwandan government sees citizen engagement as critical to achieving 
universal health care. Citizen engagement is captured in the government’s 
Health Sector Policy (Government of Rwanda, 2005), which calls for the 
expansion of the partnership model for improving community quality in 
the context of strengthening supervisory systems at facility and community 
levels (Government of Rwanda, 2005). PAQ was first introduced in Rwanda 
as a part of the USAID-funded global project PRIME II (Improving the 
Performance of Primary Providers in Reproductive Health, 1999–2004). The 
PAQ system was seen as serving a key role in mobilizing communities to 
participate in new initiatives (IntraHealth International, 2009a). Further, the 
National Community Health Policy, which was adopted in 2008, calls for the 
population to actively participate in program planning and implementation. 
It recommends streamlining many community-based interventions into one, 
which would use the same training strategies, curricula, and incentive schemes 
(IntraHealth International, 2009a).
General Social Accountability Approach
Twubakane addressed both supply and demand sides of social accountability—
building the capacity of government officials to listen, engage with, and 
respond to community concerns while creating new and expanding existing 
windows for citizens to directly engage with government. With an entire 
project component dedicated to community engagement and oversight, 
Twubakane had several activities focused on improving linkages between 
the health sector and citizens. These activities included open house and 
accountability days during which district and senior government officials 
would open their doors to anyone to come into their offices to ask any 
questions. Twubakane also worked to strengthen communication regarding 
important health messages through mass media and to obtain citizen feedback, 
primarily through radio shows. Twubakane also expanded the PAQ system to 
all health centers in the 12 project districts. 
PAQ Approach
The PAQ approach, developed by Save the Children/US in the mid-1990s, was 
designed to leverage community participation to assess quality and improve 
health service delivery (IntraHealth International, 2009a). The approach is 
based on the premise that not all health sector stakeholders define “quality” 
the same way (IntraHealth International, 2009a). It therefore presumes that 
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strengthening the communication 
between communities and their 
providers will improve service 
delivery and quality, and finally 
increase utilization as perceived 
quality issues are addressed 
(IntraHealth International, 2009a, p. 
6). In short, “Ideally, an effective PAQ 
committee would raise the standard 
of care, as defined by the community 
and other stakeholders, so that poor 
quality of services is no longer an 
impediment to health center use” 
(IntraHealth International, 2009a, pp. 
6–7).
PAQ teams were established at 
each health center within Twubakane’s 
implementation area. They improved 
health center services by bringing 
together community representatives, 
local leaders, and health center 
medical providers and managers 
(Brinkerhoff et al., 2009). By the 
end of the project, there were 133 
PAQ teams composed of anywhere 
from 15 to 25 people (IntraHealth 
International, 2009a, 2010). The box at right lists the types of representatives 
who could serve on a PAQ team (IntraHealth International, 2009a). 
Once established, PAQ teams developed a team definition of service quality 
and then used this definition to prioritize key quality gaps at the health center. 
PAQ teams then communicated the changes they sought to health center staff, 
sector administrative staff, or district authorities, who were then responsible 
for determining what to address. As health centers implemented changes, 
PAQ teams informed community members while promoting the use of health 
center services. PAQ teams also held community meetings to gather ongoing 
suggestions from community members and to mobilize communities when 
needed (IntraHealth International, 2009a).
Potential PAQ Team Members 
Community Representatives
• Community health workers
• School administrators
• Church members
• Staff of local nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs)
• Police
• People living with HIV
• Private-sector health workers
• Traditional healers
Health Center Representatives
• Health center staff
• Health center manager†
• Health committee managers
• Health insurance managers
Sector Representatives
• Executive secretary
• Manager of social affairs
• National Youth Council coordinator
• National Women’s Council coordinator
† Health center manager was always a member.
Source: IntraHealth International (2009a), p. 7.
 Social Accountability in Health Facilities 53
As a result of this process, PAQ teams were both compliance focused 
and coproduction focused.13 The approach was designed to improve service 
delivery by increasing citizen participation (empowerment purpose); the 
PAQ teams provided oversight and identified solutions at health centers 
(governance purpose and service delivery purpose). Because PAQ teams were 
community-driven, they carried out a range of activities, including several that 
could be classified as focusing on empowerment, such as establishing local-
level task forces to talk about family planning with communities; talking about 
decentralization, nutrition, family planning, and malaria on radio programs; 
and conducting community outreach to address vaccinations, gender-based 
violence, and prenatal care and delivery (Brinkerhoff et al., 2009). 
Some PAQ teams also held meetings with external stakeholder groups at 
which they shared information about their activities, and in at least one case 
they helped to coordinate development activities so as to prevent duplication 
of effort (IntraHealth International, 2009a).
PAQ teams also came to address service delivery through their oversight 
activities. As each PAQ team went through an exercise to define quality, they 
identified the different perspectives that providers and community members 
had of service quality (IntraHealth International, 2009a). Providers primarily 
looked to medical outcomes to define quality, while community members 
looked to cleanliness, comfort, staff reception, and timeliness. To this end, 
PAQ activities generated feedback on staff behavior, reduced staff absenteeism, 
advocated for greater amounts of resources and staff in health center budgets, 
and improved facility cleanliness (Brinkerhoff et al., 2009).
Implementation of PAQ Approach
Twubakane was designed to improve service delivery by developing capacity, 
which included national and community-level strategies. The PAQ approach 
supported and complemented the implementation of activities at both levels: 
citizens were engaged in order to ensure that the services that Twubakane 
targeted were important for health facility clients and that there was a 
community able and ready to hold facilities accountable. As mentioned 
earlier, the PAQ approach, with its inherent design to address perceived and 
13 For an explanation of the various types of social accountability purposes (service delivery, 
governance and democracy, and empowerment) and actions (transparency, coproduction, 
compliance, confrontation) described in these case studies, refer to “Framing Social 
Accountability” in Chapter 2.
54  Chapter 4
real quality issues at the local level, was first introduced in Rwanda by the 
PRIME II project (2001), which worked with Save the Children to adapt the 
methodology for the Rwandan context. The approach was further expanded 
under the USAID Access, Quality, and Use in Reproductive Health Project 
(ACQUIRE) project, and finally was included in the design of Twubakane 
(IntraHealth International, 2009a). Under Twubakane, the PAQ approach was 
expected to “increase community participation in planning and management 
of health care and health care facilities at the local level” (IntraHealth 
International, 2008a). 
Establishing a PAQ Team
To establish a PAQ team, Twubakane followed the methodology that had 
been used under PRIME II/Rwanda and supported five broad stages that were 
designed to bridge the often large gap between community members and 
providers:
1. Adapt PAQ approach to community needs.
2. Identify support from the MINISANTE, health districts, and the 
community. 
3. Hold community meetings with women, men, and youth groups to 
obtain different perspectives of quality. 
4. Convene a workshop to bring people from the community and providers 
together to discuss what quality means for each group, and how the 
definitions are different. 
5. Establish the PAQ team. A group of Twubakane staff, in partnership with 
community leaders and MINISANTE representatives, established the 
PAQ team by electing providers and community members to identify 
problems and solutions (IntraHealth International, n.d.-a, n.d.-b).
Health center staff and management perspectives of the approach were 
mixed. Nine out of 12 sites that were assessed in a 2009 study cited how 
improved provider interactions with clients resulted in clients returning for 
additional services. Staff and managers stated that the PAQ teams made their 
jobs easier and harder—the PAQ teams motivated staff and managers to do 
their jobs better, yet the resulting increase in service demand resulted in higher 
workloads for all levels of workers (IntraHealth International, 2009a).
Once the teams were established, Twubakane quarterly reports revealed a 
variety of technical assistance and support provided to the teams. Twubakane 
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worked with district hospitals to identify mentors/supervisors, who were 
health center supervisors, for each PAQ team. The mentors/supervisors 
received training from Twubakane in how to improve the efficacy and 
sustainability of the PAQ teams. After the training, these mentors/supervisors 
became responsible for supporting their health center’s PAQ team (IntraHealth 
International, 2008a, 2008b). Further, Twubakane, in collaboration with 
authorities from the district and district hospitals, conducted supervision visits 
to the health centers whose mentors/supervisors had recently been trained 
to ensure that the mentors/supervisors were providing adequate support 
(IntraHealth International, 2008a). 
Twubakane also held exchange workshops—which included PAQ team 
members and representatives from the relevant district hospitals, health 
centers, and district and sector offices—to review PAQ team activities, 
accomplishments, challenges, and sustainability strategies. At the workshops, 
hospital and district staff identified PAQ teams that needed “restructuring, 
reanimation and supervision,” which is discussed below (IntraHealth 
International, 2008c). 
Throughout the project, Twubakane provided technical assistance to PAQ 
teams on family planning, child survival, mutuelles, and the development of 
income-generating activities (IntraHealth International, 2008c). Twubakane 
also convened coordination meetings for supervisors and PAQ members to 
share their quarterly operational plans and to exchange information with local 
health structures on the sustainability of their activities. Participants indicated 
that these coordination meetings were helpful in their efforts to overcome PAQ 
team operational challenges (IntraHealth International, 2008c).
Community Partnership for Quality Improvement (PAQ) Team Activities
Once established, PAQ teams undertook many different activities, primarily 
through subcommittees that were established for specific tasks, to influence 
change at their respective health facility. Their roles included lobbying for 
directives, advocating for funds, making specific proposals for new rules 
and systems, and calling for specific staff to be reprimanded when found in 
violation of health facility regulations and guidelines. PAQ teams also focused 
on particular technical areas, such as increasing the use of family planning and 
safe motherhood services, enrolling in mutuelles, and teaching about personal 
and food hygiene (IntraHealth International, 2009a). PAQs that sought to 
mobilize community members primarily conducted “group sensitization 
activities, household visits, and team members serving as good examples to 
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the community” (IntraHealth International 2010, p. 49). PAQ teams developed 
subcommittees that were responsible for specific efforts, such as developing 
income-generating activities, obtaining external financing, and overseeing 
building renovations or improvements.
Both local governments and PAQ teams were eligible to apply for 
Twubakane’s district incentive fund grants to fund activities, and some PAQ 
teams did so to fund minor operating expenses or to initiate microprojects 
such as income-generating activities. District incentive fund grants in the 
amount of 500,000 to 1.3 million Rwandan francs were available for each 
PAQ team (IntraHealth International, 2009a), and they were applied to a 
range of uses such as training and building capacity for community health 
workers, improving household nutrition by building vegetable gardens and 
raising livestock, and instituting income-generating activities to support PAQ 
operations (Brinkerhoff et al., 2009). 
Some PAQ teams that were afflicted by low participation were “relaunched,” 
which included redefining the purpose and objectives of the PAQ approach 
and roles and responsibilities of the PAQ team. It was reported that low 
participation, when it occurred, was a result of not having funds for basic 
operational costs. Further, while PAQ team members were meant to be 
volunteers, members often felt that they should have been paid for their time 
and effort. In these cases, stakeholders who had been active in the previous 
PAQ team were asked to elect a new PAQ team and board (IntraHealth 
International, 2009c).
Implementation Challenges
Like any intervention, the PAQ approach faced implementation challenges.
• Team participation. Several districts experienced difficulty generating 
team participation, primarily defined as meeting minimum attendance 
standards. PAQ members cited a lack of remuneration for team 
members’ time at the meetings and travel to and from the meetings 
as an impediment to their participation in PAQ meetings. PAQ teams 
also found it difficult to find meeting space. PAQ members also wanted 
funding for an operational budget and special projects. When attempts 
were made to restructure the teams, it was difficult to actually remove the 
inactive PAQ team members, despite their being replaced (IntraHealth 
International, 2009a; 2010).
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• Community mobilization. In some districts it was difficult to mobilize the 
community and build the relationship between the community and 
health facilities (IntraHealth International, 2008a). Not only were some 
community members simply not interested in PAQ activities, there 
were also cultural barriers such as religious leaders who were opposed 
to family planning, traditional birth attendants who did not want to 
refer women to health centers to give birth, and men who refused to 
get tested for HIV (IntraHealth International, 2009a, p. 18). Another 
area of concern was that communities were discouraged when health 
center staff did not act on proposals from the PAQ teams (IntraHealth 
International, 2009a).
• Lack of training in technical areas. PAQ members also felt that if they 
were meant to be a link between health facilities and communities, 
they needed ongoing training on health content so they could speak 
competently to the community’s health concerns, such as family 
planning, health-seeking behavior, assisted delivery, and management of 
income-generating activities (IntraHealth International, 2009a).
Effects of the PAQ Approach to Promote Social Accountability
The PAQ approach was designed to contribute to the sixth project component 
(community engagement and oversight), whose broad goal was to “increase 
community access to, participation in and ownership of health services” 
(IntraHealth International, 2008a, p. 13). The broad goal for the PAQ 
approach was to support “increased community participation in planning 
and management of health care and health care facilities at the local level” 
(IntraHealth International 2008a, p. 13). In other words, because the PAQ 
approach was designed to contribute to this project component, the project’s 
data collection efforts focused on tracking the number of established and 
active PAQ teams. By the end of Twubakane, in October 2009, 98 percent 
of the 136 health centers in Twubakane’s districts had a PAQ team. Eighty-
five percent of the health centers had a PAQ team that reported having 
met at least once in the previous six months, and 71 percent of the health 
centers had a PAQ team that had met in the past three months (IntraHealth 
International, 2010). 
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The project did not evaluate the impact of the PAQ approach on 
empowerment, service delivery, or governance and democracy. However, a 
2009 assessment found that the PAQ approach resulted in improvements in 
all three of those social accountability aims (see Table 5 and Brinkerhoff et al., 
2009). The same assessment found that with governance and democracy and 
empowerment, the PAQ approach’s primary impact was on citizen voice, and it 
had secondary impacts on responsiveness and accountability. As confirmed in 
a project document:
A total of 114 of the PAQ teams (86%) have influenced some kind of 
change to health services or infrastructure. Of those, 64 teams influenced 
improvements to the quality of services (e.g., interaction with clients, respect 
of health care norms, etc.); 49 influenced improvements to hygiene and 
sanitation within health centers; and 37 influenced the restructuring of staff 
(e.g., recruitment, removing of ineffectual personnel, etc.). (IntraHealth 
International, 2010, p. 48)
Table 5. Summary of effects of PAQ approach to promote social accountability
Type of effect Examples
Service organization and 
delivery
Improved provider/client relationship, punctuality of health 
facility staff, and health facility ownership over tasks
Governance and democracy Creation of formal mechanism for citizen engagement in 
health facility governance
Empowerment Feeling of empowerment among PAQ team members; 
pride in their work serving the community
PAQ = Partenariat pour l’Amélioration de la Qualité, or Community Partnerships for Quality Improvement
To identify any impacts on health status, a 2009 internal project assessment 
looked at three key indicators: number of deliveries attended by a skilled 
professional, number of children under 12 months of age receiving diphtheria-
pertussis-tetanus (DPT3) vaccinations, and number of antenatal care visits. 
While there was an upward trend in these indicators at the health facilities with 
PAQ teams, it is difficult to attribute this to the PAQ teams because the trends 
were already rising, and no comparison study was done in areas without PAQ 
teams (IntraHealth International, 2009a). For example, there was an upward 
trend in the number of attended infant deliveries throughout the Twubakane 
districts, but the study implementers did not know the total number of babies 
delivered in each community (IntraHealth International, 2009a). 
PAQ effectiveness was not rated consistently. For example, while PAQ team 
members cited improvements in health center hygiene and cleanliness, fewer 
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than half of general community members thought that PAQ activities resulted 
in infrastructure and hygiene improvements (IntraHealth International, 
2009a). However, health center personnel and sector administrators who were 
not PAQ team members noted several changes in infrastructure resulting 
from PAQ work, including additional rooms for consultations, cafeterias, new 
furniture and equipment, and improved hygiene. Staff noted many of the same 
things, while also commenting on the PAQ teams’ role in educating patients 
about clinic and personal hygiene (IntraHealth International, 2009a). 
There was agreement among PAQ team members, community members, 
health center personnel, sector administrators, and district representatives that 
PAQ teams impacted service organization and delivery, including improved 
reception of health center clients, personnel punctuality, relations between 
providers and patients, and health center ownership over tasks. District 
representatives went further, stating that PAQ teams were critical in helping 
to solve service delivery problems and guaranteeing provider accountability 
(IntraHealth International, 2009a). Here we are beginning to see the impact 
that the PAQ approach had on governance and democracy: health centers 
being held accountable to the communities they were meant to serve.
PAQ team members reported that participating in the PAQ team 
empowered team members and the communities they served. The manager of 
one health center, a PAQ team member, said, “The PAQ approach has made 
my work a lot easier, and also made me proud of the good work and great 
results” (IntraHealth International, 2009e, p. 33). PAQ team members thought 
the relationships among the community, health center, and the sector were 
much stronger, allowing the community to work together to resolve problems 
at health centers. Improvements in governance and democracy were evidenced 
by team members in a majority of sites recognizing an “‘improved climate of 
partnership’ and two-way dialogue between health centers and communities” 
(IntraHealth International, 2009a, p. 24). Sector and district representatives 
noted the “advantages of having a system in place to ‘coordinate’ community–
government communications” (IntraHealth International, 2009a, p. 25). 
Further, health center staff and managers acknowledged the important 
role that PAQ team members began to play in community outreach and 
education. Their outreach efforts were credited with increasing demand, and 
improving health center credibility among community members. One PAQ 
committee member said, “We educated the surrounding community and 
most especially . . . pregnant women to consider the health center as their first 
choice for delivering their babies” (IntraHealth International, 2009a, p. 25).
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However, PAQ teams were not a panacea. Community members who 
used facilities with PAQ teams cited the following challenges: physical 
environment (meaning cleanliness and the comfort of waiting areas; 60 percent 
of respondents to the 2009 assessment) and client wait times (33 percent of 
respondents). In many locations, community members commented about the 
need for staff to observe posted hours of service (IntraHealth International, 
2009a). 
Sustainability of Interventions and Outcomes
In a quarterly report (IntraHealth International, 2009d), Twubakane 
implementers reported they saw positive signs that the PAQ approach would 
continue to be implemented after Twubakane’s termination. Some of these 
signs included the high percentage of active PAQ teams, the fact that PAQ 
teams had specific action plans and had meetings to review them, and the 
commitment expressed by district authorities in several districts to continue 
district-level support to the PAQ teams (IntraHealth International, 2009d). 
At the time that Twubakane was being implemented, there was interest 
within the Rwandan government to implement the PAQ approach nationally 
and sustain it. In 2006, MINISANTE identified the importance of community 
engagement in achieving health goals (Government of Rwanda, 2005). Service 
and district representatives were supportive of the PAQ approach, recognizing 
improvements in service organization, service delivery, and accountability 
(IntraHealth International, 2009a). PAQ team members identified several key 
areas that needed to be addressed: funding for operations, funding for health 
center improvements that PAQs recommended, and training for PAQ team 
members (IntraHealth International, 2009a). Beginning in 2008, Twubakane 
shifted from a focus on establishing PAQ teams to this issue of sustainability, 
and to institutionalizing the PAQ teams and fostering their sustainability by 
building the capacity of PAQ supervisors (IntraHealth International, 2010).
PAQ team members also suggested that the MINISANTE officially promote 
the PAQ approach both within the government and among its implementing 
partners, that Twubakane and others continue to work with local government 
structures to provide supportive supervision, and that the Rwandan 
government and partners continue to provide technical and financial support 
to PAQ teams (IntraHealth International, 2009b). Some PAQ teams undertook 
activities to address their own sustainability before Twubakane ended, such as 
setting up income-generating activities, requesting member contributions and 
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member support funds, and replacing absent or inactive members (IntraHealth 
International, 2010).
Twubakane itself made recommendations to take into consideration to 
sustain the PAQ approach, in addition to the Rwandan government taking 
a more active role in promoting and supporting the PAQ approach. The 
project called for the MINISANTE, partners, and local government offices to 
work together to address PAQ team member turnover, training needs, and 
mechanisms for covering operating expenses (IntraHealth International, 2010). 
Twubakane also saw the need for PAQ teams to establish strong relationships 
with their local community health workers to improve information sharing 
between community members and community health workers about health 
center services (IntraHealth International, 2010).
With 5 years having passed since Twubakane ended, I tried to confirm 
that the PAQ teams were still operating. However, I was not successful in 
contacting anyone with the follow-on project, the USAID-funded Rwanda 
Family Health Project, implemented by Chemonics International; or the 
Rwandan government. It is possible that the PAQ teams are still in existence 
but have taken on a new name—the Family Health Project provided support 
to 84 members of “quality committees” or “decentralized quality councils” in 
several districts in 2013 (Chemonics International, 2013). 
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the Greater Mekong Region and China
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CHAPTER 5
Project Overview
The United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Health 
Policy Initiative (HPI, http://www.healthpolicyinitiative.com/) was carried 
out by four consortia of implementing partners from 2005 through 2013. 
Among its goals was improving the enabling environment for HIV prevention, 
care, and treatment. As one of the four HPI awardees, RTI International, in 
partnership with the Burnet Institute, carried out a project for the Asia-Pacific 
Region known as the Health Policy Initiative in the Greater Mekong Region 
and China (HPI/GMR-C), from September 2007 to September 2012. Funding 
for HPI/GMR-C came from the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR) under two categories: strategic information, and policy and systems 
strengthening. The project’s total funding was approximately US$5.9 million. 
HPI/GMR-C pursued three objectives (intermediate results, or IRs):
• IR1: Adopt and implement national and local HIV policies, plans, and 
programs, based on international best practice 
• IR2: Develop, strengthen, and support effective public sector and civil 
society champions and networks to assume leadership in the policy 
process 
• IR3: Use timely and accurate data for evidence-based decision making 
The China team consisted of a country director, two policy and advocacy 
specialists, and a finance and administration manager. The team operated from 
Note: The narrative and analysis in this chapter represent the views of the authors alone and are 
focused on HPI/GMR-C’s social accountability interventions. They do not reflect the project’s 
overall achievements..
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Yunnan province. The overall project director (chief of party) was based in 
Bangkok, at the request of USAID.
This case study focuses on the project’s use of social accountability 
mechanisms to achieve its objectives. The discussion covers which social 
accountability approach and mechanisms the project employed, how the 
social accountability interventions were implemented, and what results 
were achieved.14 Our narrative comments on the sustainability of the social 
accountability mechanisms and offers some concluding observations. 
Approximately 70 percent of HPI/GMR-C’s funding and activities were 
targeted at China and about 30 percent at the Greater Mekong Region. This 
case study concentrates on the China portion of the project, which was limited 
largely to two border provinces: Yunnan and Guangxi, which have among the 
highest rates of HIV prevalence in China.
Project Components and Social Accountability
Prior US Government–funded work on HIV prevention, care, and treatment 
had led to the development of a comprehensive prevention package for 
people living with HIV and key affected populations (men who have sex 
with men, injecting drug users, transgender people, and female sex workers). 
The theory of change that informed HPI/GMR-C’s three objectives posited 
that the success of the package in providing HIV prevention, care, and 
treatment for people with HIV and key affected populations would depend 
upon creating and maintaining an enabling environment of laws, policies, 
regulations, and plans supported by sufficient resources, systems, structures, 
and capacities. That enabling environment could be thought of as consisting 
of six key elements: policy and advocacy, community mobilization, stigma 
and discrimination reduction, strategic information, capacity building, and 
livelihood development (see Figure 5). HPI/GMR-C worked on all of these 
except the last one (see Young, 2010, 2012). 
The project’s approach to social accountability was, therefore, focused on 
enhancing both the demand- and supply-side conditions that would facilitate 
positive state-society interactions around HIV prevention, care, and treatment. 
Expected social accountability outcomes concentrated on governance 
(i.e., changes in laws, regulations, policies, and procedures) and empowerment 
14 For an explanation of the various types of social accountability purposes (service delivery, 
governance and democracy, and empowerment) and actions (transparency, coproduction, 
compliance, confrontation) described in these case studies, refer to “Framing Social 
Accountability” in Chapter 2.
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of people with HIV and key affected populations. Service delivery outcomes 
were not explicitly intended, although as the following discussion indicates, 
some improvements in access to services were achieved as a result of the 
project’s social accountability activities.
On the demand side, HPI/GMR-C devoted major effort to building HIV-
related civil society organizations’ (CSOs’) capacities to create a constituency 
among people with HIV and key affected populations, to advocate using data 
and evidence-based arguments, and to interact effectively with public officials. 
To build these capacities, the project used training, mentoring, and a small 
grants program. Demand-side activities targeting IR 2 constituted the core of 
HPI/GMR-C, although the activities related to civil society’s use of data and 
evidence fell under IR 3.
Figure 5. Theory-of-change model for the comprehensive prevention 
package, USAID/China HIV program
MARPs = most-at-risk persons; PLHIV = persons living with HIV; STI = sexually transmitted infection; USAID 
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On the supply side, HPI/GMR-C concentrated on identifying policy and 
regulatory barriers and gaps, as well as operational weaknesses that impeded 
public officials’ capacities to respond to the needs of people with HIV and 
key affected populations and that hampered civil society’s engagement with 
the government. Project activities to address these enabling environment 
issues consisted of policy mapping, institutional and regulatory assessments, 
workshops, and technical assistance to address the findings of the mapping and 
assessment exercises. These activities contributed to IR 1, but to the extent that 
public sector champions for HIV policies and service delivery were identified 
and supported, they facilitated IR 2. Through technical assistance involving 
instruments for collecting and analyzing data, subnational governments 
increased their use of evidence for decision making (IR 3). The primary target 
was the Yunnan provincial government, with lesser focus on Guangxi. Several 
activities extended to other sites in China.
Demand Side: Strengthening Civil Society Capacity for Social 
Accountability and Implementing Advocacy Campaigns 
HPI/GMR-C’s capacity development work began with training workshops for 
people with HIV and key affected population groups. These events covered 
understanding basic advocacy skills, designing and evaluating an advocacy 
campaign, mapping stakeholders, and documenting advocacy issues. Groups 
who successfully completed the training became eligible to compete for the 
small grants that the project offered to enable them to conduct an advocacy 
campaign. Grants were for a duration of up to a year, and over the life of the 
project, a total of 20 grants were awarded in four annual cycles. HPI/GMR-C 
provided mentoring and facilitated three meetings for each grantee during the 
life of the grant: (1) grant kickoff, (2) monitoring and evaluation, and (3) final 
review and lessons learned. 
Grantees pursued advocacy related to seven issues, as illustrated in Table 6. 
Fourteen of the 20 advocacy campaigns were judged by the project team to 
be successful or partially successful. In some cases, the advocacy effort failed 
due to the lack of public sector resources—financial or human—to address the 
issue raised by the civil society organization and not because the campaign 
message was rejected. For example, the Kaiyuan Big Dipper Support Group’s 
advocacy efforts did not result in expanded business hours at methadone 
maintenance treatment clinics because the local government did not have the 
budget to pay for the added costs. However, the positive relationships that were 
established laid the groundwork for future cooperative social accountability.
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Table 6. Health Policy Initiative in the Greater Mekong Region and China  
(HPI/GMR-C) small grants for advocacy
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• Pilot provider-initiated testing 
and counseling 




70  Chapter 5
Table 6. Health Policy Initiative in the Greater Mekong Region and China  
(HPI/GMR-C) small grants for advocacy
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employment training and 
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Source: Adapted from Young (2012).
(continued)
In other cases, outcomes were less than successful because the grantee CSOs 
lacked capacity or faced operational weaknesses. For example, Kaiyuan Hand-
in-Hand Care Home’s grant to advocate for rules to reduce health facilities’ 
refusals to provide services was suspended due to staff performance issues. 
Many of the CSOs working on stigma and discrimination issues on behalf of 
people with HIV and key affected populations were organizationally fragile 
and financially weak.
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Supply Side: Addressing Policy and Regulatory Barriers; 
Strengthening Response Capacity of Local Authorities
Much of HPI/GMR-C’s work on the supply side consisted of operational policy 
assessments. Research teams completed analyses on HIV voluntary counseling 
and testing in Yunnan and Guangxi provinces, methadone maintenance 
treatment in Yunnan, the HIV-related legal environment in Yunnan, the 
regulatory framework for CSOs in Yunnan, and policies and laws affecting 
injecting drug users’ access to services and employment opportunities. Most 
of these studies engaged staff of provincial Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention as partners, which helped to build their capacity in policy analysis 
and research. 
The findings from the studies informed HPI/GMR-C’s technical assistance 
with provincial government entities to help them become more responsive 
to people with HIV and key affected populations. The research also yielded 
information that civil society organizations could use in advocacy campaigns. 
The project produced policy briefs in appealing formats to disseminate the 
study findings, and organized discussion sessions and consultations to assist 
public officials with revising rules and regulations, as well as developing action 
plans to implement reforms. 
Besides policy assessments and related studies, HPI/GMR-C’s development 
and dissemination of data collection and analysis tools also strengthened the 
response capacity of local governments. The clearest example is the Resource 
Estimation Tool for Advocacy (RETA), which was created to calculate 
resources needed to scale up HIV-prevention interventions for men who have 
sex with men. The tool was originally developed for China and the Greater 
Mekong Region. Training in its use was provided to officials in Kunming City 
and in the provinces of Yunnan, Guangxi, Sichuan, and Tianjin. In each of 
these locations, officials—some in cooperation with CSOs—developed action 
plans and resource estimates for scaling up HIV programs.
Several examples illustrate these supply-side policy environment studies 
that supported social accountability and the government’s responsiveness 
to the needs of people living with HIV and most-at-risk persons. These 
examples include regulations for registering CSOs and the HIV-related legal 
environment, both in Yunnan.
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Registration of Civil Society Organizations
HPI/GMR-C’s analysis of the regulatory environment revealed, not 
unexpectedly, that operational space for CSOs in China was highly controlled. 
Provinces had the authority to determine the criteria for registration (Haiyu & 
Young, 2009). In 2008, following dialogue with HPI/GMR-C staff on the study 
findings, the Yunnan Civil Affairs Bureau relaxed some of the provisions in 
its registration policy. It reduced the fee to US$150, set the minimum number 
of members at 10, and eliminated the requirement for full-time paid staff. 
The Bureau retained the requirement for a parent or sponsoring organization, 
although the range of acceptable parent organizations was broadened to 
include subdistrict offices, which are local government units that manage 
neighborhoods. The revised policy also allowed smaller CSOs to “file for 
record,” with no registration fee and only five members required. 
These changes opened the door for CSOs serving people with HIV and key 
affected populations to obtain formal legal status and receive funds to engage 
in mobilization and advocacy activities. The Yunnan Civil Affairs Bureau’s 
awareness of the impediments posed by the registration policy increased. 
Project staff worked with the Bureau to host consultative meetings with 
members of the HIV community. These meetings were a forum to provide 
information on registration and to facilitate dialogue and constituency building. 
HIV-Related Legal Environment
HPI/GMR-C’s review of the legal environment in Yunnan revealed a substantial 
body of HIV-related laws and regulations, many of which were poorly drafted, 
vague, and contradictory. Despite relatively sound legislation at both national 
and provincial levels designed to protect those with HIV, the courts, police, 
employers, and health care and insurance providers frequently ignored these 
laws. Without enforcement, people with HIV faced frequent discrimination and 
denial of statutory rights. The study also found that legal professionals had only 
limited capacity to provide the specialist counsel needed by people with HIV, 
key affected populations, families, local authorities, and businesses (Patterson & 
Ping, 2008). 
HPI/GMR-C partnered with the International Development Legal 
Organization, which had previously undertaken a pilot project on HIV laws, 
to work with government offices to improve the quality and implementation of 
legal frameworks, establish HIV-related legal services, and address HIV-related 
stigma and discrimination. Study findings also contributed to new advocacy 
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messages that CSOs could use to lobby officials. HPI/GMR-C supported the 
International Development Legal Organization to conduct an HIV workshop 
for judges and senior lawyers in Yunnan, where the project shared its 
findings from the Yunnan legal environment study and a study of stigma and 
discrimination against people living with HIV. 
Implementation
Successes and Results
HPI/GMR-C achieved substantial success on both the demand and supply 
sides related to HIV policies and services (Mok & Haberer, 2012). As Table 6 
summarizes, 70 percent of the advocacy campaigns that the project’s small 
grants funded resulted in some measure of success in achieving the purposes 
of the campaigns. Further, besides funding, the training, coaching, and 
mentoring that HPI/GMR-C provided to groups of people living with HIV 
and most-at-risk persons helped them to develop their capacities to mobilize 
stakeholders, design and manage advocacy activities, interact with public 
officials, and—in some cases—partner with government to deliver services. 
An example of a partnership to coproduce services was CSO provision of 
anonymous screening for HIV in collaboration with the provincial Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, which conducted the laboratory tests. 
On the supply side, successes included, for example, convincing provincial 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and AIDS bureaus to change 
the policy on name-linked voluntary counseling and testing to authorize 
anonymous counseling and testing. This change was based on project studies 
and consensus-building workshops to discuss the study findings, and was 
reinforced by CSO advocacy. This change enabled partnerships between 
CSOs and the provincial Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for 
purposes of testing. In Dali Prefecture, for example, voluntary counseling 
and testing referrals rose from an average of 8 per month to 34 following 
the AIDS bureau’s authorization of anonymity (RTI International, 2010). As 
another example of the impact of HPI/GMR-C policy studies, the Yunnan 
Civil Affairs Bureau made changes in CSO registration requirements, which 
facilitated organizing people living with HIV and most-at-risk persons into 
effective constituencies. A third example of a significant policy change was 
the shift to allow takeaway and home delivery of methadone for drug users 
with HIV. Advocacy on the part of HPI/GMR-C grantees facilitated this last 
policy change.
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Challenges
Among the challenges to citizen-led social accountability activities in China 
during HPI/GMR-C was the highly constrained legal space for organizing 
collective action. Complicated policies and procedures limited the ability of 
local CSOs to obtain legal status and to engage with government officials. The 
government’s policies exerted a high degree of control and supervision of civil 
society activities. In this environment, CSOs had limited capacity and power 
to take independent actions or to influence government officials. Further, the 
concept of community activism was relatively new. Individuals in leadership 
roles did not grasp the need to build constituencies within the community, and 
then to engage them in policy advocacy. Advocacy itself constituted another 
unfamiliar realm of activity, which meant that the training and coaching that 
HPI/GMR-C provided along with the grants was quite basic. 
Nonetheless, the activities of HPI/GMR-C demonstrated that 
advocacy efforts could achieve some degree of success when pursued in 
nonconfrontational and collaborative ways (Pritchard et al., 2009). CSOs 
intentionally sought to establish cooperative relationships with local 
government officials. They stressed their common interests in shared goals, 
and built credibility with their government interlocutors through the use of 
evidence in support of their advocacy efforts. They pursued dialogue through 
informal communications channels to establish understanding and consensus 
before seeking formal interactions, which then served to provide official 
recognition for the informally reached agreements. CSOs tended to focus on 
making improvements in existing HIV-related laws and regulations, which 
helped them to be perceived by government actors as contributing to achieving 
officially sanctioned outcomes and targets, instead of opposing them. Local 
health departments became their natural allies (Young, 2012).
Another challenge was the societal stigma and discrimination that people 
with HIV and key affected populations face in China, then as now. Men 
who have sex with men are highly stigmatized, and injecting drug users and 
sex workers are criminalized as well. Distrust of government among these 
groups is strong, as is fear of public opprobrium. In addition, they have 
internalized the societal stigma, with many feeling that they both expect 
and deserve to be treated badly by government and members of mainstream 
Chinese society. These factors powerfully motivate these groups to pursue 
rights-based advocacy on their own behalf, as well as to seek HIV prevention, 
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care, and treatment. For example, the local government in Dali Prefecture 
publicly recognized an HPI/GRM-C grantee, the Dali Good Friends Club, 
for its advocacy and partnership with the local AIDS Bureau, which led to 
media coverage. Sadly, the attention generated a negative reaction that led to a 
reorganization of the CSO and a change in leadership, as members felt that the 
publicity had “outed” them. As a result, the organization ceased its advocacy 
activities (RTI International, 2010).
HPI/GMR-C’s work in China and the region sought to increase awareness 
of the impacts of stigma and discrimination, and to pursue interventions 
to reduce them. For example, the project’s efforts in Yunnan and Kunming 
provinces to provide information on rights and legal services helped to build 
awareness and encouraged people with HIV and key affected populations to 
consider using the formal legal system to pursue their HIV-related statutory 
rights (Xia & Stephens, 2011).
Effects of HPI/GMR-C’s Efforts to Promote Social Accountability
HPI/GMR-C’s demand- and supply-side activities to enhance the enabling 
environment for HIV prevention, care, and treatment led to service delivery, 
governance, and empowerment outcomes. The project’s efforts positively 
influenced local authorities and health facilities to become more aware of and 
responsive to the needs of people with HIV and key affected populations. The 
following summarizes the effects:
• Service delivery. Although the project did not collect detailed data on 
service utilization by people with HIV and key affected populations, 
assessment of the outcomes of the small grants program revealed several 
improvements in access to services, which is a necessary precursor to 
utilization. These included expanded access to methadone maintenance 
treatment; some reductions in refusals to provide health services at 
facilities, and in nonreimbursement for treatment provided; greater 
access to voluntary counseling and testing; and some increased access to 
pre-employment training and jobs.
• Governance. A combination of the project’s support to HIV-related CSO 
advocacy campaigns and the policy operational assessments stimulated a 
number of changes in local laws and regulations. The increased access to 
services was supported by modifications in regulations. As noted earlier, 
the Yunnan provincial government changed registration requirements 
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for CSOs. A study combined with an advocacy coalition led to a new 
regulation that removed the names of former injecting drug users from 
the national drug user database. The project’s assessment of the HIV-
related legal framework and support for the provision of legal services 
improved access to rights and protections for people with HIV and key 
affected populations.
• Empowerment. A major effect of HPI/GMR-C’s activities involved 
empowerment of people with HIV and key affected populations. Their 
ability to organize themselves and legally register as CSOs created a 
formal platform from which to advocate for their rights and needs. The 
capacity building, grant-making, and networking support the project 
offered empowered the local groups to build constituencies, establish 
positive working relationships with government officials and health care 
providers, and pursue advocacy campaigns. The governance changes 
supported the newly empowered groups to exercise their rights and gain 
access to the services they needed, although the impacts of stigma should 
not be underestimated. 
A critical concern for accountability mechanisms and the results to which 
they lead is the extent to which they are sustained and sustainable. HPI/
GMR-C’s explicit focus on the enabling environment for HIV prevention, care, 
and treatment reflects a recognition that these services and health outcomes 
depend upon sustained attention by governments, people with HIV, and key 
affected populations (refer to Figure 5 earlier in this chapter). Each of the 
project’s IRs targeted features associated with sustainability: a supportive legal 
and regulatory environment; mobilized, motivated, and capable citizens who 
advocate for their needs and desires; and capable and motivated government 
actors who can plan, implement, and respond to citizen input using data and 
evidence for decisions. 
HPI/GMR-C was a relatively small project, operating mainly in two heavily 
populated provinces of a huge country. Thus, the sustainability expectations 
had to be modest, and recognize that many of the changes put in motion by 
the project would take a long time to yield results, particularly in light of the 
well-recognized barriers that stigma and discrimination pose in dealing with 
HIV. Nationwide application and uptake of the HIV comprehensive prevention 
package will be a long-term endeavor.
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Sustainability of Interventions and Outcomes
HPI/GMR-C is an interesting case study of social accountability for several 
reasons. First, it exemplified a set of interventions intended explicitly to 
strengthen the contextual factors that affect how social accountability operates 
and that will influence the sustainability of accountability mechanisms. Second, 
because the project focused on China, it offers a window into the ways in 
which citizens can exercise voice and seek to influence government where the 
state is authoritarian. The social accountability strategy adopted by the CSO 
grantees explicitly framed their advocacy efforts as aimed at coproducing better 
service access and quality for people with HIV and key affected populations 
in cooperation with government, rather than challenging state actors. Third, 
fortuitously, this advocacy strategy meshed with provincial governments’ 
need to meet national targets for delivery of HIV services; public officials were 
motivated to take action, although it took HPI/GMR-Cs’ support to organize 
the dialogue that brought officials together with key populations to make those 
actions effective. Fourth, for Chinese citizens who fell within categories that 
society stigmatized and discriminated against, and whose voice and influence 
options were even more limited than for the average citizen, the HPI/GMR-C 
approach to engaging with government demonstrated what can be achieved 
when there is some degree of overlap between the goals of both parties. 
Public officials did not necessarily change their views that members 
of key populations were societal undesirables, but nonetheless they were 
willing to work with them to achieve shared objectives. However, this case 
raises questions about the limits of social accountability. The changes in 
HIV policy and services that HPI/GMR-C facilitated resulted from the 
overlap of interests between public officials and people with HIV and key 
populations. Coproduction enabled officials to perform better in meeting 
their goals, so whether or not they appreciated the values underlying social 
accountability, it was expedient for them to engage. To achieve sustainability 
in such circumstances—that is, where power asymmetries are large—social 
accountability will be tolerated to the extent that it contributes to public 
officials’ “success” measured largely on their own terms. Prospects for 
social accountability to change state–society relations regarding stigma and 
discrimination remain slight. 
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Social Accountability in Cross-Sectoral  
Service Delivery: The Kinerja Public Service 
Delivery Program in Indonesia
Jana C. Hertz
CHAPTER 6
Overview and General Program Approach 
The Kinerja public service improvement program is an effort to support the 
Government of Indonesia to strengthen the decentralization process and 
improve public service delivery outcomes, with a focus on good governance 
and social accountability. Kinerja is funded by the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) and implemented in 24 districts 
in five provinces.15 It began in September 2010 and continues to mid-2017. 
By mid-2015, Kinerja had also been funded by local governments to extend 
implementation to an additional 44 “replication districts” (RTI International, 
2015a). Kinerja aligns with national government priorities relevant to local 
governments. Specifically, the program aims to improve local governments’ 
delivery of services in three sectors—education, health, and economic 
development—by applying good governance practices at the district and 
community levels. Kinerja means “performance” in the Bahasa Indonesia 
language.
As context, Indonesia is the fourth largest country in the world after China, 
India, and the United States in terms of population, at approximately 250 
Note: Kinerja colleagues Elke Rapp (RTI)  and Amanda Stek (Social Impact) provided helpful 
comments, insight into project implementation, and access to project documents. RTI colleagues 
Taylor Williamson, Peter Vaz, and Robin Bush provided helpful comments. The narrative and 
analysis in this chapter represent the views of the author alone and focus on Kinerja’s social 
accountability interventions. They do not reflect the project’s overall achievements.
15 To explain the geographical reach in more detail, Kinerja “core” activities began in 2010 and 
include 20 districts in four provinces: Aceh, East Java, South Sulawesi, and West Kalimantan. 
The program was expanded in March 2012 to an additional four districts in the province of 
Papua, adapting Kinerja’s approach to address maternal and child health, HIV/AIDS, and 
tuberculosis; this portion of the program is referred to as “Kinerja Papua.” The interventions in 
“Kinerja Papua” are not covered in this case study.
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million. It is an archipelago of over 17,000 islands with a breadth roughly 
equivalent to the distance between the US east and west coasts. Indonesia 
declared independence from the Netherlands in 1945. Until the 1996 Asian 
financial crisis, it was managed by a strongly centralized government. In 1998, 
during the “reform era,” Indonesia began a process of fiscal and administration 
decentralization, transferring authority to over 500 district-level governments 
spread over 34 provinces. Planning, budgeting, monitoring, and oversight of 
public service delivery became the responsibility of district-level governments 
in a “big bang” fashion. Since 1998, local governments have worked to improve 
their capacity to deliver efficient, effective, and responsive public services.
Kinerja addresses the demand side, as well as the supply side, of service 
delivery by strengthening accountability mechanisms and enabling local 
governments to better respond to citizens’ needs. It works through local 
institutions to build their capacity and encourage sustainable partnerships with 
local government.
The program builds on a body of existing innovative practices in local 
governance programs and sector initiatives in education, health, and 
economic development. Its approach centers on stimulating local demand 
for better service delivery and on establishing strategies for nation¬wide 
dissemination. In keeping with this mandate, Kinerja technical advisors and 
partner organizations have reviewed and adapted relevant existing tools, often 
developed in collaboration with and supported by ministries in the respective 
sectors.
Kinerja’s framework includes four objectives (RTI International, 2011; RTI 
International & Social Impact, 2010):
1. Creating incentives for improved local government service delivery. These 
incentives include an expectation of better performance outcomes due 
to greater involvement of and accountability to citizens; rewards (or 
penalties) for good (or bad) performance; and prestige (or shame) owing 
to publicly available information on local governments’ performance. 
Kinerja assistance contributes to stronger incentives by giving citizens a 
more effective voice in public service delivery; supporting performance 
management systems in local governments; and increasing competition 
through benchmarking, competitive awards programs, and public 
information. 
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2. Encouraging the adoption of innovative service delivery. As noted, Kinerja 
offers a targeted and well-designed menu of technical interventions in 
the three sectors of education, health, and economic development. It 
focuses on a few crucial elements of service delivery in these particular 
sectors—those where an impact can be made—rather than undertaking 
too many disparate activities. 
3. Replicating improved management systems and disseminating them through 
intermediary organizations. Kinerja’s impact has expanded nationally via 
Web-based dissemination and capacity building for service providers. 
The program has established links to national and provincial training 
institutes, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and universities, 
and has worked with various ministries to form national policies and 
regulations. 
4. Applying a rigorous impact-evaluation scheme with randomized site selections, 
using control sites and in-depth studies. At several points, the program 
measured impact and determined which interventions worked, why, 
and how. 
Cross-Sectoral Social Accountability Approach
As a project engaged in public service improvements, Kinerja applies 
governance approaches and principles to enhance service delivery in the three 
designated sectors. Kinerja’s package of technical assistance combines technical 
interventions to strengthen service provision (supply) with governance 
interventions to identify citizen priorities and hold providers accountable for 
inputs (demand). 
For example, in the education sector, Kinerja offers a menu of three 
technical interventions: school-based management, proportional teacher 
distribution, and analysis of school unit costs. In the health sector, Kinerja’s 
menu of technical interventions consists of promotion of immediate and 
exclusive breastfeeding, partnership between midwives and traditional birth 
attendants, and health clinic management. In the economic development 
sector, Kinerja offers technical assistance for establishing one-stop service 
centers for business licenses. For each of these, Kinerja provides four 
governance interventions: (1) support of multistakeholder forums (MSFs), 
(2) complaint-handling surveys, (3) service charters, and (4) citizen 
journalism. 
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Regardless of the technical intervention selected by a given local 
government, the same four governance interventions are applied, emphasizing 
the importance of combining governance and sectoral interventions. Table 7 
summarizes the selected technical interventions that are made available to each 
district on a demand basis, and the governance interventions that are applied 
to each technical intervention chosen. As referenced under objective 4 above, 
the Kinerja districts were randomly selected as part of USAID’s monitoring 
and evaluation randomized control trial (RCT) pilot of governance programs, 
but these districts select their own technical interventions from a limited menu 
to ensure alignment with local government plans and budgets. 
Table 7. Summary of Kinerja technical and governance interventions
Sector (selected 
by districts)
Technical Interventions  
(selected by districts)
Governance Interventions 
(applied to all sectors)





• Partnership between midwives and 
traditional birth attendants
• Health clinic management
Education • School-based management
• Proportional teacher distribution
• School operational cost analysis
Economic 
development
• One-stop service centers for business 
licenses
16 Steps for Kinerja’s social accountability mechanisms were adapted from Wetterberg et al. (2015). 
The typology of social accountability actions and purposes was drawn from Brinkerhoff and 
Wetterberg (2016). For an explanation of the various types of social accountability purposes 
(service delivery, governance and democracy, and empowerment) and actions (transparency, 
coproduction, compliance, confrontation) described in these case studies, refer to “Framing 
Social Accountability” in Chapter 2.
Table 8 summarizes the steps for implementing the social accountability 
mechanisms linked to social accountability actions.16 Overall, the suite 
of Kinerja social accountability mechanisms touches on a range of social 
accountability actions: transparency-related action (steps 1, 2, 5, and 7), 
collaborative/joint action through coproduction (steps 1, 2, 5), compliance-
focused action (steps 3, 4, and 6), and contentious/confrontational action 
(step 7) in the case of some articles produced by citizen journalists. Taken 
holistically, the social accountability mechanisms influence citizen–provider 
interactions in diverse ways.
 Social Accountability in Cross-Sectoral Service Delivery 85
Table 8. Steps for Kinerja’s social accountability mechanisms and related  
social accountability actions
Step Social accountability action
1 Building political commitment: 
building political commitment among 
stakeholders, signing memorandum of 
understanding with the district head, 
agreeing to address outcomes of the 
complaint-handling survey, sharing and 
adapting tools to local context.
• Transparency related: collection, analysis, 
and dissemination of information about 
services, civic education
• Coproduction focused: engagement in 
service delivery planning, budgeting, and 
implementation
2 Multistakeholder forum workshop: 
raising citizens’ awareness of rights, 
building formal commitments among 
stakeholders, adopting or adapting tools 
to the local context, formulating action 
plans. 
• Transparency related: collection, analysis, 
and dissemination of information about 
services
• Coproduction focused: engagement in 
delivering public services
3 Complaint-handling survey: interviewing 
the service users to identify complaints 
on effectiveness, responsiveness, 
efficiency, human resources, and logistics 
of the service unit.
• Transparency related: collection, analysis, 
and dissemination of information about 
services
• Compliance focused: monitoring of 
services in cooperation with providers
4 Service charter negotiation: analyzing 
complaints, formulating service 
charters between users and providers 
to document planned improvements, 
formulating actions beyond authority 
or capacity of service delivery units as 
technical recommendations for the 
district head.
• Compliance focused: monitoring and 
oversight of services in cooperation with 
officials and providers
5 Service charter signing: service charters 
and technical recommendations signed 
publicly and witnessed by the district 
executive, local legislatures and other 
related stakeholders to encourage 
accountability. 
• Transparency related: dissemination of 
information on public policies, programs, 
and services
• Coproduction focused: engagement in 
planning and implementing policies, 
programs and services
6 Service charter monitoring: independent 
MSFs monitor progress of service 
charter implementation and technical 
recommendations; MSFs meet regularly 
with district authorities (executive 
and legislative) and lobby for timely 
implementation of reforms.
• Compliance focused: monitoring and 
oversight of services in cooperation with 
officials and providers
7 Media: citizen journalists and local media 
create wider public awareness and report 
on service delivery.
• Transparency related: dissemination of 
information on public services
• Contentious/confrontational: civil society 
action that contests state actions
Source: Adapted from Wetterberg et al. (2015), p. 6.
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Implementation of Cross-Sectoral Social Accountability Approach
Kinerja is implemented through intermediary organizations consisting of 
local NGOs or academic institutions. The intermediary organizations receive 
grants from Kinerja to deliver technical assistance packages of sectoral and 
governance interventions in partnership with local governments and local 
communities in the randomly selected Kinerja districts. The quality of 
implementation depends on the convergence of various factors, including 
the quality of technical assistance provided by the local intermediary 
organizations, the level of engagement of Kinerja staff, and the amount of time 
and level of commitment to reform shown by the local governments and local 
communities. The Kinerja midterm evaluation (Social Impact, 2013) found 
that performance varied significantly across the indicators (with achievement 
rates ranging from 0 percent to 358 percent as of December 2012), with 
no particular correlation with indicator type. The evaluators found some 
consistent variations in performance by technical assistance package but could 
not systematically correlate them with a particular intermediary organization 
or region. As the midterm report concluded, “This suggests that performance 
is to a greater extent related to the intersection of geography, implementer, 
and package,” which, in turn, was related to the performance of local Kinerja 
staff, local intermediary organizations, and service delivery units or local 
governments in different localities (Social Impact, 2013, p. 2).
One of the first steps the intermediary organizations take before 
implementing the social accountability mechanisms is to identify existing 
multistakeholder forums or to form new ones in places where they do 
not exist, by engaging active community members. The MSFs and local 
government officials then work together to design a questionnaire for the 
complaint-handling survey of public service delivery units. This is an example 
of collaborative/joint social accountability action. 
The complaint-handling surveys are designed both for compliance, to 
see the extent to which minimum service standards are achieved; and for 
coproduction, to capture citizens’ viewpoints about service delivery. However, 
local government officials and MSF members have often disagreed regarding 
the types of questions that should be asked. Sometimes providers felt that 
community members were not knowledgeable enough about the services 
to be able to respond (“they are not doctors or nurses”). In these cases, the 
complaint-handling surveys led to contentious/confrontational actions in 
which civil society representatives, through the multistakeholder forum, 
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advocated for their viewpoint and explained that citizens did not require any 
specialized knowledge to participate, other than their own experiences. In 
several places, health clinic staff were offended at the idea of introducing a 
complaint-handling survey. It took considerable input—through study trips 
by these clinic staff to successful sites, for example—to develop cooperation 
with the MSF and citizens that led to effective service delivery. The complaint-
handling surveys are conducted through interviews with users of the service 
delivery units. The answers are collated by the intermediary organizations 
and presented to the MSF and service providers. As mentioned previously, 
sometimes the service providers react negatively (“There must be something 
wrong with the methodology,” “That can’t be right”), thereby generating a 
contentious/confrontational action. However, since the questionnaire is agreed 
upon beforehand by both MSF and service providers, it is difficult for the 
service providers to unduly criticize the process without losing credibility. 
After the results are discussed, they are made public on school bulletin boards 
or health clinic announcement boards. 
After publication of the survey results, the MSF and service providers 
negotiate a service charter outlining various action items the service providers 
agree to implement based on the complaints from citizens. The charters are 
signed by MSF representatives and the service providers, and witnessed by a 
district local government official—in most cases, the district head—indicating 
a coproduction social accountability action through joint engagement on 
service delivery planning and implementation. This is also a good example of 
transparency-related social accountability actions through the dissemination 
of information regarding services and planned reforms. The MSF then 
monitors the implementation of the service charter and attempts to hold the 
service providers accountable for agreed reforms. 
As of April 2015, MSF monitoring of service charter implementation at the 
service delivery unit level had taken place in 157 schools and 61 health clinics 
(Social Impact, 2015). Overall, a total of 6,157 service delivery improvements 
were pledged in these 218 charters. There was a reported 83 percent 
completion rate (5,115 of the 6,157 complaints were addressed), including 
81 percent of education complaints addressed and 89 percent of health 
complaints addressed.17 
17 Lower achievement rates for schools may have been due to the higher number of complaints 
and service pledges in the education sector in comparison to those documented for health 
clinics.
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The evaluation results also pointed to citizen journalism as a cross-cutting 
intervention that helped to raise awareness about public service delivery issues 
and to influence the enabling environment for other social accountability 
interventions. It was used to publicize the results of complaint-handling 
surveys or to promote the agreements between citizens and providers on 
service charters. In some areas, citizen journalists brought a sense of urgency 
to issues such as students in rural areas not being able to learn due to poor 
teacher distribution in Luwu Utara district, the successes of an adolescent 
and reproductive health program in Bondowoso district, and the experiences 
associated with an open-data initiative in Banda Aceh municipality. Over 
280 citizen journalists who were trained under the Kinerja program remained 
active, and by early 2015 they had produced 1,106 articles in four different 
provinces (Social Impact, 2015). In mid-2015, the program team reported that 
citizen journalists were working through various channels, including SMS 
gateway, Facebook, Twitter, their own tabloids, community radio, and most 
notably through mainstream media (E. G. Rapp, personal communication, 
July 23, 2015). 
Effects of Kinerja’s Efforts to Promote Social Accountability 
Three social accountability outcomes characterized in the analytical framework 
for this study (see “Framing Social Accountability” in Chapter 2) include 
service delivery, governance and democracy, and empowerment. Some of 
Kinerja’s efforts to promote social accountability through these three aims are 
highlighted below. 
To demonstrate the effects of these efforts, I refer to both quantitative 
and qualitative impact evaluations of the program’s activities. The Kinerja 
quantitative impact evaluation (Social Impact & SMERU Research Institute, 
2015) consisted of two parts: (1) district-level evaluation comparing treatment 
and control districts, and (2) subdistrict-level evaluation of school-based 
management comparing treatment and control schools. A qualitative 
evaluation of Kinerja interventions (SMERU Research Institute, 2015) was 
conducted in conjunction with the quantitative evaluation. These efforts 
complemented a 2013 limited qualitative evaluation of two districts to examine 
“the potential of the Kinerja School-Based Management ‘package’ to produce 
impact in subsequent years” (Social Impact et al., 2013, p. 1).
Some limitations of the quantitative evaluation must be noted, including 
the use of secondary national data sets for district-level comparisons, which 
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used general indicators and timelines not necessarily aligned with the project; 
and data collection in only 40 districts, thereby reducing statistical power. 
In addition, the 2015 qualitative study took place in only 11 of the 20 target 
districts. 
Finally, I have incorporated the results of an independent qualitative study 
focused on social accountability in service delivery, which also took place in 
2015 but was limited to four Kinerja districts (Wetterberg et al., 2015).
Service Delivery
All of the social accountability mechanisms are applied to sectoral service 
delivery issues in the education, health, or economic development sectors. 
Although the 2015 quantitative impact evaluation did not show evidence 
of change in sector-related indicators at the district level, the qualitative 
evaluation showed improvement in intermediate health and education 
outcomes within districts and service delivery units (Social Impact & SMERU 
Research Institute, 2015). The evaluations also showed progress on the 
program objectives. Examples included districts passing improved regulations 
on maternal and child health and distribution of teachers; and establishment 
of successful participatory processes regarding education reforms, such as 
proportional teacher distribution and operational cost analysis for education 
units (Social Impact & SMERU Research Institute, 2015). The qualitative 
impact evaluation also highlighted improvements in health management 
and good governance among service delivery units, and behavioral change 
according to specific health indicators tracked in monitoring data (SMERU 
Research Institute, 2015). 
The independent qualitative study covering four Kinerja districts found that 
in the vast majority of service delivery sites (14 out of 15), either providers or 
the MSF reported changes in service delivery (Wetterberg et al., 2015). Among 
the reported examples were small physical improvements, changed hours of 
operation, better service orientation, better registration processes, increased 
availability of doctors and medicines, and increased attendance of midwives at 
rural posts.
Governance and Empowerment
According to the multiple studies summarized in this chapter, the social 
accountability mechanisms contributed to changes both in citizen engagement 
and in provider responses at the level of the service delivery unit. Kinerja was 
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successful in strengthening public institutions and actors through integration 
of governance and citizen empowerment in technical interventions. 
Governance and empowerment effects can be broken down into citizen 
engagement outcomes using the four main typologies identified by Gaventa 
and Barrett (2012). Table 9 summarizes Kinerja effects based on the results of 
the impact evaluation (Social Impact & SMERU Research Institute, 2015) and 
categorizes them according to the typologies.
Table 9. Citizen engagement outcomes and examples of Kinerja effects




• Increased civic and political 
knowledge
• Citizens came to expect that 
multistakeholder forums (MSFs) 
should be involved with school 
decision making
• Greater sense of empowerment 
and agency
• Parents gained a greater sense 
of their roles and responsibilities 





• Increased capacities for collective 
action
• District-level MSFs advocated for 
increased funding for schools; 
principals and parents reported 
committees playing a more 
active role
• New forms of participation • Interactions between school 





• Greater access to state services and 
resources
• School principals expected 
school committee involvement in 
finance and operations decision 
making
• Enhanced state responsiveness and 
accountability





• Inclusion of new actors and issues 
in public spaces
• Providers were satisfied 
with MSF’s role of collecting 
complaints and providing 
feedback to service delivery units
• Greater cohesion across social 
groups
• Communication and 
engagement improved between 
citizens and service delivery units
Key:    = empowerment,   = governance. 
Source: Created by author; model adapted from Gaventa and Barrett (2012). Data on Kinerja effects from 
Social Impact and SMERU Research Institute (2015). 
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Construction of Citizenship
The impact evaluation among service delivery units showed evidence of 
positive outcomes in Kinerja-supported schools on construction of citizenship, 
including increased civic and political knowledge and greater sense of 
empowerment and agency. Parents were clearer about the role of school 
committees and had a more expansive view of their roles and responsibilities—
although that did not always translate into more active participation. They 
had a strong sense they should represent their communities and raise funds 
for schools. Members from Kinerja-supported school committees were almost 
10 times as likely to agree that they should represent their communities 
(p = 0.020) and three times as likely to think they should help raise funds 
(p = 0.073) (Social Impact, 2015). 
Practices of Citizen Participation
Capacities for collective action increased and new forms of participation 
emerged. For example, the qualitative evaluation found that MSFs at the 
district level took steps to advocate for increased funding for priority areas 
for schools (SMERU Research Institute, 2015). The quantitative evaluation 
found that partner schools tended to have more robust and formally created 
school committees. Kinerja-supported principals were, on average, 4.4 times 
as likely to report committees approving school budgets (p = 0.020), and there 
was some evidence that committees were more likely to help raise funds, 
although the results were not significant at the 90-percent level (Social Impact 
& SMERU Research Institute, 2015).
Principals from Kinerja-supported schools reported being, on average, 
3 times as likely to have received pressure from parents to improve students’ 
performance (p = 0.076) and almost 2.5 times as likely to communicate with 
parents (p = 0.083) (Social Impact, 2015). Committee members from Kinerja-
supported schools showed higher average satisfaction than their peers from 
control schools, in particular on village management and school infrastructure. 
The evaluation reports also showed evidence of improvements initiated 
by school committees, as well as communities’ recognition of the school 
committees’ role in these improvements. The improvements most often cited 
were related to small infrastructure projects within the service delivery units, 
even in remote areas such as Sekadau and Melawi districts in West Kalimantan 
province (see the following text box).
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Responsive and Accountable States 
Study results also indicated positive outcomes 
regarding responsive and accountable states, 
through evidence of greater access to state 
services and resources, greater realization of 
rights, and enhanced state responsiveness and 
province. For example, school administrators 
used citizen feedback to advocate for school 
improvements (see text box at right). 
Impact evaluation results also indicated 
that most Kinerja-supported principals expected that committees should be 
involved with school finance and operations decisions. For example, principals 
were almost 14 times as likely to think school committees should help raise 
school funds (p = 0.092) and 2.6 times as likely to think they should allocate 
School Operational Assistance Program funds (p = 0.072). Although this result 
fell just below the 90-percent significance level, principals from treatment 
schools were 15 times as likely to believe committees should approve the 
school budget (p = 0.105) and 2.4 times as likely to believe they should make 
final operations decisions (p = 0.110) (Social Impact & SMERU Research 
Institute, 2015, p. 17).
Parents from partner schools were more likely to be satisfied with the 
school committees and also reported higher parental satisfaction with school 
management more broadly, school facilities, and academics (teacher quality 
and number). The impact evaluation showed that parents from partner schools 
were twice as likely to be satisfied with the school committee (p = 0.005) and 
twice as likely to report satisfaction with village management (p = 0.009). It 
found slightly higher levels of parental satisfaction in all other areas, including 
school management more broadly, school facilities, and academics (teacher 
quality and number), although none of these was statistically significant. 
Respondents from partner schools were, on average, 42 percent less likely 
to perceive low district support for their schools (p = 0.126), and 64 percent 
“A principal in Sekadau…used the 
results of the complaint survey 
as a way to call attention to the 
needs of his school when meeting 
with officials from the District 
Education Office. The principal 
was able to highlight areas of 
need based on the results of the 
survey.” (Social Impact & SMERU 
Research Institute, 2015, p. 28)
“In Sekadau, a sampled school committee helped build a fence, a toilet, and a simple 
dam behind the school to prevent landslides. In Melawi, a school fence and an additional 
classroom were built in a sampled school thanks to the participation of the school committee. 
When asked about improvements that were most valuable to them, parents and school 
respondents noted that ‘school committee improvements’ were most valuable.” (Social Impact 
& SMERU Research Institute, 2015, p. 19)
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less likely to report a textbook shortage (p = 0.079) (Social Impact & SMERU 
Research Institute, 2015, p. 26).
Inclusive and Cohesive Societies
Another positive outcome was evidence of inclusive and cohesive societies, 
such as inclusion of new actors and issues in public spaces and greater social 
cohesion across groups. The 2015 impact evaluation (Social Impact & SMERU 
Research Institute, 2015) showed improved communication and engagement 
between citizens and their service providers. Respondents noted satisfaction 
with MSFs and the role they played in collecting complaints and providing 
feedback to service delivery units. The impact evaluation cited the example of 
a health clinic staff member in Singkawang city who acknowledged how MSF 
members had disseminated information on health issues to the community. 
The respondent also said the MSF helped the health clinic by informing staff 
of community complaints so the unit could handle issues more quickly (Social 
Impact & SMERU Research Institute, 2015, p. 12).
The data also suggested small-scale improvements in community 
communication in Kinerja partner schools. Parents visited the treatment 
schools more frequently and were more likely to pay attention to posted 
notices. The impact evaluation data showed that 
while there were no statistically significant differences in the likelihood 
of partners from treatment and control groups attending school meetings 
and communicating with teachers and principals, parents visited treatment 
schools 71% more often and were over 1.7 times more likely to look at the 
bulletin board. (Social Impact & SMERU Research Institute, 2015, p. 25)
Negative Outcomes
In the area of school-based management, the Kinerja subdistrict-level 
portion of the quantitative impact evaluation (explained at the beginning of 
this subsection) reported indications of greater responsiveness, but limited 
improvement in terms of community feedback mechanisms and action. The 
evaluators found no statistically significant differences between treatment 
and control groups related to the volume of complaints from parents, the 
types of issues they complained about, or whether they received a response 
to their complaints (Social Impact & SMERU Research Institute, 2015, p. 26). 
This suggests a possible disconnect between the collaborative/joint social 
accountability actions (for both compliance and coproduction) and the citizen 
empowerment effects. However, the study also mentioned that the lack of 
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complaints could indicate parents’ greater satisfaction with the services and 
therefore lessened inclination to complain.
The Wetterberg et al. (2015) qualitative study of four districts also reported 
two negative outcomes in the health sector. One, mentioned earlier, was that 
providers in some cases ignored citizen feedback, stating that the users were 
not well enough informed to properly assess services. Secondly, in some cases, 
providers acknowledged citizen complaints but failed to respond, because they 
felt the issue was outside of their control. In both cases, providers were not 
responsive, highlighting a different type of disconnect between collaborative/
joint social accountability actions and citizen empowerment.
Data from the same study found considerable variability in perceptions 
regarding social accountability between providers and citizens, which contrasts 
with the considerable congruence in perception regarding service delivery. For 
instance, a comparison of providers and citizens in 15 service delivery units 
representing four Kinerja districts indicated that in only 5 out of 15 public 
service delivery sites did both citizens and providers acknowledge that citizens 
had the right to hold service delivery units responsible, compared to 12 out 
of 15 sites where only citizens acknowledged these rights (Wetterberg et al., 
2015). Although the data cannot be generalized, as a whole, the results flag 
the ongoing challenge of gaps between citizen empowerment and provider 
response.
Contextual Domains Influencing Social Accountability Actions
The 24 Kinerja districts implementing social accountability mechanisms 
have a range of different demographic and socioeconomic conditions: urban 
and rural, homogenous and heterogeneous ethnicity, and differing levels of 
previous experience with social accountability mechanisms. Wetterberg et al. 
(2015) found that in the four examined districts, contextual factors mattered 
less than service delivery unit contextual factors, or what Joshi (2014) referred 
to as micro-context.18 
For example, micro-contextual factors such as positive or negative 
leadership from a health clinic director could influence the extent to which 
social accountability mechanisms were effective. At one of the Kinerja sites, the 
health clinic director was quoted as saying:
18 “Micro-context” is defined as local factors that impact upon the particular implementation 
trajectories of social accountability interventions (Joshi, 2014).
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After the complaint survey, we learned about many different types of 
complaints that we did not know about before….When we learned about 
the complaints, we addressed them by providing additional medicines 
and equipment and worked with the midwives to address the complaints 
associated with them. (Wetterberg et al., 2015, p. 26; interview March 4, 2014) 
This positive leadership by the health clinic director led to improved 
citizen satisfaction and greater financial autonomy for the clinic, including the 
authority to order medicines. The director commented, “Before, if we needed 
something as simple as a piece of paper we had to go to the district health 
office, but now we do not have to do that” (Wetterberg et al., 2015, p. 26). This 
health clinic also received a local government award for outstanding health 
clinic, and demand for its services rose. The director’s leadership (micro-
context) was instrumental to social accountability reforms in combination 
with the project interventions.
Conversely, lack of leadership, or negative leadership, was reported in the 
findings of the 2015 qualitative impact evaluation as a hindrance to successful 
feedback mechanisms. An MSF member from a school committee at one of 
the Kinerja sites said he faced challenges when monitoring the service charter 
because the principal would not discuss the school’s progress with him (Social 
Impact & SMERU Research Institute, 2015, p. 24). In such cases, the micro-
context meant that despite increased citizen engagement in providing feedback 
and monitoring services, leaders within the service units who were resistant to 
accountability inhibited progress (Social Impact & SMERU Research Institute, 
2015, p. 24). 
In East Java, Kinerja funded a nearly 10-year study (2004–2013) on 
sustainable innovations and good practices of districts winning autonomy 
awards (Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi, 2014). This study identified several 
micro-contextual factors inhibiting or contributing to replication of innovative 
practices . Practices that were successfully replicated featured (1) support 
from the highest local leadership (in particular, district heads); (2) local 
communities active in advocating for innovative practices; (3) support of a 
stable and conducive bureaucracy through long-serving staff competent in 
innovation management; (4) external awards from independent institutions, 
provincial governments, national governments, or international organizations; 
(5) positive reporting in mass media; (6) funding support from district 
governments; and (7) donor assistance. Kinerja staff found that these micro-
contextual factors were salient in Kinerja-supported districts as well.
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The qualitative study comparing four Kinerja districts also found that level 
of experience with previous social accountability actions or previous attitudes 
by providers influenced but did not predict outcomes. Some sites initially 
antagonistic toward social accountability implemented some of the deepest 
reforms (Wetterberg et al., 2015). 
As before, although the conclusions cannot be generalized, they highlight 
the importance of adjusting to the continually evolving micro-context, 
whether it is particular actors, conditions, or dynamics, when implementing 
social accountability interventions.
Sustainability of Interventions and Outcomes
It is difficult to measure the extent to which the Kinerja social accountability 
approach will be sustainable in the project districts going forward, since the 
interventions are cyclical and require a certain amount of time for replication. 
However, as of mid-2015 there was some indication that mechanisms will be 
maintained by local governments. For example, the district governments of 
Jember and Tulungagung had committed to providing operational funds for 
district-level MSFs to continue their oversight work (RTI International, 2015a). 
In Kinerja replication districts, the local governments provide all funding 
for programming and Kinerja supplies only technical assistance. Scaling up 
has taken place—based on records of districts’ own expenditures—in nearly 
every district (except for Aceh Tenggara, in education) (E. G. Rapp, personal 
communication, July 25, 2015). In addition, as of June 2015, 56 partnerships 
had been formed between local governments and Kinerja intermediary 
organizations: “The overachievement (of the indicators related to partnerships) 
shows the respect for and capacity of Kinerja’s grantees in partner districts and 
also the willingness of district governments to contract assistance from civil 
society and Kinerja partners” (Social Impact & SMERU Research Institute, 
2015; and A. Stek, Kinerja monitoring and evaluation specialist, personal 
communication, August 11, 2015).
Kinerja also promotes integration of MSFs at the district level to broaden 
membership and increase collective advocacy. This allows the MSFs to learn 
from each other and to apply successful social accountability approaches 
to multiple sectors. As an example, the health and education MSFs merged 
in Bondowoso and Jember (East Java), with the local governments funding 
their operational role in designing and overseeing the implementation 
of public policies. Although no mergers were reported in Aceh or South 
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Sulawesi, district-level MSFs in Sekadau (West Kalimantan) integrated 
(RTI International, 2015a). Districts have come up with different approaches 
to sustainability of MSFs. Some establish regulations; others want to stay 
independent and collect membership fees and voluntary contributions 
(RTI International, 2015c). In the health sector, Kinerja submitted a policy 
paper to the Ministry of Health recommending that MSFs at the district level 
serve as the embryo for the health committees mandated in the national 
Health Law No. 36/2009 (RTI International, 2015c).
After the initial implementation of social accountability interventions, 
Kinerja supported treatment districts committed to replicating the program’s 
reform packages in additional service delivery units with their own financial 
resources. Based on monitoring and evaluation data recorded for reporting on 
performance, Kinerja good practices were replicated 450 times by 399 service 
delivery units during the program (RTI International, 2015c, p. 57). The 
good practices included both technical and governance mechanisms, such as 
development of standard operating procedures for maternal and child health, 
negotiation of service charters, and implementation of complaint-handling 
surveys. 
Kinerja exceeded its targets for replication with a total of 450 good practices 
(project target: 344) implemented within partner districts, and 116 good 
practices in 44 nonpartner districts (project target: 25 nonpartner districts) 
(RTI International, 2015a, 2015b). Although replication does not guarantee 
sustainability, it is evidence that local governments acknowledge the value of 
social accountability and are willing to continue funding such activities outside 
of project resources.
Conclusions
Kinerja is a useful example of a successful approach to integrated, cross-
sectoral governance, due to the inroads it has made in terms of service 
delivery, governance, and empowerment. However, this case study has shown 
that although providers and citizens both have reported perceived changes in 
service delivery, they continue to differ on the role of citizens in monitoring 
and holding government accountable for service delivery. Sustainability of 
specific social accountability mechanisms has been limited; however, the 
general social accountability approach is being replicated extensively outside of 
target areas and applied to new sectors.
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It is difficult to measure the association between social accountability and 
service delivery in terms of specific sectoral outcomes—such as maternal 
mortality rates. Nevertheless, certain Kinerja districts were able to make the 
connection. This was the case in Aceh Singkil, which received a United Nations 
Public Service Delivery award for addressing maternal mortality. 
More generally, the lessons from Kinerja point to the need for creative 
and innovative measurement approaches that focus on shifts in relationships 
and systems that lead to long-term sustainable changes that empower local 
governments, service providers, and citizens. In contrast, a focus on short-
term technical interventions and their immediate impacts on services cannot 
capture such shifts. The Kinerja case study and other studies in this book 
contribute to our understanding of the nuances of cross-sectoral governance 
programming. They challenge funding agencies and practitioners to push the 
boundaries in terms of design, implementation, and monitoring and take more 
risks to invest in social accountability.
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The Morocco Local Governance Program (LGP) was a US$14.7 million effort, 
implemented by RTI International between 2009 and 2014. It was designed 
to contribute to two aims laid out by the Morocco mission of the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID): (1) strengthen the 
participation of citizens, especially youth, in local governance; and (2) promote 
more effective and accountable local government. Specifically, LGP had four 
objectives:
• Improve participatory practices in elected bodies
• Improve commune19 performance
• Enhance the transparency and accountability of local authorities
• Improve collaboration between communes and state decentralized 
services.
The program’s theory of change was that “improved transparency, as well 
as better performance and greater participation, will lead to greater citizen 
confidence in their commune” (RTI International, 2014, p. 24). LGP followed 
the Morocco Local Governance Project (LGP1, 2005–2009), also implemented 
by RTI, which was organized around two major thematic areas: (1) enhancing 
government transparency and (2) improving administration performance. 
LGP thus built on the prior project’s work, but added greater emphasis on 
citizen participation, especially by youth and, to a lesser extent, women. 
Note: RTI colleagues Christian Arandel and Harry Birnholz contributed helpful comments, 
insights to project operations, and access to project documents. The narrative and analysis in this 
chapter represent the views of the author alone and are focused on LGP’s social accountability 
interventions. They do not reflect the program’s overall achievements.
19 The term commune means “local government,” whether urban or rural. Communes are 
governed by councils made up of elected councilors, led by a commune president (mayor).
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In designing and implementing program activities, the LGP technical team 
worked with several partners. At the central government level, LGP’s main 
counterpart was the General Directorate for Local Authorities (Direction 
Générale des Collectivités Locales, DGCL). LGP’s primary implementing 
partners, however, were communes that elected to participate in the program; 
a “fundamental principle of LGP implementation was the establishment of 
partnerships with communes, which were considered full partners and not 
simply beneficiaries” (RTI International, 2014, p. 5). In 2010–2011, partner 
communes were selected from 198 communes in the three regions of Rabat-
Salé-Zemmour-Zaer, Fès-Boulemane, and Doukkala-Abda. Partner communes 
needed to demonstrate “a willingness to apply good governance principles to 
improve communal performance, a commitment to involve more youth and 
women in communal life, and a readiness to provide basic services required 
by their citizens” (RTI International, 2014, pp. 4–5). By 2012, 44 communes in 
the LGP intervention areas had received support, expanding to 105 by the end 
of the program. In addition, 37 communes in other regions were involved in 
LGP’s dissemination and replication activities.
LGP relied primarily on each commune’s self-selection to participate in the 
program’s activities. It also pursued a pilot approach in which a few communes 
were designated to start an activity, with the intent of adding more communes 
later on; and sometimes preparing guides, toolkits, or models for the DGCL to 
disseminate to other communes. 
LGP also worked with the Near East Foundation to implement activities 
benefiting citizens, particularly youth; and with several private sector partners 
for specific technical tasks (such as local consulting firm AUDITAS to carry 
out internal audits). 
Context
As mentioned, LGP was preceded by LGP1, which had been involved in a 
number of reforms that supported LGP’s work. The prior project contributed 
to the development of the 2009 Communal Charter, which sought to enhance 
effectiveness of commune councils and executives, promoted greater citizen 
participation, and instituted Communal Development Plans (CDPs) to 
enhance strategic planning. Local elections in the same year resulted in 
turnover of more than half of local councilors as well as commune council 
presidents. Over 12 percent of locally elected official posts were won by 
women, compared to less than 1 percent previously, as a result of a quota for 
women’s participation in local councils (RTI International, 2014). 
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Morocco largely avoided the violent events of its neighbors during the 2011 
Arab Spring. Although there was no movement for regime change, there were 
increased calls for a constitutional monarchy, with support from both secular 
and Islamist political factions; as well as large youth demonstrations in early 
2011 (Hinnebusch, 2015). In response to these protests, the 2011 revision of 
the Constitution espouses good governance, participatory democracy, and 
gender equality, and it formally includes civil society in the enactment and 
evaluation of public policies. Even with this promising legal framework for 
enhancing social accountability, however, “the real challenge is its application 
in everyday life” (RTI International, 2014, p. 26).
At the national level, state–society relations in Morocco are characterized 
by a dynamic in which reforms intended to formally dilute the monarchy’s 
power instead often serve to reinforce it. The Moroccan king has maintained 
control by dividing the opposition and using reforms to extend opportunities 
for clientelism that tie ostensibly more empowered actors more closely to the 
royal regime. Events after 2011 have “highlighted a number of contradictions, 
such as the simultaneous promotion of change and maintenance of the status 
quo…. [M]any studies [have] found the king’s particular position to be the 
biggest beneficiary of this interplay between continuity and change” (Garcia & 
Collado, 2015, p. 47). The enduring legitimacy of the monarchy has facilitated 
continued concentration of economic and political power in the hands of elites 
close to the royal family, while partial political reforms have allowed the king 
to distance himself from the government in power and its policies. A high level 
of political pluralism, combined with a low level of social mobilization and 
effective mechanisms for co-opting the political opposition, has undermined 
the possibilities for effective social movements to coalesce (Hinnebusch, 2015; 
see also Figure 2, Chapter 2).
As a result, citizens are skeptical that any efforts on their part to exercise 
electoral or social accountability will result in concrete improvements. For 
example, after the 2011 protests, the king responded by promoting “advanced 
regionalization” as a step toward decentralization that would democratize 
and transfer powers to the regions, provide human and fiscal resources, and 
improve governance. In practice, these reforms did mandate direct election of 
all members of regional councils, implementation of decisions of the commune 
council presidents, and new channels for citizen participation. At the same 
time, however, the councils were not authorized to collect taxes, and they 
lack power to tailor political functions according to cultural, linguistic, and 
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historical differences. The limited reforms thus serve to maintain the country’s 
unitary system and centralized control of the national territory, to the benefit 
of the monarchy (Garcia & Collado, 2015). 
The central government continues to play a strong role in local governance. 
In particular, the Ministry of Interior maintains control over local financial 
and political decisions. While communes have some legislative and 
administrative powers, they control only a small portion of public budgets, 
and financial allocations are supervised by the Ministry of Interior (Montanari 
& Bergh, 2014). Even in ostensibly participatory government programs, 
such as the National Initiative for Human Development (Initiative Nationale 
pour le Développement Humain, INDH), participation usually amounts to 
consultation, as the Ministry of Interior staff from the province level collects an 
annual list of needs, rather than conducting a participatory planning exercise. 
Decision making power over INDH funds resides at the provincial level, as 
commune presidents do not control budgets and often do not attend province-
level meetings to finalize INDH proposals. Thus, the “participatory” process 
often is driven by centrally appointed officials, rather than by end users and 
local governments (Bergh, 2012).
Financial constraints, in combination with weak technical and 
administrative capacities and continuing limitations on political authority 
from the central state, undermine the communes’ role in delivering 
services needed by citizens. As a result, relations between citizens and local 
governments are often characterized by distrust:
[W]hile the commune has been assigned a crucial role in representing the 
population’s needs and priorities as part of the new decentralized policy…the 
commune (as a collective representative body composed of councilors and 
civil servants) struggles to assert its authority and accountability in a complex 
institutional landscape in which other actors and interest groups dominate 
and narrow the space for ordinary people to exercise their citizenship…. A 
direct consequence is local community frustration regarding the authorities’ 
attitudes and inaction and a sense of disenchantment and of receiving too 
little information. This arrangement under the “decentralization” scheme 
seems to have a disengaging effect vis-à-vis the local communities, ultimately 
maintaining the division between communities and authorities. (Montanari 
& Bergh, 2014, p. 18)
LGP’s activities were thus conducted in a complex and evolving 
environment. While nascent reforms opened opportunities for improvements 
in transparency, participation, accountability, and commune performance, 
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continued dominance of local governance by the central state and citizen 
distrust of the government simultaneously constrained these openings. 
General Social Accountability Approach and Specific Activities
LGP undertook both technical interventions to enhance the effectiveness of 
local governments and activities intended to deepen citizen participation. 
In addition, LGP supported communal training plans, implementation 
of the new communal tax administration, and public discussion forums. 
Most of the program’s activities, however, combined the local governance 
and the citizen participation dimensions, “promoting cooperation between 
commune representatives and local civil society, with a goal of improving 
performance through greater accountability” (RTI International, 2014, p. 35). 
In terms of social accountability aims (such as service delivery, governance 
and democracy, and empowerment; see “Framing Social Accountability” 
in Chapter 2), LGP activities were thus oriented toward improving both 
governance and empowerment. Note, however, that the program did not have 
explicit links to improving sectorally specific service delivery. Some activities 
were related to services (such as the complaints-management systems and 
internal audits), but there were no specific sectoral targets or partner agencies 
with which the program collaborated. 
Consequently, LGP stands out as an exception to the stylized patterns in 
Table 1 (Chapter 2), in which most types of social accountability action have 
service delivery improvement as an explicit aim. Because activities with social 
accountability elements cut across program objectives, they are listed below 
according to the type of social accountability action they were primarily 
oriented toward: transparency, coproduction, or compliance (again, see 
“Framing Social Accountability” in Chapter 2). Note that no LGP activities 
involved contentious/confrontational social accountability. 
Coproduction
The bulk of LGP’s social accountability activities were oriented toward 
citizens’ engagement in public policy making and planning. First, LGP 
collaborated with communes to implement participatory strategic planning 
processes to design the Communal Development Plans stipulated in the 
2009 Communal Charter. The CDP is a strategic vision that details specific 
programs a commune plans to fund and implement over a 6-year period. In 
41 communes, LGP trained and mentored local teams assigned to developing 
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CDPs. The program also supported monitoring during CDP implementation 
in 94 communes. CDP development was identified as DGCL’s highest priority 
of all LGP activities. 
Second, LGP facilitated youth engagement with local governments, as 
young people had been previously excluded from policy making and planning. 
To this end, LGP supported the establishment of structures for dialogue 
between young people and their communes, particularly through local 
youth councils. The program trained youth, facilitated meetings with elected 
officials, issued small grants to support youth council initiatives, and organized 
a study tour to the United States for members of local youth councils and 
young parliamentarians.
Third, LGP offered the Communal Performance Framework (CPF) 
as a means of monitoring commune performance, building on RTI’s 
implementation of the Local Governance Development Framework in several 
other countries. (For more information on the Local Governance Development 
Framework, see Bell & Bland, 2014.) The CPF is a participatory and iterative 
self-monitoring and evaluation system for local governments. By assessing 
relative performance on key functions against established national and 
international benchmarks, the CPF was intended to promote dialogue with 
citizens on commune performance and to engage citizens in both generating 
and discussing information on commune performance over time. 
Finally, the Commission for Equity and Equal Opportunities 
(Commission de la Parité et de l’Egalité des Chances, CPEC) was envisioned as 
the primary communication channel for engaging and involving civil society 
in communal life under the 2009 Communal Charter. LGP supported 10 
communes interested in fulfilling this mandate.
LGP also worked to promote women’s participation, centered on female 
elected officials. As noted previously, women made gains in representation 
during the 2009 local elections but continued to be marginalized by 
their fellow officials. LGP activities included a diagnostic study of 
women’s participation, trainings, creation of networks, and facilitation of 
communications among women officials. While this activity had social 
accountability elements (strengthening the role of previously excluded social 
groups to hold government accountable for meeting their needs), it focused 
primarily on strengthening electoral democracy. Therefore I have included it 
among this list of LGP activities of interest in terms of social accountability, 
and have omitted further discussion from the case study.
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Compliance
Some of LGP’s activities also focused on citizens’ monitoring and oversight of 
public policies, programs, and services. In five communes (El Jadida, Safi, Fès, 
Kénitra, and Séfrou) the program worked with officials to set up complaints-
management systems “to improve practices for welcoming, processing, and 
responding to complaints, grievances, and other claims from individuals and 
corporations” (RTI International, 2014, p. 21). The systems would allow for 
tracking of how and by whom complaints were responded to, as a means of 
rebuilding confidence in relations among the commune, citizens, and clients, 
and reducing opportunities for corruption (RTI International, 2011). LGP 
provided a needs assessment, recommendations, and an action plan; supported 
the setup of systems to manage complaints and mediation; and strengthened 
capacity for receiving and addressing complaints.
Note that evaluation and monitoring of CDPs and CPFs, as well as the 
work of CPECs (already categorized as coproduction in the previous section), 
also involved a compliance element. These activities were designed to involve 
citizens in evaluating whether commune initiatives addressed community 
priorities and in assessing progress on commune performance targets 
identified in the CPF.
Transparency
Two LGP activities related to the collection, analysis, and dissemination 
of information on public policies, programs, and services. In four pilot 
communes (Safi, El Jadida, Séfrou, and Salé), LGP facilitated local 
communication plans. The plans were intended to document and 
disseminate information on communal initiatives and citizens’ expectations 
of the commune, as well as the legal framework and national policy related 
to local governance (RTI International, 2014). Before the development 
of communication plans, communes lacked structured mechanisms for 
channeling information, internally or externally. The plans identified specific 
actions that the commune would take to share information, such as installing 
better signage, putting out press releases, and organizing media activities 
around specific events. During LGP implementation, this activity was closely 
related to other activities (such as sharing information about complaints-
management systems and CDPs). It is therefore not discussed independently.
LGP also supported internal audits in three communes (Salé, El Jadida, 
and Safi). Rather than increasing accountability to citizens, this activity largely 
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focused on strengthening officials’ technical capacities to identify and remedy 
problems in specific areas of commune responsibility (taxation, purchasing 
and procurement, public health, urban planning, wholesale markets, 
slaughterhouses, legal affairs and litigation, administrative services, inventory, 
and asset management). However, the DGCL’s commitment to including this 
activity was considered by program staff to represent a significant shift in 
official attitudes. After resisting internal audits during LGP1, under LGP, the 
DGCL supported greater opening of commune affairs to external scrutiny in 
a depoliticized, consistent manner, with the intent of ensuring accountability, 
rather than as a means of exerting central government control (RTI Interna-
tional, 2014). In this way, internal audits contributed to a broader push to 
increase transparency and responsiveness in service delivery.
Implementation of Social Accountability Interventions
Communal Development Plans
CDPs were not part of LGP’s original program plans but were included at 
the request of the DGCL and many of the partner communes to fulfill the 
requirement set out in the 2009 Communal Charter. In 2011, during start-
up consultations with DGCL, provinces and commune council presidents 
indicated that support for communes to prepare CDPs was the top priority. 
The DGCL had previously instructed the commune presidents on how to 
prepare CDPs, including completing a participatory diagnosis and engaging 
different societal groups from the commune. However, the DGCL had 
provided very little practical support to communes to implement these 
instructions. Training was limited and guidelines were delayed. Also, 
communes that successfully completed CDPs received no greater priority in 
budget allocations, even though the plans were an official requirement for 
receiving central funding. As a result, many communes did not complete 
CDPs and instead relied on consultants to comply with the law, which did not 
expand citizen participation or increase commune officials’ capacity. 
In response to the DGCL’s expressed interest, LGP organized workshops for 
commune teams responsible for developing key aspects of the CDP process, 
with group trainings for rural communes and more directed coaching support 
for larger urban communes. Team members joined province-level training 
sessions on participatory strategic planning, development of action plans, and 
multiyear budgeting. LGP also supported commune technical teams through 
 Social Accountability and Governance 109
the CDP development process, providing capacity building and skills transfer 
through expert coaches as the commune teams carried out each CDP stage. 
During 2011, LGP supported 41 partner communes to develop CDPs 
using participatory approaches. CDP development involved consultation 
with various community interest groups (youth, neighborhood associations, 
other civil society actors) who were asked “for the first time to contribute to 
the vision for development of their commune” (RTI International, 2011, p. 
20). In 2012, an LGP survey of civil society associations in partner communes 
indicated that 25 percent of respondents had been personally involved in at 
least one CDP development phase. Participation increased to 34 percent for 
those who self-identified as very interested in communal affairs and 39 percent 
for those with university degrees (RTI International, 2012).
After completing CDPs (Stage 1), communes faced the challenge of 
securing necessary financing for identified priorities by competing with other 
communes for central government and national program support. In response, 
LGP, the DGCL, and regional and provincial administrations developed 
Stage 2 of CDP activities, which included training and coaching on monitoring 
and evaluation techniques, participatory methods, and advocacy for resources 
for CDP projects. Communes’ demand for participation in this stage exceeded 
expectations, so to accommodate all requests, LGP organized province-level 
trainings for clusters of rural communes for training and coaching workshops. 
Urban centers received individualized support.
By the time the program ended, LGP had supported setup of systems for 
CDP monitoring and evaluation in 94 communes (Stage 2). In larger cities, 
commune officials presented CDPs to youth councils as part of efforts to 
improve communications with them. LGP also supported communes to put in 
place mechanisms to self-assess progress and verify whether implementation 
was taking place (H. A. Birnholz, personal communication, July 22, 2015). 
In an evaluation survey conducted by the program, 54 percent of responding 
communes reported that they had adopted at least 50 percent of actions 
specified in CDPs by the end of 2014 (RTI International, 2014).
Overall, the CDP process was effective in involving local stakeholders 
in CDP development, implementation, and monitoring, as the process 
created demand for participation, including from citizens and associations. 
Commune officials gained understanding of participatory planning concepts 
and developed skills to replicate CDPs in fulfillment of Communal Charter 
requirements (RTI International, 2014). There remained, however, a concern 
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that lack of institutional supports could jeopardize CDP sustainability. 
Commune general secretaries were seen as having limited capacity to 
coordinate and mobilize officials, who in turn had few incentives to take on the 
additional workload involved. Further, few communes had dedicated planning 
structures to rely on for completing CDPs. As of mid-2015, the DGCL had 
not yet provided additional funding to communes that had completed their 
CDPs, thereby creating disincentives for the communes to dedicate future 
resources to updating and monitoring those CDPs (H. A. Birnholz, personal 
communication, July 22, 2015). Finally, although the CDPs contained plans 
for many projects and actions that were identified as participatory, it was not 
certain at the end of the program that their impact was evident to commune 
residents (RTI International, 2014). This raises the possibility that citizens may 
not see the value of engaging in subsequent CDP processes. 
Youth Councils
In Morocco, youths aged 15–29 make up about 30 percent of the population 
(Janah et al., 2014).20 This important demographic group faces substantial 
problems, such as unemployment and lack of education, but has historically 
been excluded from local political engagement. To address this concern, 
the 2011 Constitution calls for the creation of a national consultative body 
on youth and civic associations, and a National Strategy for Integration of 
Youth has been drawn up for implementation between 2015 and 2030. Local 
youth councils were intended to address several constraints to young people’s 
participation in communal affairs. First, mutual distrust between youth and 
communal leaders has interfered with constructive communications. Second, 
youth lack tools and skills to effectively participate in local governance. Finally, 
no mechanisms have been available for youth to participate in communal life. 
The youth councils that LGP supported were consultative and collaborative 
structures to facilitate increased youth participation in politics in general, 
and in communal life in particular. The councils were designed to allow for 
dialogue and discussion between youth and commune officials around local 
decisions, to better align them with young people’s priorities. LGP supported 
the establishment of youth councils in 10 communes (Séfrou, Ain Cheggag, 
Sidi Hrazem, Safi, El Jadida, Jemaat Shim, Moulay Abdellah, Ayir, Sidi Ismail, 
and Kénitra). 
20 In addition to Janah et al. (2014), this section draws from personal communications with 
Harry Birnholz (July 27, 2015) and from an LGP impact evaluation of youth-related activities 
(Jazouli, 2014).
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Youth council participants were drawn primarily from formally registered 
youth organizations, to ensure that the commune would see them as legitimate. 
In communes where associations were less well developed (such as Jemaat 
Shim and Ayir), LGP helped issue an open call for candidates for the youth 
councils. Once youth council representatives had been identified, the members 
elected a gender-balanced executive committee to interface with the commune. 
The executive committee consisted of three to four youth and three to four 
elected officials or commune staff. In addition, the youth councils set up 
thematic commissions on topics of interest to young people, such as projects, 
culture, social events, and communications. A set of initial meetings then 
followed, to build capacity and provide a structured process to formulate each 
youth council’s priorities. LGP provided training in how to present projects, 
resolve conflicts, and develop a common vocabulary between youth and the 
commune. Elected officials and commune staff participated in these meetings, 
to start the dialogue and build trust. 
Subsequently, various opportunities for dialogue—such as roundtables, 
forums, and thematic meetings—were organized to identify youth priorities 
that could be realized. Initially, these meetings were quite contentious and 
focused on grievances. Municipalities often lacked resources to respond to 
all expressed needs, and officials therefore had to negotiate with the youth 
councils on priorities. Support from commune presidents varied, with some 
perceiving youth councils as a means of responding to issues raised during 
2011 demonstrations, but others seeing greater openness as an unnecessary 
risk. In most locations, however, at least one or two interested councilors 
supported work with the youth council. 
Collaboration between youth councils and communes was strengthened 
through involvement in joint activities to develop projects that corresponded 
to youth priorities. In Kénitra and Moulay Abdellah, communes organized 
open-door days in which commune offices welcomed youth, to inform them 
of available services and identify youth proposals for improvements. In Safi 
and El Jadida, open-door days focused on employability and entrepreneurship. 
Youth councils also initiated information campaigns and roundtables on 
topics of interest to youth, such as infrastructure, local development, and 
the environment. LGP awarded small grants to four projects resulting from 
commune-youth council collaborations:
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• In Safi, a communal library was renovated to create a space where youth 
and commune actors could communicate.
• In Séfrou, the partnerships held roundtables, debates, and clean-up 
campaigns in three marginalized neighborhoods, which also helped to 
put in place three local cells of youth volunteers to follow up on the initial 
efforts. The national INDH project funded the extension of this model to 
other neighborhoods.
• A permanent space in Ain Cheggag was prepared for youth to engage 
in activities that would benefit young people in the commune. These 
activities resulted in the youth council bringing together several related 
actors (communal officials, INDH, private sector, local groups) to solve 
problems identified by youth, such as access to electricity.
• The Kénitra youth council worked in three marginalized neighborhoods 
to engage youth, through cleanup and renovation of a tunnel leading to a 
local university, as well as establishment of a library and a sports center. 
LGP’s youth activities achieved considerable success by the end of the 
program. This program achievement was demonstrated by high levels of local 
visibility and participation in activities organized by youth councils. In a 2014 
citizen survey, 55 percent of respondents indicated they had participated in 
youth council activities (compared to 7 percent for CPEC and 20 percent for 
complaints-management mechanisms and CDPs). Youth also felt strongly that 
LGP activities were effective, as 70 percent reported that they significantly 
impacted their communes (Berrada, 2014).
LGP’s support to youth councils had effects on several levels. Most 
fundamentally, youth councils helped to build the capacity and networks of 
individual youth leaders. At the communal level, young people’s interests 
became better reflected by and taken into account by officials at several 
sites. For example, the El Jadida youth council was involved in developing 
the communal budget. In Kénitra, the youth council gave input to the CDP 
that resulted in funding for a center to house community groups and their 
activities; while the youth council in Safi organized a forum to discuss CDP 
implementation. Some youth councils began to advocate for specific services, 
such as transport in Kénitra and Moulay Abdellah and electricity in Ain 
Cheggag. In Moulay Abdellah, the youth council also advocated for the 
construction of a middle school to improve access to education.
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Communal officials also became more aware of the importance of including 
young people in local affairs. After the establishment of the youth councils, 
interactions with commune governments to discuss youth priorities increased 
in frequency. Four of the commune presidents began directly communicating 
with their youth councils (Kénitra, Ain Cheggag, Moulay Abdallah, and 
Jemaat Shim). Proof of commune support for youth councils includes facilities 
provided for activities (roundtables, exhibitions, etc.), invitations to events 
(such as commune-organized festivals), permanent space for six of the youth 
councils (Kénitra, Ain Cheggag, Séfrou, Safi, Moulay Abdellah, Ayir), and 
technical and financial support for youth council activities. 
Youth councils demonstrated independent initiative, without LGP 
support, such as regional meetings between councils in Séfrou and Safi. The 
youth councils also had an impact at the national level. In 2013, the youth 
councils decided to form a national association (Association Marocaine 
pour l’Appui aux Conseils Locaux des Jeunes, AMACLJ) after meeting with 
young parliamentarians. That meeting helped youth council members to see 
the possibilities and means of collaboration and coordination among the 
councils, and prompted the establishment of AMACLJ. The organization’s 
purpose is to institutionalize participation of youth at the local level. Through 
collaboration with young parliamentarians, youth councils and commune 
actors also advocated for the creation of a national youth council (Conseil 
Consultatif de la Jeunesse et de l’Action Associative). Two meetings organized 
by the El Jadida and Séfrou youth councils also resulted in recommendations 
for the inclusion of a youth dimension to revised legislation on the commune 
(RTI International, 2014). Notably, in May 2015, a new law on regional 
governments included provisions for consultation commissions on youth in 
regional councils, lending further legitimacy to youth participation.
Until they have clear legal support, however, youth councils may have 
difficulty generating funds and other resources to support their activities. Some 
communes have recognized youth councils through administrative actions, 
but these could be overturned by subsequent commune presidents. The youth 
councils have therefore mobilized through AMACLJ to institutionalize youth 
participation at the local level. Some of the youth councils have also developed 
strong partnerships and abilities to mobilize funds from both private and 
public sources. For example, the Kénitra and Ain Cheggag youth councils 
mobilized universities and local organizations, and involved Peace Corps 
volunteers in their activities. The Séfrou youth council accessed INDH funds 
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to expand activities to additional neighborhoods. These youth councils have 
better prospects for sustainability than others that have been less successful at 
mobilizing resources. 
Complaints-Management Systems
To establish complaints-management systems, LGP began by conducting 
diagnostics of existing systems in Fès, El Jadida, and Safi. The diagnostics 
revealed that prior mechanisms were not transparent, were ineffective and 
unsystematic, and often failed to route complaints to the officials responsible 
for improvements. For example, El Jadida had no clear guidelines on how to 
process citizens’ complaints, which would often be lost or transferred to the 
wrong department. Citizens who did complain did not receive a response, 
“which fostered feelings of frustration and distrust toward the commune 
and its staff ” (RTI International, 2012, p. 24). The El Jadida commune 
council president expressed strong support for a new system, as he reported 
spending more than 80 percent of his time responding to citizen requests and 
complaints. 
After the initial diagnostics, LGP developed recommendations and an 
action plan to improve current systems, supported setup of new complaints-
management systems, and provided capacity building for responsible 
commune staff. LGP also assisted with developing plans and mobilizing 
resources for conveniently located and clearly designated sites for receiving 
and registering citizen complaints. In all three pilot communes, the executive 
leadership demonstrated strong interest in improving the response to citizen 
complaints. Séfrou and Kénitra communes asked to participate in the fourth 
year of the program, bringing the number of pilot communes to five.
Even with the strong leadership support, improvements in complaints 
management met with certain challenges. Delays in some communes occurred 
due to problems assigning dedicated staff and providing funding and facilities. 
The launch of the complaints-managements system in Fès was hampered by 
arrondissement (borough)–level administrative and elected officials. These 
officials resisted the introduction of the system, which they perceived as 
“undermining their direct relationship and influence with citizens” (RTI 
International, 2013, p. 5). LGP organized meetings with arrondissement and 
commune officials to facilitate the system’s introduction, and considered 
excluding Fès from this pilot activity, although in the end the commune was 
included. 
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Overall, however, the systems took off quite quickly; during the first six 
months of the 2013–2014 program year, over 700 complaints were received, of 
which 250 were successfully processed. In all five pilot communes (El Jadida, 
Safi, Fès, Kénitra, and Séfrou), complaints-management units were established, 
and all of them demonstrated improvements in receiving, managing, and 
monitoring complaints from citizens.21 These efforts also contributed to 
improved relationships between commune officials and citizens, with some 
officials acknowledging the system’s contributions in helping them identify 
citizens’ priorities for improvements, and citizens recognizing the commune’s 
efforts to address problems (RTI International, 2014). LGP also developed 
Web-based software for complaints management to allow citizens to follow 
progress on resolving complaints. Séfrou installed the system, overcoming 
technical challenges of limited Internet service; and the other four communes 
were expected to adopt it, as well. Finally, the program developed a handbook 
for DGCL to inform other communes about how to establish a complaints-
management system.
There was strong support from the leaders of the pilot communes for 
sustaining complaints-management systems, as well as satisfactory capacity for 
system management. With El Jadida’s new system, for example, the commune 
leaders aimed to enhance service quality by using citizens’ complaints to 
identify needs and expectations, so that the commune could set priorities that 
would reflect community concerns. The commune committed to responding 
to citizens within 2 weeks with a solution or information about how the 
complaint was being processed, and found that local department heads usually 
responded within the 5-day deadline set in the complaints-management 
system. Complaints were compiled into a database for the commune to use 
as a dashboard to focus its improvements. The commune council president of 
El Jadida acknowledged that the system was more transparent than previously 
and more accountable to citizens.
In addition, national-level interest arose regarding replication and a 
constitutional guarantee of citizens’ rights to complain (Article 156). However, 
no clear national strategy emerged for supporting local-level complaints 
mechanisms. Communes continued to lack resources to fund system setup and 
21 In all of 2013, some 1,376 complaints were received in three communes, and commune 
officials responded to 54 percent of these. During January–September 2014, four communes 
received 1,615 complaints from citizens, and they responded to 48 percent (RTI International, 
2014, p. 19).
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staff time to manage it. Some elected officials and civil servants also objected to 
the approach, “which they consider encroaching upon their traditional role as 
intermediaries between citizens and the commune, and thus questions one of 
their functions” (RTI International, 2014, p. 34). These factors may jeopardize 
further replication of complaints mechanisms beyond the pilot communes that 
received LGP support. 
CPECs
LGP supported the establishment of CPECs through a three-step process. 
First, the program held three regional workshops, attended by representatives 
from 35 communes, to inform them of the process for establishing a CPEC. 
Second, in the 12 communes that expressed interest, program staff organized 
local workshops with commune officials to provide more detail on the process 
of operationalizing CPECs, including choosing appropriate members. Finally, 
LGP provided training and support to CPEC members, once selected, to 
strengthen their ability to effectively carry out a consultative role. 
Although the CPECs were supported by the 2009 Communal Charter,22 
establishing and facilitating the functioning of these bodies met with some 
challenges. Commune presidents were slow to start the process of establishing 
CPECs “because they still identify dialogue as a challenge to their authority” 
(RTI International, 2012, p. 3). The expectation of elections in 2012 may 
have further contributed to commune presidents’ reluctance, as civil society 
actors questioned the establishment of a new commission at the start of a new 
election cycle (RTI International, 2012).
LGP worked successfully to assuage some of these concerns by 
communicating with communes and by building a critical mass of CPECs 
in the program regions. For example, after lengthy dialogue with program 
staff, the commune presidents of the large urban centers of Fès and Kénitra 
agreed to establish CPECs in 2012. By the end of the program, 10 communes 
had set up CPECs. Six commune councils had solicited the advice of their 
CPECs, and two CPECs had provided guidance to commune councils 
(RTI International, 2014).
After they were established, however, the committees did not generate 
momentum to continue to work independently. The LGP final report 
attributed this result to several factors:
22 The Charter allowed for creation of a CPEC through direct appointment by the mayor or by 
recommendation from a civil society organization.
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• Mismatched expectations from stakeholders. Elected officials were reluctant 
to take advice from an unelected committee, and civil society members 
were not satisfied with a more limited, consultative role.
• Unclear requirements for establishing CPECs. Challenges included establishing 
objective criteria for selecting CPEC members from local associations 
to avoid politicization, as well as determining who had the authority to 
appoint members. 
• Difficulty ensuring equal gender representation. Women were supposed to be 
equitably represented in CPECs, but balance was especially difficult to 
achieve in rural communes. 
• Lack of budget:.Without funding, CPECs were unable to operate as 
expected.
The CPEC experience illustrates the difficulty of imposing accountability 
to citizens on local councils, especially when such structures overlap with 
the authority of elected officials. The LGP final report concluded that elected 
officials would continue to resist efforts by higher levels of government to 
impose permanent consultative structures on commune councils, as such 
structures were likely to be perceived as competing for power, rather than 
mechanisms for collaborating with citizens (RTI International, 2014).
Communal Performance Framework
LGP’s work on the CPF focused on two pilot communes23—Séfrou and 
El Jadida—to test the approach, which could then be shared with other 
communes through a central working group. In these communes, the 
CPF process was expected to be managed by the commune council, which 
would initiate an internal reflection process in improving local governance. 
Citizen participation was anticipated through community discussion of 
constraints and solutions to improve communal performance, with the 
involvement of commune councils, commune managers, technicians, the 
CPEC, and youth councils. The CPF was intended to reinforce participatory 
tools and approaches introduced through the CDP process, and to increase 
accountability and transparency of commune performance to citizens (RTI 
International, 2011).
23 Original plans to develop CPFs in 12 communes were scaled back to these two pilot communes 
(Sefrou and El Jadida) at the request of the DGCL.
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However, CPF activities faced persistent challenges with involving 
commune employees. There were few incentives for staff to work on the 
CPF, as commune presidents provided little support for an additional LGP 
activity. LGP adapted by planning activities on days when employees were 
expected to report to work, or in the evenings by agreement with commune 
staff, but delays still resulted (RTI International, 2012). These delays affected 
several program activities (internal audit, complaints management, commune 
communication plans). In spite of these accommodations, it became clear in 
2012 that local governments in Séfrou and El Jadida could not commit to the 
CPF process—which required continuous involvement of commune employees 
during important design phases—due to lack of support from elected officials 
and competing work demands (RTI International, 2013). CPF activities were 
thus suspended.
In early 2013, however, commune officials and staff from both pilot sites 
approached LGP about restarting CPF activities—and Kénitra also expressed 
interest in starting the CPF process in 2013 (RTI International, 2013). To 
demonstrate their commitment, each commune president created a formal 
team to complete the CPF process. LGP supported the commune councils to 
complete a modified set of activities. Rather than completing a self-evaluation 
and reassessment cycle, as originally planned, LGP supported the testing, 
validation, and documentation of the CPF approach in the program time 
that remained. By the end of LGP, commune councils had validated the 
action plans developed, and expressed commitment to implementing them in 
June 2015. 
Pilot communes reported that the CPF activities were valuable as they 
helped the council develop a realistic plan for performance improvements 
(RTI International, 2014). LGP’s CPF work can therefore be considered a 
limited success, in that it strengthened supply-side capacity in two communes. 
However, it was not as widely implemented or as participatory as originally 
envisioned. Because CPF reassessments were not feasible in the limited time 
available, the intended commune–civil society dialogue over local government 
performance did not take place. 
Part of the explanation for the limited results is that this activity was 
not a central government priority. The DGCL limited the scope of CPF 
activities to the two pilot communes, and also did not make available central 
resources for replication after the shift to the pilot commune strategy. Further, 
communes have few incentives within the current legal framework to adopt 
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self-assessment, which explains why commune presidents did not initially 
dedicate resources to CPF activities.
Internal Audits
In all three communes where internal audits were piloted, dedicated units 
were set up with LGP support. They conducted audits of commune services 
or operations, such as markets and bus stations. Even though internal 
audits were new to Moroccan communes, the process was well received. 
The LGP final report noted that internal audits “now enjoy strong DGCL 
support, which is committed to promoting the process and disseminated 
tools” (RTI International, 2014, p. 23). As the program ended in December 
2014, there were plans to replicate audits in 16 communes with government 
support. During LGP, citizens were not engaged in the internal audits, but 
there is future potential for “foster[ing] greater accountability through 
effective civil society monitoring of communal actions. Thus, the internal audit 
activities could bring about real debates that engage citizens and communes” 
(RTI International, 2014, p. 36). 
Effects of Program’s Efforts to Promote Social Accountability
The effects of LGP’s social accountability activities were nuanced and complex. 
The program facilitated distinct improvements in commune governance and 
in enhanced citizen empowerment, as well as some modest improvements in 
service delivery. 
Governance
Even in an environment of distrust between citizens and the commune, LGP 
social accountability activities made inroads toward closer collaboration with 
citizens to improve the quality of local governance. As detailed previously, 
the program had a number of technical achievements that strengthened 
integrity of commune operations (especially through CDPs and complaints-
management systems) and that increased citizens’ active engagement in 
public affairs (such as collaboration with youth councils and development of 
CDPs). Complementing the activities described in the previous section, LGP’s 
work to support communication plans and internal audits contributed to 
improving transparency of commune operations. Commune officials’ support 
for improved communications and the DGCL’s plans to replicate audits in 
additional communes represented a shift in government attitudes toward 
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greater sharing of information, which is an important step toward greater 
social accountability. 
In particular, communes’ receptiveness to citizen participation appears 
to have increased, with the number of commune activities open to citizen 
participation substantially exceeding program targets.24 As mentioned earlier, 
over 50 percent of communes reported substantial progress on implementing 
CDP projects identified with citizen input. Of elected officials who participated 
in LGP activities, 89 percent reported that the program contributed to 
enhancing citizen participation, and 55 percent perceived this contribution to 
be very significant (RTI International, 2014). 
Citizens also took advantage of these opportunities, with statistically 
significant increases in survey respondents reporting that they had participated 
in a commune-organized activity (see Table 10). These outcomes point to 
improved governance in communes that participated in LGP’s activities. 
Table 10. Selected performance monitoring indicators from LGP citizen surveys:  
2011, 2013, 2014
Performance monitoring indicator 2011 2013 2014
Participated in an event or public activity organized 
by the commune (2.1)
21% 30%* 43%*
Agree that commune communication is … (2.3.3)
 … very effective 5% 6% 5%
 … somewhat effective 45% 47% 53%*
Report general confidence in commune council (2.3) 40% 36% 39%
*  Signifies statistically significant difference from prior survey round (p < 0.05). 
Source: Berrada (2014). 
Empowerment
The program’s youth activities were the most visible of all its efforts, 
and arguably made the most substantive contribution toward greater 
empowerment. In the 2014 citizen survey, 64 percent of respondents reported 
that they had heard of local youth councils, compared to 12 percent for the 
CPEC and about 40 percent for CDP and complaints-management systems 
(Berrada, 2014)25 The youth councils gave young people—often frustrated by 
24 The target for performance monitoring indicator AO1, “number of communal initiatives and 
actions that encourage citizen participation, especially by youth” was 260, while the number of 
activities identified during LGP was 413 (RTI International, 2014, Table 4).
25 The survey did not ask about any other project activities. 
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their exclusion from government processes—a formal channel to undertake 
development and advocacy activities, sometimes in collaboration with 
commune officials and national parliamentarians. The youth activities resulted 
in structures that empowered youth at commune, regional, and national levels. 
In program surveys, 97 percent of elected officials and 80 percent of youth 
reported that they believed the councils would continue to exist after LGP 
ended (RTI International, 2014).
In addition to the youth councils, complaints-management systems 
contributed to citizen empowerment. Community members enthusiastically 
used these systems to voice their grievances. Further, CDP processes gave 
citizens a new avenue for communicating their needs to the commune. 
There was some concern, however, that implementation of projects identified 
in CDP was not visible to citizens, which could undermine their sense of 
empowerment in the future (RTI International, 2014).
Service Delivery
Finally, although service delivery was not an explicit LGP objective, some 
localized improvements in public services were attributable to the program’s 
social accountability activities. Specifically, the complaints-management 
systems and youth councils led to communes undertaking improvements 
or providing new services (for example, water and sanitation, youth centers, 
electricity) at specific sites where problems were identified through these 
mechanisms. The LGP experience suggests that social accountability actions 
do not automatically achieve service delivery aims (see Table 1 in Chapter 2), 
but need to be explicitly tied to specific services for gains to result.
Effects on Community Confidence in LGP Partner Communes
As noted in the “Effects on Community Confidence” section, LGP activities 
contributed to each of the expected outcomes of social accountability efforts. 
Alongside positive shifts in governance and empowerment, there were nascent 
improvements in citizens’ perceptions of commune councils, as posited in the 
program’s theory of change. During the last 2 years of the program, there was a 
small but statistically significant improvement in the proportion reporting that 
commune communications were “somewhat effective” (Table 10). This change 
indicated that citizens did recognize communes’ efforts to engage with citizens. 
However, this recognition had not yet translated into greater trust; citizens 
122  Chapter 7
did not report a statistically significant change in confidence in the commune 
council over the course of the program (Table 10). 
Part of the explanation for citizens’ continued low levels of confidence in 
the commune was that “lack of trust between citizens and their communes is 
a chronic condition of Moroccan governance, [and] has its roots in decades 
of security-focused local administration in the country” (RTI International, 
2014, pp. 24–25; see also Montanari & Bergh, 2014). The LGP final report also 
posited several other reasons for the unchanged levels of confidence reported 
by citizens. Improvements in communal performance were not yet generally 
visible to citizens (as noted in the previous section under “Empowerment”) 
and therefore were not increasing citizens’ trust in local governments. The LGP 
case suggests that trust in the local government does not increase directly from 
opportunities for participation and improved communication alone (refer to 
Table 2 in Chapter 2). Stronger links between participation, communication, 
and sectorally specific services in LGP’s design may have led to concrete public 
service improvements that, in turn, garnered gains in trust.
Further, LGP activities highlighted a tension between electoral and social 
accountability. The limited uptake of the CPEC and CPFs illustrated elected 
officials’ reluctance to cede oversight to citizens. Although “[p]articipation 
in planning and discussing issues is well accepted, civil society’s rights to 
hold communes accountable for their management and performance have 
not garnered widespread buy-in” (RTI International, 2014, p. 36). Further 
expansion of complaints-management systems and internal audits may 
contribute to changing these attitudes over the longer term by increasing 
transparency of commune operations and receptiveness to accountability. 
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Social Accountability in Cross-Sectoral Service 
Delivery: The Leadership, Empowerment, 




The United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) 
Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy, and Development (LEAD) project 
started in 2009, and was originally intended to run for 5 years on a budget of 
US$40 million.26 It was extended until 2016, however, with a shift in objectives 
and expansion of geographic scope, as described below.
Objectives
LEAD’s theory of change was that “by addressing both the demand and 
supply side of local government service, accountability and development 
will be strengthened, which makes the system work more effectively through 
partnership building” (The Mitchell Group, 2013, p. 7). The project aimed to 
achieve four original objectives:
1. Strengthen local government capacity to build relations with 
communities, and improve effective management of services.
2. Increase transparency of local government operations through a 
participatory budget process, better monitoring, and introduction of 
mandated fiscal responsibility and public procurement laws. 
Note: RTI colleagues Tijjani Mohammed, Callistus Donatus, Yvonne Sidhom, and Annette 
Uhlenberg contributed project documents, operational insights, and thorough comments on 
earlier drafts. F. Henry Healey of RTI provided helpful comments and parallels to the Nigeria 
Northern Education Initiative (NEI) case study that appears elsewhere in this book. The narrative 
and analysis in this chapter represent the views of the author alone and are focused on LEAD’s 
social accountability interventions. They do not reflect the project’s overall achievements.
26 In 2013, LEAD’s USAID funding was augmented by US$2 million from Chevron Corporation 
to expand project activities, adding Rivers State to Bauchi and Sokoto, which were LEAD’s 
original focus states. Because Rivers began activities 2 years later than Sokoto and Bauchi, the 
narrative in this chapter focuses on the latter two states unless otherwise indicated.
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3. Strengthen capacity of local organizations for service planning, 
budgeting, and monitoring.
4. Improve service delivery through support to selected local government 
services, such as water and sanitation, and through collaboration with 
other USAID/Nigeria Focus States Strategy projects in education and 
health.27
Each of the first three objectives had direct links to social accountability. 
Although Objective 1 primarily focused on strengthening the supply side, 
it encouraged engagement with citizens as an avenue to enhance local 
governments’ decision making and effective service delivery (Table 11). The 
second objective aimed for greater transparency through increased citizen 
participation in planning, and the third addressed the demand side by building 
civil society and community-based organizations’ ability to engage with local 
governments.28 
27 Specifically, USAID Nigeria facilitated/encouraged collaboration with two projects—Northern 
Education Initiative (NEI) (see case study) and Targeted States High Impact Project (TSHIP)—
both of which worked in LEAD’s original target states of Bauchi and Sokoto. 
28 For an explanation of the various types of social accountability purposes (service delivery, 
governance and democracy, and empowerment) and actions (transparency, coproduction, 
compliance, confrontation) described in these case studies, please refer to “Framing Social 
Accountability” in Chapter 2.
Table 11.  Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy, and Development (LEAD) program 
activities, by objective
OBJECTIVE 1: Strengthen local government capacity
Local Government Development Framework (LGDF): The LGDF, introduced by RTI, was a 
collective self-assessment of LGA performance that provided inputs for a targeted capacity 
building plan (Bell & Bland, 2014). It was administered annually in CLGAs. Among the 
participants were representatives from civil society. 
Strengthening of Ward Development Committees (WDCs): WDCs existed before LEAD 
began; they were the primary mechanism for mobilizing communities in CLGAs. LEAD 
assessed WDCs’ technical and management capabilities and degree of representativeness as 
the basis for action plans for organizational development. 
Community priority setting: Introduced by LEAD, this process began with broad 
participation at the ward level and built toward LGA-wide priorities to be included in CLGA 
annual budgets. 
Community-Based Strategic Plans (CBSPs): CBSPs drew on the results of community 
priority-setting to provide CLGAs with a guide for decisions on infrastructure and services 
based on citizens’ expressed needs. CBSPs did not exist before LEAD.
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(continued)
Table 11.  Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy, and Development (LEAD) program 
activities, by objective
OBJECTIVE 1: Strengthen local government capacity (continued)
Town hall meetings: LEAD introduced these meetings for CLGAs to report publicly on 
annual activities and budget implementation, as a way to build a culture of accountability 
and regular reporting to citizens.
LGA archiving and document access systems: LEAD established record-keeping systems 
to facilitate public access to key LGA documents, such as budget, personnel, and council 
records. 
OBJECTIVE 2: Increase transparency of local government operations
Internally generated revenues: LEAD found that LGAs were heavily reliant on federal grants, 
which had shrunk in size in recent years. In response, LEAD facilitated the establishment of 
Taxpayers’ Consultative Forums to map potential revenues, register taxpayers, and identify 
sources with highest potential for internally generated revenues.
Policy reforms: The project worked with CLGAs to operationalize existing fiscal 
responsibility and procurement laws, which often had not been implemented by local 
governments. 
Stakeholder budget working groups: The purpose of these working groups was to 
“sensitize government to budget issues and to identify significant areas for improvement” 
(The Mitchell Group, 2013, p. 17). The groups operated at the state level, and members 
included traditional and religious leaders, civil society organizations (CSOs), the media, 
elected representatives, and officials from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Budget 
and Economic Planning, and the Office of the Auditor General. For LEAD’s focus on health 
and education during the 2015–2016 extension, the budget working groups were cascaded 
down to LGAs.
OBJECTIVE 3: Strengthen capacity of local organizations
Organizational capacity assessments and strengthening: Capacity assessments of LEAD’s 
CSO subgrantee partners were updated over time to gauge progress and identify priorities 
for improving core capacities. Core capacities encompassed establishment of organizational 
objectives, governance, operations and management systems, human resources, financial 
and assets management, program planning, project management, strategic planning, 
community mobilization, and results monitoring.
Community Partnership Program grants: LEAD’s grants to CSOs encouraged collaboration 
between local governments and communities, supported CSO capacity building, and 
contributed to service improvements. Activities often were identified through CBSPs and 
service improvements prioritized by community members. 
Mapping of state- and community-level organizations: LEAD built a database of CSOs 
active in each state and CLGA to facilitate linkages to donors and other development 
organizations. 
Building and strengthening of CSO networks: LEAD supported CSO networking for peer-
to-peer support and advocacy.
Public expenditure tracking: LEAD trained CSOs in how to gather information, analyze 
budget implementation, and examine performance related to service delivery. 
(continued)
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Table 11.  Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy, and Development (LEAD) program 
activities, by objective
OBJECTIVE 4: Improve service delivery
Service Improvement Plans (SIPs): LEAD facilitated SIP development through a series 
of participatory planning meetings that included representatives from CLGAs, WDCs, 
community-based organizations, and civil society (such as trade unions, community leaders, 
and women’s and youth groups). The meeting participants would jointly create a framework 
for sustainable maintenance of local services (mostly water, sanitation, and infrastructure).
Policy reforms: LEAD facilitated the development of state-level water policies and 
implementation of the National Environmental Sanitation Law.
Improving water delivery capacity of state agencies: LEAD worked to strengthen the 
capacity of state agencies and local governments that were sharing responsibilities for 
water service in urban and rural areas.
Improving health, education, and other services: LEAD collaborated with USAID’s health 
and education projects to improve services at the local level. Areas of collaboration included 
coordinated SIP review, development of SIPs for specific services, and policy development 
and implementation. 
CBSP = Community-Based Strategic Plan; CLGA = Champion Local Government Area;  
CSO = civil society organization; LGA = Local Government Area;  
LGDF = Local Government Development Framework; SIP = Service Improvement Plan;  
WDC = Ward Development Committee.
During LEAD’s extension period (2015–2016), activities to support local 
government capacity building and transparency were consolidated, while 
capacity building for local organizations and improved service delivery 
remained separate objectives. However, the service delivery objective was 
refocused specifically on improving access to basic education and reading and 
on strengthening the health system. In terms of relative budget allocations, 
about a third of funds was spent on local government strengthening (Obj. 1), 
with about a quarter each for increased transparency (Obj. 2) and improving 
service delivery (Obj. 4) and one-fifth for strengthening citizen groups (Obj. 3). 
After 2014 there was a relative decline in allocations to local government 
capacity building activities, because many of the planned activities under this 
objective had been completed.
Geographic Scope
The project’s focus was originally in Bauchi and Sokoto states, with an 
expansion to Rivers in 2013. In each state, specific Local Government 
Areas (LGAs) were selected for technical assistance through a competitive 
mechanism. The program was widely advertised, and interested LGAs 
prepared proposals. Selection committees had representation from state 
government, academia, civil society, media, and traditional and religious 
(continued)
 Social Accountability in Cross-Sectoral Service Delivery 129
leaders. Champion LGAs (CLGAs) were selected, based on their commitment 
to improved governance, willingness to support the program’s spread to 
other LGAs, and the presence of partner projects (NEI and TSHIP) in the 
area. Two rounds of CLGA selection were held in Sokoto and Bauchi in 2010 
and 2011, and one round in 2013 in Rivers. In total, LEAD worked with 12 
CLGAs in Sokoto, 8 in Bauchi, and 3 in Rivers (The Mitchell Group, 2013; RTI 
International, 2015).
Context
Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution guarantees democratically elected local 
governments, which are autonomously responsible for primary service 
delivery. There are 774 Local Government Areas, which each represent from 
150,000 to 800,000 citizens. Each LGA is led by an executive chairperson 
working with a legislative council (Local Government Council, or LGC). 
These elected officials have the power to raise revenues to provide basic 
public services. On average, each LGA has 10 wards within its jurisdiction, 
each represented by a councilor in the LGC. Ward Development Committees 
(WDCs) carry out development activities and are made up of representatives 
from Village Development Committees (The Mitchell Group, 2013).
In practice, however, LGAs have little autonomy. Given their low capacity 
to generate revenue, LGAs depend heavily on grants from the Federation 
Account. Moreover, budgets and personnel remain tightly controlled by the 
federal and state governments. To date, elected council members frequently 
have little familiarity with political and policy making processes, corruption 
is frequent, and local officials’ responsibilities are often usurped by state 
governments. In more than half the states, including Bauchi, local leaders are 
not elected, in spite of the constitutional stipulations (The Mitchell Group, 
2013; Ningi Local Government, n.d.; RTI International, 2014a). 
Further, LEAD programming aside, citizens have been given few 
opportunities to engage with local government and lack understanding of 
its responsibilities for service delivery. Community organizations flourish in 
Nigeria; in 2008–2009 over 80 percent of Afrobarometer survey respondents 
belonged to a religious organization, and almost 50 percent were members of 
other voluntary groups (Afrobarometer, 2015). However, these community-
level groups have not influenced local governance processes, as limited 
capacity, resources, and connections among groups constrain advocacy 
efforts. In addition, officials are generally reluctant to allow civil society 
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participation in budget and finance decisions or to share related information. 
Local state–society relations are often characterized by mistrust. According to 
Afrobarometer data, nearly three-quarters of citizens rated local governments 
as fair or very bad at allowing citizens to participate in council decisions in 
2008–2009 (Afrobarometer, 2015).
There were differences in governance structures and capacities between 
the two primary states where LEAD was operating. Initially, Bauchi was 
considered to be better governed than Sokoto. However, Bauchi’s LGA 
officials are civil servants appointed by the state government and frequently 
are transferred between posts. In 2010, the Governor of Bauchi dissolved the 
Local Government Councils, which shifted LEAD’s emphasis in the state away 
from building LGA capacity and transparency (including work with WDCs) 
and toward community empowerment and CSO strengthening (The Mitchell 
Group, 2013).
Although worsening security during the life of the project impinged on 
implementation in both northern states, Bauchi was particularly affected. 
During security alerts, LEAD teams and CSO partners had to limit their 
activities, LGAs’ ability to collect revenues declined, and stakeholders could 
not be brought together for large meetings (The Mitchell Group, 2013).
Social Accountability Approach
Under each of the project’s original objectives, LEAD has executed a series 
of activities (refer to Table 11 above), many of which had elements of social 
accountability, in line with LEAD’s theory of change. LEAD’s capacity 
development activities—for LGAs and WDCs (Obj. 1), as well as for CSOs 
(Obj. 3)—were fundamentally expected to contribute to citizens’ abilities 
to hold the state to account. Even though they are not social accountability 
activities in themselves, ensuring that WDCs were representative, that CSOs 
were able to mobilize communities and advocate for citizens, and that local 
officials were receptive to citizen priorities laid the groundwork for the 
activities directly related to social accountability. 
In terms of project activities that directly contributed to citizens’ ability 
to hold the state to account, the cornerstone was the community priority-
setting process (Figure 6). Community priority-setting was expected to be a 
participatory and socially inclusive planning and budgeting process to identify 
community priorities at ward and local government levels, to be included 
in LGA annual budgets. The community-priority setting activities were an 
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annual process that fed into LGA budgeting, with the intent that it would be 
institutionalized and refined over time.
The priority-setting process involved two main steps. First, each councilor 
organized a ward-level meeting that included key stakeholders (women, 
youth, traditional and religious leaders, and disabled persons) to come up with 
three to five priorities for the ward. The ward meeting facilitators also were 
expected to produce minutes, to maintain an attendance list, and to designate 
ward representatives to the LGA-level priority-setting meeting (LEAD, n.d.-b).
Next, the LGC would organize a town hall meeting to review the results of 
the ward meetings. Town hall meetings were intended to 
establish a system for Local Government Councils and other elected 
representatives to inform and provide feedback to citizens on the LGA’s 
activities such as budget planning and implementation and constituency 
projects… to build a culture of transparency and accountability to the 
citizens… [T]he primary purpose of a town hall meeting is to collect data, 
provide information, and receive feedback from the community members. 
(LEAD, n.d.-c, p. 1)
Figure 6. LEAD’s social accountability activities
CSO = civil society organization; LGA = Local Government Area; WDC = Ward Development Committee
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LEAD encouraged Local Government Councils to use the town hall 
meetings for priority-setting and community dialogue, with which they 
rarely had experience. The participants, who were expected to represent all 
the wards in the LGA, reviewed all the ward priorities to select the 5 to 10 
most frequently listed needs. The meeting participants then voted for their 
top three choices to select the community’s priorities for the LGA’s annual 
budget. The recommendations were submitted to the LGC for approval 
and implementation. Town hall meetings thus shifted LGC discussions 
from normative decisions about budgets to concrete needs and the effects 
that budget implementation would have on local people (LEAD, n.d.-a). 
Importantly, town hall meetings also were expected to give citizens an 
opportunity to monitor LGC implementation of budgets based on community 
priorities, as the meetings would be repeated annually.
Community-Based Strategic Plans (CBSPs) were intended to provide 
LGAs with a 4-year agenda for development priorities. The CBSP planning 
process began with a large meeting, with broad representation from all wards 
and societal groups (including men and women, the physically challenged, 
women’s groups, youth, CSOs, farmers, businessmen), as well as from the 
LGC. LEAD facilitated the development of a 5-year strategic plan, drawing 
on citizen priorities. Public hearings were held on the draft plans. Final 
plans incorporated feedback from hearings, and were ratified by the LGA 
chairperson. 
For community priorities that received LGA budget support, Service 
Improvement Plans (SIPs) were developed through a participatory process, 
involving local government officials, CSOs, traditional rulers, community 
leaders, women, and youth groups from the relevant areas of the LGA. LEAD 
facilitated a process to identify expectations, review current service delivery 
challenges, determine improvement priorities, identify strategies to address 
prioritized challenges, and develop an action plan. SIPs could be implemented 
through contractors managed by the local government or shared between 
Local Government Service Delivery Teams and community groups. The shared 
activities were designated Community Partnership Program projects, with the 
Service Delivery Team providing budget support and guidance on structure 
and regulations for service delivery, and community groups taking primary 
responsibility for implementation and maintenance of improvements. 
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Throughout the implementation of budgeted projects, CSOs were 
encouraged to track public expenditures to reduce corruption and increase 
transparency. Public expenditure tracking was devised as a participatory 
budget monitoring activity to gather information on budgets, funds flows, and 
use of funds to implement community-identified priorities.
In a manner similar to LGA, CSO, and WDC strengthening, LEAD’s state-
level activities contributed to LGA-level social accountability. LEAD staff 
collaborated with CSOs and LGAs to engage on state annual budgets; and with 
state-level multistakeholder policy working groups, for the purpose of dialogue 
and advocacy with the state legislature on specific reform issues (i.e., fiscal 
responsibility and public procurement laws, intergovernmental resource flows, 
and local government autonomy). 
Types of Social Accountability Action 
As designed, LEAD’s activities were primarily oriented toward coproduction 
social accountability action. The community priority-setting process, 
strategic planning, and implementation of service improvements (SIPs and 
Community Partnership Program projects) were all mechanisms to encourage 
collaboration between citizens and local officials. These activities were 
intended to increase interaction and communication, thereby enhancing local 
governments’ receptiveness to citizens’ needs and active citizen engagement in 
government processes and service delivery.
There were some elements that also encouraged transparency and 
compliance. The town hall meetings (especially ones organized around 
reporting on budget implementation), public expenditure tracking, and 
state-level engagement served both of these functions. They gave citizens 
opportunities to gain information on budgets, to claim a measure of oversight 
in financial management, and to monitor the extent to which community 
priorities were actually implemented as planned. In 2015, LEAD added a 
scorecard29 activity, aimed at enhancing citizens’ ability to monitor service 
delivery and increasing the emphasis on compliance social accountability 
actions. 
29 Scorecard development began earlier but was not implemented due to budget constraints. 
During the extension, there were plans for local partners, LGAs, and communities to use 
scorecards to monitor LGAs and service providers in water and sanitation, education, health, 
HIV/AIDS, agriculture, and food security (RTI International, 2014b).
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Expected Contribution to Social Accountability Aims
LEAD’s activities were expected to contribute to all three social accountability 
aims: governance, service delivery, and empowerment. The mechanisms 
outlined above were intended to make governments more responsive to local 
needs and more transparent by encouraging active engagement of citizens in 
LGA planning and decision making (governance). As a result, investments in 
service improvements were expected to be better targeted to the most urgent 
shortcomings, improving service delivery. Project activities aimed to enhance 
citizen voice, by encouraging a broad range of community members to express 
their needs and concerns about services (empowerment). 
Implementation
Most social accountability activities under LEAD made some progress. 
However, progress was often partial and the connections and integration 
among activities were not always clear. These mixed results were due in part to 
the uncertain security environment, which resulted in delayed and canceled 
activities for a number of project elements. Implementation was further 
challenged by funding constraints. USAID/Nigeria had a budget shortfall 
in 2013, resulting in programming cuts that limited the number of grants 
that LEAD could make. In 2014, LEAD was preparing to close down, which 
further shifted focus away from grant-making. The limited grants program 
reduced CSO activities (such as public expenditure tracking) and engagement 
with community groups, including the Community Partnership Program to 
encourage community-local government collaboration on specific service 
improvements. 
Community Priority Setting
The community priority-setting process was “a center piece of LEAD’s 
approach since the beginning of the project’s assistance to Round 1 CLGAs” 
(RTI International, 2014a, p. 9). Initiated by LEAD with support from CSOs, 
it successfully linked community participation to the formulation of local 
government budgets. As Table 12 shows, compared to a baseline of zero before 
the project’s start, about 350 community priority projects were included 
in LGA budgets in 2014 (Performance Monitoring Plan [PMP] indicator 
2.1.1). Rivers State’s CLGAs had their first priority-setting cycle during 2014, 
with the CLGAs Okrika and Khana incorporating all identified projects in 
budgets, and Akuku-Toru including about 75 percent (Callistus Donatus, 
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personal communication, June 9, 2015). Many CLGAs also implemented 
these priorities. For example, four Bauchi CLGAs implemented 75 percent to 
100 percent of community priorities included in their 2013 annual budgets 
(LEAD, n.d.-d, 4). The tallies by CLGA were: Kirfi, four out of five community 
priorities partially or completely implemented; Misau, four out of five; Ja’amare 
three out of four; Gamawa, five out of five (LEAD, n.d.-d).
A contributing factor to the strong LGA support for community priorities 
was an increase in allocations of state-level resources that corresponded to 
community-identified priorities. LEAD’s work with CSOs and state officials 
increased transparency and accountability of budget allocations that allowed 
LGAs to better respond to citizen needs (further discussed below in the 
“Governance” subsection).
Town Hall Meetings 
These meetings took place across CLGAs at different points in the project, 
although not always as envisioned in the program design. In 2013, Bauchi 
LGA-wide meetings were held for community priority-setting, while in Sokoto 
the meetings were held by Ward Development Committees. The unintended 
variations led to increased support from LEAD to ensure that the two-stage 
town hall meeting process for (1) planning based on community priority 
setting and (2) reporting on implementation occurred as intended (RTI 
International, 2014a). In Rivers, the two-stage process appears to have been 
more easily adopted (LEAD, n.d.-a).
Community-Based Strategic Plans
CBSP activities started in 2012 and by 2013, ten Round 1 CLGAs had ratified 
CBSPs (The Mitchell Group, 2013). These medium-term plans were integrated 
with annual community priority-setting processes to ensure that they were 
linked but did not duplicate efforts. 
Service Improvement Plans
About 50 SIPs were developed across the program areas (see Table 12, PMP 
indicator 4.A). As initial project funding emphasized water and sanitation, 
many of the SIPs followed in this vein, even though health and education 
services were also part of the project’s focus, especially after the program 
extension in November 2014. In education, for example, LEAD worked with 
community education forums created by NEI, to encourage sustainability of 
the forums (see NEI case study). 
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Table 12. Progress on selected Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) indicators  
as of September 2014 
PMP indicator Baseline
2010a 2011a 2012a 2013 2014
Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual
2.1.1: Number of 
community priority 
projects included in Local 
Government Area (LGA) 
budgets (annual indicator)
0 — — — — — — 50 63 20 352
3.1.3: Number of 
participatory planning 
sessions conducted
0 100 135 100 50 100 201 100 82 50 19
4.A: Number of Service 
Improvement Plans (SIPs) 
produced by targeted LGAs 
(annual indicator)
0 10 0 — — 15 24 10 0 10 25
4.1.1: Number of people in 
target areas with access to 
improved drinking water 
supply as a result of US 
Government assistance
219,100 — — 0 40,950 0 101,500 60,000 47,250 0 200,410
4.1.3: Number of 
community associations 
actively participating in 
process of building local 
infrastructure projects
10 10 0 88 84 30 112 30 3 20 95
4.2.2: Number of 
activities/projects jointly 
implemented by civil 
society organizations  
(CSOs) and LGA
— — — — — 0 0 20 1 10 20
a Empty cells are blank in source.
Source: Adapted from RTI International (2014a), Annex A.
As preparation for the initial SIPs, LEAD organized a 2011 workshop to 
jointly assess water facilities in CLGAs. The assessment found that, on average, 
50 percent of water access points broke down within 2 years of construction 
and more than 70 percent of water systems in some CLGAs were not fully 
functional (The Mitchell Group, 2013). SIPs involved community members 
to complete smaller repairs and to ensure maintenance, while CLGAs and 
state-level institutions took on more complicated improvements. Some CLGAs 
also focused on sanitation, including repairs, improved drainage, and regular 
clean-ups of markets, abattoirs, and parking lots.
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Table 12. Progress on selected Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) indicators  
as of September 2014 
PMP indicator Baseline
2010a 2011a 2012a 2013 2014
Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual
2.1.1: Number of 
community priority 
projects included in Local 
Government Area (LGA) 
budgets (annual indicator)
0 — — — — — — 50 63 20 352
3.1.3: Number of 
participatory planning 
sessions conducted
0 100 135 100 50 100 201 100 82 50 19
4.A: Number of Service 
Improvement Plans (SIPs) 
produced by targeted LGAs 
(annual indicator)
0 10 0 — — 15 24 10 0 10 25
4.1.1: Number of people in 
target areas with access to 
improved drinking water 
supply as a result of US 
Government assistance
219,100 — — 0 40,950 0 101,500 60,000 47,250 0 200,410
4.1.3: Number of 
community associations 
actively participating in 
process of building local 
infrastructure projects
10 10 0 88 84 30 112 30 3 20 95
4.2.2: Number of 
activities/projects jointly 
implemented by civil 
society organizations  
(CSOs) and LGA
— — — — — 0 0 20 1 10 20
a Empty cells are blank in source.
Source: Adapted from RTI International (2014a), Annex A.
Reports on SIP development described a participatory process for 
identifying challenges, selecting among them, designing strategies to address 
selected investment priorities, and developing action plans. Participants in 
these activities often overlapped with those in the community priority-setting 
process. Project monitoring indicators did point to substantial community 
engagement in the construction of infrastructure projects (coproduction) 
(Table 12, indicator 4.1.3).
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Public Expenditure Tracking
This activity was slow to start in Sokoto and Bauchi due to funding delays. 
However, by 2014, CSOs in Sokoto, as well as Rivers, had worked with WDCs 
and community-based organizations on budget tracking (RTI International, 
2015). Further, LEAD supported public hearings on education and health 
budgets, to identify discrepancies and bring them to public attention. 
For example, in December 2014, state-level community education forums 
(refer to “Community Education Forums” in Chapter 3) conducted separate 
hearings on the Ningi and Ja’amare 2015 Local Government Education 
Authority budget (both in Bauchi), attended by local government officials and 
community members. Both meetings were reportedly “highly interactive—the 
participants made meaningful contributions and suggestions about improving 
the budget process and its content” (RTI International, 2015, p. 10). In fact, 
LEAD found the community education forums to be the most appropriate 
umbrella groups for organizing education budget engagement activities, 
and proceeded to facilitate the formation of additional forums in areas 
where NEI had not worked (such as Ja’amare) (Tijjani Mohammad, personal 
communication, June 3, 2015).
These activities point to increased transparency on local budgets and some 
nascent opportunities for compliance-oriented social accountability actions, in 
instances where citizens used the meetings not only to provide input on budget 
allocations but also to question their use. Even toward the end of the project, 
however, the focus was primarily on training citizens to find and analyze 
relevant information (transparency), rather than on bringing discrepancies to 
public attention (compliance). During the project extension, LEAD worked 
to identify and raise public awareness of discrepancies through the budget 
stakeholder consultative meetings and budget information sharing meetings. 
Public expenditure tracking was also expected to produce an increase in 
LGA/state health and education budget allocations and in funds released for 
implementation (Tijjani Mohammad, personal communication, June 3, 2015).
Geographic Variation
During the project’s early years, progress in Sokoto was much stronger than in 
Bauchi. As noted, the more challenging political and security environment (see 
“Context” section above) dampened progress in Bauchi, but shifts in program 
leadership helped to make up for some of the early delays. Rivers State, in 
which LEAD started working in 2013, made generally good progress.
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Effects
In 2013, external midterm evaluators noted that the most prominent 
project effects occurred in local governance (although transparency had 
not improved), followed by CSO empowerment, and finally service delivery 
(The Mitchell Group, 2013). In September 2014, LEAD carried out three 
consultative meetings to reflect on the past year’s activities, and to collect 
recommendations for the next year. Participants at all the meetings—including 
CLGAs, state agencies, and CSOs—
recognized that LEAD has been effective in strengthening institutional 
capacities of LGAs and CSOs, improving transparency and accountability, 
and facilitating better relationships between citizen and their LGAs and 
involvement in decision making. Participants also acknowledge the 
appreciable impact on service delivery… [with] demonstrated results in 
improving water service delivery. (RTI International, 2014b, p. 8)
More detail on each of the three expected social accountability outcomes 
follows. Although there were effects across all outcomes, the most significant 
changes appear to have been in LGA processes (governance), water services 
(service delivery), and CSO engagement (empowerment). Citizens’ awareness 
of their rights and broader sense of agency in local governance remained 
nascent. 
Governance
Local Government Development Framework scores resulting from three 
participatory assessments in each CLGA in Sokoto and Bauchi indicated an 
overall improvement in local government performance over time. As Figure 7 
illustrates, Bauchi CLGAs made substantial improvements in some of the 
general areas where LEAD’s social accountability activities focused (strategic 
planning, project planning and implementation, and service delivery). In 
terms of specific effects of social accountability activities, LEAD documented 
a clear shift in the number of community priorities that were included in 
LGA budgets, as mentioned earlier. Compared to no explicit inclusion of 
community priorities prior to LEAD’s involvement, many LGCs began to 
routinely conduct priority-setting at the start of each year’s budget process 
(LEAD, n.d.-d). In fact, by 2014, 65 percent of priorities identified by WDCs 
and community-based organizations had been included in LGA budgets (RTI 
International, 2014b). Similarly, the project documented clear increases in the 
number of participatory planning sessions conducted, particularly in the early 
years (Table 12, indicator 3.1.3). 
140  Chapter 8
These results point to greater responsiveness from LGAs, which generally 
had no experience with participatory processes before LEAD’s activities began. 
The project leadership noted citizens’ and community groups’ participation 
in decision making—that is, not just providing information on community 
Figure 7. Average Local Government Development Framework (LGDF) 
scores in Bauchi Champion Local Government Areas (CLGAs), by 
functional area
Note: LGDF scores range from 1 to 5, reflecting the proportion of elements associated with a functional 
area that are present in a particular CLGA. For example, a CLGA scores 3 if participants judge half of 
associated characteristics to be present and 5 if all characteristics are deemed present.
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interests, issues, and needs—as a significant shift introduced through LEAD’s 
activities (Tijjani Mohammad, personal communication, June 3, 2015). The 
achievements are especially notable given the limited opportunities for voice 
and accountability available in Nigeria (see Figure 2 in Chapter 2).
LEAD’s collaboration with CSOs to increase citizen engagement in public 
expenditure tracking and involvement in state annual budgets through 
dialogue and advocacy for fiscal reforms, intergovernmental resource flows, 
and local government autonomy resulted in modest transparency increases. In 
part because of LEAD’s experience, USAID’s planned follow-on project is likely 
to focus efforts to increase transparency and accountability at the state level, 
where LGA resources are actually controlled.
One specific project-initiated change in the budget allocation process is 
worth elaborating upon. As part of LEAD’s support to improve the budget 
process at LGA and state levels, project lobbying and CSO advocacy led to 
the creation of a budget hearing interface between state-level Ministries of 
Local Government and LGAs. It gave the LGAs an opportunity to present and 
defend draft budgets before they were approved by the Ministry. This increased 
transparency of budget processes represented a clear departure from the 
Ministry’s prior practice of arbitrary budget review and allocations. Combined 
with greater openness, the knowledge that LGA budget priorities could be 
traced back to communities and citizens’ groups deterred state-level actors 
from tampering with them during the budget review and approval stages 
(Tijjani Mohammad, personal communication, June 25, 2015). 
Empowerment
LEAD’s support to CSOs was effective. CSO organizational capacities 
were strengthened, as documented in the project’s annual assessments. 
For example, a 2015 assessment of Bauchi CSO partners indicated that all 
had improved capacity across most of the elements (although weaknesses 
remained in management of assets, personnel, capacity building, and resource 
mobilization) (RTI International, 2015). Collaboration between CSOs 
and community-based groups in CLGAs in all three states strengthened 
the technical and organizational capacities of local organizations (RTI 
International, 2014b). Connections between CSOs also were enhanced, 
through support to existing networks (in Sokoto) and creation of a similar 
structure (in Bauchi). These organizations carried out advocacy at the state 
level (see text box on following page) and mobilized and provided training to 
community-based organizations in CLGAs. 
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Network of civil society organizations monitors Sokoto state budget 
“Participatory budgeting [was] an unheard of process in the region. The LEAD project 
supported the Consortium of NGOs in Sokoto [State] (CONSS) to review the performance 
of the 2011 Sokoto State Budget and to perform an analysis of the 2012 budget. CONSS 
involved broad participation in the budget review exercise by consulting with business 
associations, [community-based organizations], CSOs, faith-based organizations, PTAs 
[parent–teacher associations], the Nigerian Bar Association, market women and USAID 
FSS [Focus States Strategy] partners TSHIP and NEI. The Sokoto State House of Assembly 
[SSHOA] in 2011 allowed CONSS to submit its remarks on the performance of the 2011 
budget and its analysis of the 2012 budget to the House Committee on Finance and 
Appropriations. It incorporated CONSS remarks in the 2012 budget. For the 2013 budget 
CONSS, as well as other CSOs, were invited to comment on the budget by the House of 
Assembly. The Clerk of the SSHOA feels that CSOs have a great deal to contribute to the 
deliberations of the Assembly. CSOs are now invited to comment on various topics in the 
health, education and governance.” (The Mitchell Group, 2013, p. 17)
While these results are notable, the extent to which they translated into 
citizen empowerment and change in state–society relations at the local level 
remains unclear. CLGAs’ more frequent incorporation of community priorities 
into budgets and collaboration with citizens on service improvements suggest 
that citizens were participating in LEAD’s governance activities (oriented 
toward coproduction). Through “collaboration [on] community priority 
setting, budget development and water point maintenance, LEAD has 
successfully built bridges between LGAs and CSOs to the point where there 
is less mistrust and more active collaboration” (RTI International, 2014b, 
p. 24). The 2013 midterm evaluation noted that “many feel that [LEAD] is 
contributing to a cultural change in the relationships between state and local 
government and communities [in Sokoto]” (The Mitchell Group, 2013, p. 11). 
Whether these interactions resulted in a change in citizens’ perceptions of their 
rights or empowered them to hold government to account, however, is not 
documented.
Service Delivery
Based on LGDF data, local government capacity to deliver services increased 
with LEAD’s support (Figure 7 shows data for Bauchi CLGAs). In particular, 
access to water improved as a result of the project’s participatory planning 
and collaborative implementation activities (Table 12, PMP indicator 4.1.1). 
During 2014, 21 SIPs were developed across the three states. Of these, 
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100 percent of water SIPs and 70 percent of those from other sectors were 
implemented in Bauchi and Sokoto (RTI International, 2014b).
According to the project leadership, most of the improvement in service 
delivery could be attributed to social accountability activities. Some slight 
proportion could also be attributed to state-level policy and regulatory 
environment improvements that had a bearing on service delivery. For 
example, improving coordination and institutional arrangements in the water 
sector increased access to water at the CLGA level (Tijjani Mohammad, 
personal communication, June 3, 2015).
Sustainability of Interventions and Outcomes
By mid-2015, there were encouraging signs that some of LEAD’s social 
accountability mechanisms would be institutionalized through state 
government support and continuation by CSOs. The midterm evaluation 
concluded that “the only way the LEAD project will become sustainable 
is if the States themselves take over the capacity building role for local 
governments. The [Mid-Term Evaluation] Team does not believe Bauchi and 
Sokoto States are prepared or capable to do this… [as they] are institutionally 
weak” (The Mitchell Group, 2013, p. 27). State support increased after that 
point, however, with scale-up of LEAD mechanisms to new LGAs using 
state financial resources. All 23 LGAs in Sokoto received accounting and 
SIP training, and Rivers State’s government pledged to disseminate the SIP 
methodology to all 23 LGAs (RTI International, 2014a).
Even in Bauchi, where the state government was more reluctant to work 
with LEAD than counterparts in Sokoto and Rivers, some indications 
emerged that support was increasing. In 2014, the state government printed 
and disseminated CBSP documents to four LGAs (RTI International, 2014a). 
During late 2014 and early 2015, the state government increased budget 
transparency and indicated greater openness to citizen engagement in 
planning, particularly in the education sector (RTI International, 2015).
The CSO networks that LEAD supported were increasingly taking over 
responsibilities for the community priority-setting processes, and continued 
to work on participatory budget tracking. They also increasingly were 
linking community priorities to advocacy for state-level sectoral resources 
(see following text box). In particular, the Consortium of NGOs in Sokoto 
State (CONSS) was coordinating these activities, and the Bauchi State 
Network of Civil Society Groups was expected to follow during 2015 (RTI 
International, 2015).
144  Chapter 8
Network of civil society organizations links community priorities with  
state-level funds 
In Sokoto, LEAD supported the Consortium of NGOs in Sokoto State (CONSS) network to 
facilitate the process of prioritizing education and health needs that would be included 
in the 2015 state budget. In October and November 2014, CSO partners mobilized 
community stakeholders and wrote officially to local councilors to request ward-level 
priority-setting meetings. As a result, priority-setting meetings took place in 126 wards in 
12 CLGAs, resulting in a total of 1,683 projects related to basic education; primary health 
care; and water, sanitation, and hygiene, as well as other miscellaneous microprojects. 
Harmonization forums in the 12 CLGAs were facilitated by the CSO partners and 
supported by LEAD’s technical team. 
In late November, CONSS, along with LEAD CSO grantees, facilitated an advocacy 
visit to the State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB) and the Ministry of Health 
to hand over the harmonized priorities for inclusion in the 2015 state budget. 
The SUBEB executive chairperson hailed CONSS’s effort and LEAD’s support to the 
state, and assured the advocacy members that the priorities would be included 
in the 2015 budget and prioritized within SUBEB resources. Similarly, the director 
of Medical Services acknowledged that the prioritized projects were modest and 
represented the communities’ needs and priorities. He assured the attendees that 
the priorities would be considered and included in the 2015 budgets. (Adapted from 
RTI International, 2015, p. 20)
In terms of sustaining service improvements, maintenance of water 
services that were improved under LEAD was challenging. The 2013 
midterm evaluation included an independent engineering assessment of 
maintenance prospects for 58 water access points in two CLGAs (Illela in 
Sokoto and Katagum in Bauchi). At the time, between 55 percent and 87 
percent of the water points inspected were operational. These outcomes were 
not dramatically better than LEAD’s baseline assessments in 2011 (refer to 
Table 12). Community groups charged with maintenance were rarely aware 
of these responsibilities and lacked knowledge to undertake repairs (The 
Mitchell Group, 2013). Subsequently, maintenance seems to have improved 
due to additional trainings to improve community and service delivery teams’ 
capacities for maintenance, as well as vigorous partnership-building with LGAs 
to leverage needed resources for maintenance (Tijjani Mohammad, personal 
communication, June 3, 2015). In 2014, maintenance was carried out for 
1,076 water points that served a population of 376,600 across the three states 
(RTI International, 2014b). Sustainability prospects of service improvements 
may thus have been increasing. 
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Overall, implementation of the project’s social accountability activities 
appears to have been highly dependent on the LEAD project team. The 
activities involved a complex series of processes in a challenging environment, 
requiring a high level of LEAD support to keep going. While parts of the 
approach, in the form of single or subsets of activities, may be sustained, the 
overall system of social accountability activities is unlikely to continue without 
LEAD support.
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Cross-Sectoral Social Accountability in Practice: 
Findings from Six Cases
Anna Wetterberg and Derick W. Brinkerhoff
CHAPTER 9
This chapter consists of three distinct sections. First, a comparative analysis 
reviews the answers to the research questions—laid out in the opening 
section of Chapter 2—across the cases, noting similarities and differences 
informed by the analytical framework and background information, also 
outlined in Chapter 2. Next, the discussion identifies barriers to effective social 
accountability, as well as strategies for overcoming such barriers, suggested by 
the case studies. Finally, the chapter concludes with some considerations for 
future project designs and implementation. 
The comparative analysis below provides the details, based on the preceding 
six case study chapters, that underlie the recommendations outlined in the rest 
of the chapter. Readers primarily interested in the key findings may prefer to 
proceed directly to the next section, “Discussion.”
Comparative Analysis 
This section analyzes the six case study projects in detail, comparing 
approaches to social accountability, expected and actual outcomes, 
and sustainability of interventions and outcomes. Figure 8 summarizes 
commonalities observed across the case studies. It underscores the similarities 
in the social accountability interventions used in each project, but recognizes 
that the specific constellations of interventions, implementation, and 
outcomes are influenced by both macro- and micro-level contextual factors. 
Further, sustainability of social accountability efforts depends in large part on 
contextual factors that shape the state’s responsiveness.
Theories of Change and Expected Outcomes
Although the case study projects were implemented in widely varying 
country contexts, their posited theories of change were quite similar (see 
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Chapter 2, Table 3). Most of them were, in essence, a variant of the following: 
improving citizens’ capabilities to advocate for priority improvements, 
in combination with strengthening state actors’ capacities to deliver 
services, will result in better public services. In fact, all the projects 
explicitly addressed both the supply (state capacity) and demand (citizen 
capacity) sides of social accountability in their objectives and theories of 
change.30  In this sense, none of the projects adopted solely a citizen-centered 
approach (Narayan, 2005), but instead worked simultaneously on increasing 
government officials’ preparedness to respond to priorities and shortcomings 
identified by civil society actors.
Not surprisingly, given the comparable theories of change, the projects 
also anticipated similar social accountability outcomes. All of the projects 
expected to bring about improvements in governance, as social accountability 
mechanisms were presumed to lead to better-functioning public institutions 
with increased opportunities for citizens to engage. Every case study project 
also anticipated increased citizen empowerment, through greater awareness of 
rights, abilities to express voice, and/or a realignment of power distributions in 
favor of civil society actors. 
Most of the case studies predicted service delivery improvements as an 
outcome, except for the Local Governance Program (LGP) in Morocco and 
the Health Policy Initiative in the Greater Mekong Region and China (HPI/
GMR-C). LGP stands out because the program’s theory of change posited 
that improved public performance and transparency, in combination with 
increased citizen engagement in government processes, would lead to 
increased community trust in local government. Like the other projects, 
LGP emphasized both the supply and demand sides to social accountability; 
however, the program worked to increase trust over explicitly improving 
service delivery, as a means to counteract a long history of local governments 
focused on maintaining security and controlling citizens. 
Neither did HPI/GMR-C have an explicitly stated service delivery 
outcome. Instead, the project emphasized creating an enabling environment 
for successful delivery of services to target populations (people living with 
HIV, men who have sex with men, etc.). HPI/GMR-C thus differed from LGP 
in that HPI/GMR-C tied social accountability outcomes to a defined set of 
30 Although it did not have a specific sectoral focus, the Morocco LGP had as one of its four 
objectives to “improve collaboration between communes and state decentralized services” (see 
“Program Overview” in Chapter 7).  
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services, even though specific service improvements were not a stated goal of 
the project. 
Social Accountability Interventions and Actions
The combinations of social accountability interventions undertaken by the case 
study projects varied considerably (see Chapter 2, Table 3). At the same time, 
however, the specific mechanisms often overlapped, as did the types of social 
accountability actions undertaken by projects. All the projects employed some 
mechanism for performance assessment and monitoring. Examples include 
Snapshot of School Management Effectiveness interviews and observations 
(Northern Education Initiative [NEI] in Nigeria), local government 
performance frameworks (LGP and Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy, and 
Development [LEAD] in Nigeria), and a complaint-handling survey (Kinerja 
in Indonesia), intended to involve citizens in assessing shortcomings in state 
actors’ performance and often to evaluate changes in identified shortcomings 
over time. 
Most of the case study projects also incorporated a user committee, 
which often included state representatives as well. Twubakane’s community 
partnerships for quality improvements (PAQs) in Rwanda, Kinerja’s 
multistakeholder forums (MSFs), LGP’s youth councils and Commissions 
for Equity and Equal Opportunity (CPECs), and NEI’s community education 
forums (CEFs) were all instituted to channel citizen voice and priorities to the 
government.31 LEAD and HPI/GMR-C also worked with citizen groups, but 
relied on existing organizations (such as Ward Development Committees and 
civil society organizations [CSOs] in Nigeria, and CSOs in China) instead of 
creating new committees. 
Four of the case study projects introduced mechanisms for participatory 
planning as a structured process for including citizens in identifying priorities 
for improving public service provisions or allocating budgets. LGP facilitated 
the implementation of government-mandated Communal Development Plans 
(CDPs). In Nigeria, both NEI and LEAD worked with Ward Development 
Committees to identify community needs and engage citizens in channeling 
and prioritizing identified needs to local governments. (NEI also introduced 
a parallel process specifically for education priorities and funding.) Although 
31 Notably, NEI also worked with existing school-based management committees. Similarly, 
Kinerja’s MSFs in the education sector were usually previously established school committees, 
and those in health likewise were sometimes based on organizations already in place. 
 Social Accountability Across Sectors: Findings from the Case Studies 151
Kinerja did not institute a full strategic planning process, it introduced 
negotiations between citizens and providers over which community-identified 
service improvement priorities would be included in schools’ and clinics’ 
service charters and which would be forwarded to higher levels of government 
for possible funding.
Finally, advocacy training for civil society actors was explicitly incorporated 
into two projects (NEI and HPI/GMR-C). However, similar interventions were 
also part of other projects’ work with user committees and civil society groups. 
For example, LGP’s youth councils, Twubakane’s PAQs, Kinerja’s MSFs, and 
LEAD’s work with CSO networks introduced advocacy skills in organizational 
strengthening efforts. 
Most projects closely connected (1) social accountability activities oriented 
toward increasing government actors’ capacity and responsiveness (supply) 
with (2) those aiming to strengthen citizens’ capacities for exercising social 
accountability (demand). For example, Kinerja’s supply- and demand-side 
interventions were tightly linked, with a standard set of social accountability 
activities accompanying all types of sectoral strengthening for service 
providers. Similarly, LEAD’s social accountability activities were designed to 
reinforce each other and to be implemented in each local government. NEI 
linked Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) training for CSOs with training 
for FOIA implementation for government officials (and with sector strategy 
representation for civil society actors), and also worked on strengthening 
both government and community capacities for collaborating on local 
planning and budgeting. HPI/GMR-C coordinated supply-side studies of 
policy barriers to service use with advocacy efforts by citizen groups. In 
contrast, LGP’s and Twubakane’s activities were less integrated. Some of 
LGP’s activities involved closely coordinated supply and demand components 
(such as CDPs), but the overall approach relied on local governments to 
select which project activities they would participate in. Although a number 
of participating local governments implemented several project activities 
related to social accountability, there was not a standard set of required social 
accountability interventions. For Twubakane, much of the project’s work with 
providers and local governments was focused on strengthening clinical and 
technical capacities rather than on responding to citizens, and supply-side 
social accountability activities (open houses and accountability days, media 
activities) were not closely linked to PAQ activities. 
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In terms of types of social accountability action, most of the projects 
worked to increase transparency, coproduction, and compliance through 
their activities. Kinerja’s citizen journalism activities were the only explicitly 
contentious/confrontational social accountability actions. Also, Twubakane’s 
activities did not have an explicit emphasis on transparency. It is notable that 
few case study project activities highlighted stand-alone transparency actions, 
even though a number of the projects were designed with strong information-
sharing components as a part of other activities. For example, NEI channeled 
project-gathered data through the Medium-Term Sector Strategy, LGP had 
an overall focus on transparency and specific information sharing through 
Communal Development Plans, and LEAD collected budget data in public 
expenditure tracking activities. None of the projects therefore assumed that 
information alone would bring about social accountability (Fox, 2007, 2015). 
Instead, the primary emphasis in most of the projects was on coproduction, 
engaging citizens in planning and implementing services and related policies. 
Actual Outcomes
This section summarizes the achievements of the case study projects in 
terms of the three posited outcomes from social accountability: governance, 
empowerment, and service delivery (Table 13). It is important to note that 
for most of the projects, the effects were not exclusively attributable to social 
accountability interventions. Aside from Kinerja, none of the projects was 
subject to evaluations that attempted to isolate and quantify such effects. 
Instead, we summarize project effects that were directly related to the social 
accountability interventions and, in many cases, attributed by government, 
project, or citizen actors to these activities. Note that to facilitate comparisons 
across the cases, Table 13 standardizes some project-specific terminology for 
officials, organizations, and processes, based on their function (e.g., “user 
committee”). Shaded outcomes (all in the service delivery column) were not 
expected to result from project activities.
Governance
All the projects resulted in strengthened mechanisms for including citizens 
in state processes. In Twubakane and Kinerja, new user committees (PAQs 
and MSFs, respectively) were accepted as participants in clinic or school 
decision making. A number of local governments working with LGP adopted 
complaints-management mechanisms that showed promising levels of 
processing and responding to citizens’ concerns. LGP also facilitated the 
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Table 13.  Summary of social accountability outcomes, by project
Governance Empowerment Service delivery
Nigeria Northern Education Initiative (NEI)











to Freedom of 
Information Act 
(FOIA) requests




to plan presented 
by coalition of user 
committees
• Civil society organizations 
(CSOs) exercised FOIA rights to 
inform medium-term planning 
representatives
• District-level user committees 
engaged in local government 
budgeting processes (but no 
funds were available to respond)
• State-level coalition of user 
committees obtained budget 
information from education 
officials and collaborated with 
district-level user committees to 
develop equitable distribution 
of resources (proposals not 
generally accepted, except 
selectively in Bauchi State)
• Local user committees 
monitored classroom 
construction and school 
rehabilitation (but no response 
from education officials to 
flagged problems)
• Few discernable effects 
could be attributed to social 
accountability activities
Twubakane
• User committees 










• Community members were 
proud to represent citizens; were 
confident in interactions and 
collaborations with health staff
• Stakeholders noted improved 
provider–client relations, 
punctuality of health facility 
staff, health facility ownership 
of tasks, and infrastructure 
(reported by both providers 
and user committee 
members)
• Increases occurred in number 
of deliveries attended by a 
skilled professional, number 
of diphtheria-pertussis-
tetanus vaccinations, and 
number of antenatal care 
visits (not clearly attributable 
to user committee) 
(continued)
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Table 13.  Summary of social accountability outcomes, by project
Governance Empowerment Service delivery
Health Policy Initiative in the Greater Mekong Region and China (HPI/GMR-C)
• Local laws and 
regulations were 





• Rights and 
protections improved 
for people with 
HIV and affected 
populations
• CSOs’ ability to register provided 
a formal platform for advocacy
• CSOs gained advocacy skills and 
experience, as well as working 
relations with providers and 
officials
• Access improved in 
methadone maintenance 
treatment, voluntary 
counseling and testing, 
pre-employment training, 
and jobs
• Locally, some facilities 
reduced refusals of health 
services 




• Officials accepted 
user committee 
involvement in school 
and health center 
decision making (but 
with variations across 
sites and roles for user 
committees)
• Interactions between 
citizens and service 
providers increased 
• Levels of 
implementation of 
service charters were 
high (83%)
• User committee members 
channeled complaints to health 
clinics but had variable capacity 
to monitor response 
• Parents reported greater sense 
of engagement in schools and 
more involvement in fundraising 
(compared to control schools)
• District-level user committees 
advocated for increased funding 
for schools and health clinics 
(but with variations across sites 
and types of decisions)
• Citizen journalism contributed 
to high levels of reporting on 
service delivery and government 
performance 
• Site-level improvements 
at health clinics were 
acknowledged by citizens 
and providers (small 
infrastructure, better service 
orientation, increased 
availability of doctors, 
improved attendance by staff 
and midwives)
• Parents were more satisfied 
with school management, 
facilities, and teacher quality 
and quantity (compared to 
control schools)
Local Governance Program (LGP)
• Local government 
openness to citizen 
participation 
improved, indicated 
by 89% of officials 
noting substantial 
LGP contributions 





• Active local youth councils made 
connections with regional and 
national networks
• Citizen engagement in 
local governance increased 
(statistically significant 
increases in citizens reporting 
participation in local 
government activities)
• Citizens expressed voice through 
complaints-management 
systems and participatory 
planning
• Localized improvements 
occurred in response to 
complaints and as a result 
of youth council activities 
(but improvements were not 
generally visible to citizens)
(continued)
(continued)
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Table 13.  Summary of social accountability outcomes, by project
Governance Empowerment Service delivery
Local Governance Program (LGP) (continued)
• A majority of local 
governments 
implemented 




• Interactions with 
youth improved
Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy, and Development (LEAD)





• Local government 
budgets showed high 
rates of inclusion 
(65%) of community 
priorities
• Transparency of 
state-level budgets 
improved to a degree
• Local governments 
enhanced their 
strategic planning, 
project planning and 
implementation, and 
service delivery 
• A budget-hearing 
interface helped 
local governments to 
present and advocate 
for draft budgets 
before final approval 
by state agencies
• CSOs gained capacities to 
advocate and monitor at 
state level, collaborate with 
community-based organizations 
and local governments, and 
manage participatory planning 
processes
• Connections strengthened 
among CSOs in each state
• Communities engaged more 
often in infrastructure project 
implementation 
• Access to drinking water 
improved for more than 
400,000 people
Note: Shaded outcomes indicate those that were not expected to result from project activities.
(continued)
implementation of participatory municipal investment plans (CDPs). LEAD 
introduced community-based planning mechanisms that have become an 
annual activity for many local governments. Due to HPI/GMR-C’s work, 
requirements for CSO registration were changed to make it easier for groups to 
be formally recognized. Stipulations for civil society representation in state-
level medium-term planning were enforced due to NEI’s efforts.
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There were also indications of government responsiveness to citizen concerns 
for each case study project. For LGP, Kinerja, and LEAD, local governments 
demonstrated responsiveness by including substantial numbers of community 
priorities in budgets, as well as implementing many of these activities. In 
China, local governments changed legal frameworks to improve access to 
services in response to HPI/GMR-C’s social accountability activities. Officials 
were least responsive in the NEI case, although there were some improvements 
in willingness to fulfill FOIA requests and a limited amount of state-level 
education funding was channeled based on citizen-identified needs. 
In some cases, there were documented increases in interactions between 
citizens and state actors. LGP reported statistically significant increases in 
citizen participation in local government activities during the last 2 years of 
the project, and also contributed to more interactions between officials and 
young people. Interactions between principals and parents were more frequent 
in schools where Kinerja had introduced social accountability activities, 
compared to control schools. Similar shifts were reported in health clinics 
where Twubakane had introduced PAQs.
Two projects demonstrated unique governance improvement. LEAD 
documented improved government performance in tasks related to 
social accountability activities (strategic planning, project planning and 
implementation, and service delivery). Notably, local governments working 
with HPI/GMR-C strengthened rights and protections for marginalized citizens 
(people living with HIV/AIDS and affected populations). 
Empowerment
In all the cases, citizens were able to exercise agency to take advantage of 
new opportunities to express voice and engage with state actors. Community 
members participated in planning processes (NEI, LGP, LEAD), served 
on user committees related to specific services (NEI, Kinerja, LEAD, 
Twubakane), and exercised their rights (NEI, HPI/GMR-C). In addition to 
these coproduction-oriented demonstrations of empowerment, there were 
some examples of citizens empowered to undertake monitoring of government 
activities (compliance). In NEI, CEFs in Bauchi State made efforts to monitor 
school construction and rehabilitation (but received no response when they 
reported irregularities). Moroccan citizens enthusiastically used complaints-
management systems where they had been established. Citizen journalists 
trained by Kinerja also publicized service delivery problems, and MSFs 
monitored implementation of service charter obligations.
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There were also gains in civil society actors’ organizational capacities to 
hold the government to account for responding to citizens’ views and needs. 
In the case of NEI, the state-wide coalition of community education forums 
collaborated with local forums to develop and present a plan for equitable 
resource distributions to the education agency in their respective states 
(Bauchi and Sokoto), demonstrating a high level of organizational capacity 
for recently established organizations. Similarly, many of the Moroccan youth 
councils—whose creation was facilitated by LGP—formed regional networks 
and made connections to political actors at the national level. CSOs working 
with both LEAD and HPI/GMR-C gained advocacy skills and established new 
collaborative relationships with state actors. Some of Kinerja’s district MSFs 
also demonstrated considerable sophistication in lobbying legislators and 
officials to support service delivery improvements. 
Service Delivery
Five of the six case study projects reported some improvements in service 
delivery, although type and measurability of effects varied across these five 
cases. Most of these were localized responses to citizen-identified issues 
(for example, complaints reported through LGP mechanisms, site-level 
improvements in schools and clinics in Kinerja and Twubakane, improved 
access to water at specific locations identified through LEAD’s planning 
processes). In contrast, through policy shifts, HPI/GMR-C—which 
concentrated on the enabling environment for services, rather than on the 
service delivery units themselves—did achieve more general improvements 
in access to methadone maintenance treatment, voluntary HIV testing 
and counseling, and jobs training. Reported effects for some projects were 
primarily in citizens’ perceptions of service delivery (of providers’ attitudes 
towards clients, or satisfaction with services received; for example, in Kinerja), 
while others documented changes in the number of facilities or citizens using 
services (such as in LEAD and Twubakane). 
NEI was the only project for which few service delivery improvements 
could be attributed to social accountability activities. Even though citizens 
attempted to hold the state to account through various means, local 
governments did not control the resources needed to respond, and state-level 
actors—who could make resource allocations—were not generally responsive 
to priorities and problems raised by civil society actors. 
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Expected Versus Actual Outcomes, by Project
NEI aimed to achieve all three social accountability outcomes. The project 
demonstrated strong effects in empowerment and some effects on governance, 
but few changes in service delivery, due to lack of responsiveness from 
local and state-level governments (see “Service Delivery” above). This lack 
of responsiveness, due to resource constraints at the local level and lack of 
political interest at higher levels, likely also weakened empowerment effects. 
As community education forums saw no effects of their earlier efforts at social 
accountability, many became dispirited and instead turned their efforts to 
fundraising.
In line with expected outcomes, LGP showed clear improvements in 
governance and citizen empowerment, as well as some gains in service 
delivery, which was not an explicit social accountability aim. Empowerment 
effects were concentrated in youth councils and in citizens’ use of complaints-
management mechanisms to channel service delivery problems. Some 
concerns arose that the lack of visibility of service improvements resulting 
from CDP implementation would undermine citizens’ willingness to continue 
to channel their voices through this process, negating related empowerment 
gains. This potential link between service delivery and empowerment suggests 
that more emphasis on service delivery could have been advantageous to 
project objectives. 
Although LEAD—like LGP—was (and remains) a governance-centered 
project, it had a stated service delivery objective and was able to demonstrate 
concrete gains in drinking water access alongside improvements in governance 
and empowerment. What is notable about LEAD’s empowerment gains—and 
what contrasts it with NEI’s experience—is the emphasis on state-level CSO 
engagement. Although the focus of social accountability was at the local 
government level, LEAD undertook complementary work at the state level to 
introduce governance mechanisms that increased transparency of state-level 
resource flows and strengthened CSOs’ capacity to exercise a voice at this level. 
Kinerja aimed for, and achieved, changes across all three social 
accountability outcomes. While notable, the gains measured in a 2015 
impact evaluation were concentrated in the coproduction range of social 
accountability actions, with only citizen journalism at the compliance/
contention end of the spectrum. Although MSFs monitored providers during 
the implementation of social accountability activities (as evidenced by high 
rates of service charter completion), they often depended on project staff to 
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mobilize to exercise that right (Wetterberg et al., 2015). Similarly, data from 
the impact evaluation indicated that parents’ higher engagement in schools 
reflected more involvement in fundraising, rather than monitoring of the 
quality of service delivery.
Kinerja’s service delivery results also suggest (as do Twubakane’s) two 
challenges of linking social accountability activities to specific sector targets. 
First, even though the project had quantitative impact targets for health and 
education, these were set at the district level (where data were available), 
whereas social accountability activities took place at a subset of service delivery 
units in each district. The lack of sectoral impact therefore may have been due 
to measurement issues. Second, responses to citizen priorities often resulted in 
changes in management practices or broad resource allocations (such as shifts 
in opening hours, or disciplinary actions for staff absenteeism). These changes 
often improved citizens’ experiences with service delivery but were likely too 
limited to have discernable effects on detailed sectoral targets. 
In contrast to the other sector-based project (NEI), and to most of the 
other projects, which channeled social accountability activities to several 
levels (service delivery units, local government, technical agencies, and higher 
levels of government), Twubakane’s PAQs were much more narrowly aimed at 
achieving social accountability outcomes at specific service delivery units. This 
localized approach to social accountability did produce gains in governance, 
empowerment, and service delivery at many clinics and in the communities 
they were serving. Although PAQs received organizational, technical, and 
financial support from district-level actors, effects were reported at the clinic 
level, without extending gains in citizen empowerment or governance to higher 
levels. In part, this reflects Twubakane’s other technical assistance components 
unrelated to social accountability, which supported strengthened capacity at 
higher levels of government (see Table 2, Chapter 2). Twubakane’s effectiveness 
invites us to consider the trade-offs between a narrow social accountability 
approach with localized gains and multipronged efforts that have the potential 
for broader gains. 
HPI/GMR-C instead concentrated its social accountability activities and 
expected outcomes on the policy arena. Actual governance and empowerment 
outcomes were also evident at the provincial level, where policy making takes 
place; and at CSOs targeting advocacy efforts toward government actors at this 
level. Service improvements, although not an expected outcome, were evident 
at service delivery units and broader programmatic levels. 
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Sustainability of Interventions and Outcomes 
For all the case study projects, some element of introduced social 
accountability mechanisms was sustained by local actors after project-initiated 
activities concluded. Often, this was a structure, such as a user committee, 
that had been initiated or supported by the project. For example, many of 
the PAQs (Twubakane) were active at the end of the project and had set up 
income-generating activities and chosen new members to replace inactive 
ones. PAQs also continued to receive technical support in some districts, and 
their continued existence was supported by national policies. In Kinerja, some 
district-level MSFs continued to function with financial support from district 
governments. NEI’s community education forums persisted as fundraising 
mechanisms to support improvements in education services. Since LGP 
ended, youth councils in Morocco (LGP) have shown independent initiative 
to generate resources to support themselves at local levels, establish regional 
networks, and create a national organization to support institutionalization 
of local youth councils, in addition to a national youth council to voice their 
interests at the central level. 
Some project-initiated processes were also sustained. LEAD’s participatory 
planning processes have become an annual exercise in many local 
governments, increasingly facilitated by CSOs. Complaints-management 
mechanisms showed good momentum for LGP, where local government 
officials also gained knowledge and skills to continue implementing CDPs. 
Policy changes supported by HPI/GMR-C provided continued support for 
CSO advocacy and stronger rights for marginalized groups.
In addition, certain CSOs improved organizational skills that enabled 
them to continue to hold government to account. In particular, CSO networks 
supported by LEAD demonstrated capacity to lobby for state-level budget 
transparency and to channel citizen voice through community priority-setting 
processes. Youth councils clearly gained capabilities to support a continued 
dialogue at various levels of Moroccan government. 
Governments also supported sustainability of some social accountability 
mechanisms through replication of project approaches to new sites. This was 
the case for Kinerja, where some districts provided funds for introducing 
social accountability tools at several more clinics or schools, and where at least 
one district adopted the MSF, complaint-handling surveys, and service charters 
for all clinics under its jurisdiction. Sokoto State in Nigeria has replicated 
some elements of LEAD’s accountability mechanism (service improvement 
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plans) to all local governments, whereas Bauchi State has disseminated 
others to selected local governments, and pledged replication to all others. 
Some of LGP’s mechanisms, such as complaints-management systems, have 
been disseminated to additional local governments by the project’s central 
government counterpart. 
There were also aspects of projects that were not sustained. NEI’s social 
accountability processes, in which community education forums participated, 
proved unsustainable when there was no response from the government to 
citizens’ efforts. In spite of strong engagement by citizens to identify priorities 
and communicate these to government actors, local governments and local 
education sector agencies did not have financial resources to react to them. 
When civil society actors (through the Medium-Term Sector Strategy and 
the state-level community education forums) attempted to hold higher-level 
officials to account for community needs, there was again no government 
reaction, this time due to a lack of political imperative to shift resources away 
from allocations that better served officials’ own needs. Further, there were no 
financing mechanisms to continue social accountability activities and support 
citizen groups. 
The lack of resources to respond to citizen needs and to sustain social 
accountability mechanisms was cited as a threat to sustainability in several 
other cases. Along with some youth councils in Morocco, both PAQs 
(Twubakane) and clinic/school-level MSFs (Kinerja) struggled to find funds 
to support committee operations. Some committees also pointed to problems 
with funding to remedy citizen-identified shortcomings, although all three 
of these projects had mechanisms for channeling problems to higher levels of 
government that proved at least partially effective during project operations. In 
both Morocco and Indonesia, the unclear legal standing of youth councils and 
MSFs proved an obstacle to securing funding.32 
Citizen fatigue also undermined sustainability. Given the lack of resource 
support, the opportunity costs of time needed for engagement, and sometimes 
the contentious interactions with government officials, some citizen and 
civil society groups’ initial enthusiasm for social accountability faded. This 
tendency was reported for PAQs and MSFs. In LGP, the lack of results visible 
32 In Kinerja—which continues through 2017—an internal debate is under way as to whether 
MSFs should lobby for legal recognition from districts. While legal status would allow them 
to receive public funds, this dependency could compromise their effectiveness as social 
accountability mechanisms. 
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to citizens may contribute to a similar lack of sustainability. In China, stigma 
and discrimination continued to inhibit individual citizens and CSOs from 
engaging in social accountability efforts. 
In some projects, a high reliance on project staff to operationalize social 
accountability threatened sustainability. This was the case for Kinerja, where 
some MSFs reported that they needed project actors to bring them together 
with officials to exercise voice (Wetterberg et al., 2015). For LEAD, the large 
number of connected social accountability activities resulted in high reliance 
on project staff to ensure they took place. A similar pattern was reported for 
NEI.
Finally, a lack of political and institutional support from government was 
a risk for many projects. This problem was particularly stark in NEI’s case, 
but was also an issue for Kinerja in some districts and for LEAD in Bauchi. 
Another more detailed example is from Morocco, where, in spite of local 
officials’ enthusiasm and strengthened skills for implementing CDPs, there 
were no incentives for the additional workloads associated with participatory 
planning, coordination within the local government was lacking, and no 
formal planning mechanisms existed to complete additional rounds of CDPs. 
LGP also experienced the lack of political support for two interventions that 
were not implemented as intended. The Commissions for Equity and Equal 
Opportunities did not generate momentum to operate independently—in spite 
of a legal provision for this structure to provide citizen input to and oversight 
over local government decision making—because elected officials felt that the 
Commissions threatened their authority to speak for their constituents. 
Discussion
The six cases confirm the conclusions from the wider literature and from 
practical experience that effective and sustainable social accountability 
outcomes are a function of both demand and supply (Brinkerhoff & Wetterberg, 
2016). The connections between demand- and supply-side capacities are 
clearly demonstrated in the projects’ theories of change, summarized in 
Chapter 2, Table 3; and in the results achieved in governance, empowerment, 
and service delivery, recapped in Table 1 (in Chapter 2) and Figure 8 in this 
chapter. Each of the projects incorporated capacity development for citizens 
to engage in social accountability—while also coaching public officials and 
providers to respond to citizens’ concerns and to use the information gleaned 
from social accountability tools and mechanisms to improve service delivery, 
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increase the effectiveness of planning and budgeting, and make adjustments in 
policies and management processes. The relevance of these connections was 
strong, whether for projects with a predominant sectoral service delivery focus, 
or for those with a governance emphasis, as well as for projects in between 
with a balance of governance and service delivery objectives. 
Barriers to Effective Social Accountability
As detailed in Table 3 (Chapter 2), the case study projects shared similar 
theories of change, as well as types of social accountability actions and 
interventions. Whether projects achieved and sustained expected outcomes, 
however, depended on the degree to which they confronted—and were able to 
overcome—barriers to social accountability. 
To summarize the findings on sustainability, perhaps the most fundamental 
threat to continued social accountability is a lack of response from government 
actors to the priorities that citizens have identified. If the state does not 
respond, there is no room for further efforts from citizens to monitor 
implementation and channel subsequent needs. If they did not perceive a 
response, civil society actors in our case studies tended to shift their attention 
away from social accountability activities. In such instances, there was often a 
sense of dejection and regression of empowerment gains, with citizens seeing 
little use for continued advocacy for greater responsiveness from the state 
through the mechanisms established by projects. Some citizens reacted by 
shifting their energies to generating community resources to support needed 
improvements in services. While such behaviors could be interpreted as signs 
of coproduction, they verge on a form of forced privatization in which the state 
has effectively abdicated its responsibilities for delivering high-quality public 
services, shifting the burden to citizens. 
Citizens could potentially have leveraged gains in empowerment to 
escalate to more confrontational social accountability actions in the face of 
government inaction (Gaventa & Barrett, 2012). In our case studies, however, 
no such reactions were reported, likely because of the relative novelty of social 
accountability actions and general constraints on voice and accountability in 
most of these country contexts (Figure 2, Chapter 2). Although some have 
suggested that even failed organizing experiences are a resource for citizens 
to draw on for future collective action (Hirschman, 1984), our cases indicated 
that gains in empowerment were threatened, at least in the short term, when the 
state failed to respond to social accountability efforts.
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There were several reasons why government actors did not appear 
responsive to citizens’ social accountability attempts (Figure 8). One was a lack 
of visibility of state response. In the Morocco case, for instance, state actors 
actually did incorporate citizen’s priorities from the Communal Development 
Plans into their budgets and plans and, in most municipalities, ensured that 
progress was made on implementing planned investments. However, these 
achievements were not communicated or readily evident to citizens, who 
therefore may be disinclined to channel priorities to the local government 
through CDP mechanisms in the future.
In several of the cases, officials who were the targets of social accountability 
actions lacked control over needed resources to initiate a response to 
citizens’ identified priorities for improvements. In Indonesia, health center 
administrators had no control over their budgets and therefore were unable 
to provide greater amounts of needed medicines or more specialized services 
than they were allocated by district officials. In Morocco and Nigeria, it was 
district officials who lacked financial autonomy to address citizens’ expressed 
needs. In spite of past decentralization reforms in these countries, effective 
control over fiscal resources remained at higher levels of government. 
Weak political support for social accountability also stymied responsiveness. 
This was most evident in NEI, where there was little commitment from state-
level actors to respond to information and priorities channeled from citizens 
through planning mechanisms and budget proposals. Several projects tried to 
ensure political support by incorporating self-selection by local governments 
(LGP, LEAD) or specific reforms (Kinerja). The motivations behind such 
“voluntary” adoption of program interventions are complicated, however, and 
may reflect local constellations of power and access to resources rather than 
a desire to improve services (Wetterberg & Brinkerhoff, 2016). In the case 
studies, self-selection did not guarantee responsiveness at all sites.
Related to several of the other reasons for a weak state response were 
unchanged attitudes toward citizen and state roles in service delivery, resulting 
in reluctance to embrace social accountability efforts at their intended level 
of action (Table 1, Chapter 2). Intended coproduction mechanisms—such 
as the Medium-Term Sector Strategies and the community education 
forums in NEI—produced transparency but little additional accountability. 
Kinerja’s complaint-handling surveys were often perceived by officials 
as confrontational, rather than collaborative; in some districts, social 
accountability actions offended providers, who initially refused to respond. 
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Rather than enforce compliance as intended, PAQs and MSFs often played 
a coproduction role by mobilizing community members to utilize services. 
Even at Kinerja clinics where social accountability actions had produced 
positive service delivery outcomes, MSFs consistently perceived stronger 
accountability roles for themselves than providers did. Similarly, in Morocco, 
officials were not ready to accept the direct citizen scrutiny of decision making 
that the Commissions on Equity and Equal Opportunity provided. In China’s 
unsupportive context for social accountability, CSOs presented compliance-
oriented advocacy as coproduction activities to garner official acceptance. 
While some of these softer social accountability actions had positive 
outcomes, they underscore the difficulties of shifting officials’ attitudes to see 
responsiveness as essential to improving public services and to accept a greater 
role for citizens to engender such improvements, especially in contexts where 
government effectiveness in providing services is weak and there have been 
few prior opportunities for voice and accountability (Figure 1, Chapter 2).
Addressing Barriers to Social Accountability
Alongside highlighting these barriers to responsiveness, our cases also point 
to a number of possible strategies for addressing them. Remarkably, some 
of these strategies proved effective even in the country contexts that a priori 
would be expected to be least receptive to social accountability activities, 
such as China. In systems lacking social accountability, service providers and 
local officials have generally been accountable to higher levels of government 
(upward accountability). To be effective, citizens’ social accountability activities 
are helped by upward-aligned accountabilities such that incentives (rewards/
sanctions) from higher levels of government support responsiveness. Shifts 
toward incentives that encourage providers and local officials to be more 
responsive to citizens can be brought about through social accountability 
efforts by citizens, CSOs, progressive government leaders (sometimes due to 
electoral accountability), or efforts of external actors, such as project staff or 
donor agencies interacting with policy makers. 
To connect top-down and bottom-up accountability efforts, Fox (2015) 
proposed a “sandwich strategy” in which local social accountability efforts 
connect with national policy reformers with the help of interlocutors. Together, 
these actors work to reduce resistance to accountability from both inside and 
outside the state. Similarly, Grandvoinnet et al. (2015) posited an elaborate 
framework for social accountability drivers that centers on connecting citizen 
and state action through information, civic mobilization, and a citizen–state 
166  Chapter 9
interface. Our cases contribute a number of nuances for operationalizing these 
general strategies and frameworks, which we turn to next.
Focus on Next Higher Levels of Government
Rather than a general emphasis on national policy support for social 
accountability and stronger rule of law (Fox, 2015), our cases suggest that 
financial, political, and institutional support from officials immediately 
above those targeted by citizens’ social accountability efforts may be most 
critical. Garnering support from one level higher than that of expected 
outcomes leverages top-down accountability to help change long-standing 
attitudes toward citizens and provides incentives for greater responsiveness. 
In Twubakane and Kinerja, this leverage derived from support from district 
officials for changes by service providers. In LEAD, state-level institutional 
changes reinforced local government responsiveness (in contrast, notably 
lacking in NEI); and in China, national pressure to meet international 
mandates for HIV services provided impetus for HPI/GMR-C’s provincial-
level improvements. Higher-level support can produce structural changes that 
sustain social accountability activities even when specific citizen or state actors 
change (Grandvoinnet et al., 2015).
Stand-Alone Policy Mandates for Social Accountability Are 
Insufficient
Including social accountability mechanisms in regulations can provide a 
measure of legitimacy and structural support that citizens can leverage for 
responsiveness. For example, incorporation of complaints-management 
mechanisms into Indonesian national legislation helped Kinerja actors 
justify such efforts to skeptical officials. In Morocco, a national mandate 
for participatory Communal Development Plans facilitated LGP’s work to 
strengthen citizen engagement in local government planning mechanisms. 
However, neither of these social accountability mechanisms had been 
consistently implemented prior to the projects’ activities, in spite of legal 
requirements. Further, NEI actors worked to include Nigerian CSOs in 
planning processes by leveraging regulatory requirements, but these did not 
empower citizen representatives to go beyond channeling information.
In several of the projects, citizens sought legal recognition to maintain 
social accountability mechanisms (for example, youth councils in Morocco, 
and Kinerja MSFs). While legal recognition can contribute to sustainability, 
it needs to be combined with public recognition and state support, as well as 
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continued citizen engagement, to result in institutionalized practices of social 
accountability. 
Demonstrate Service Delivery Improvements to Increase 
Sustainability
The cases demonstrate that projects whose starting point and core emphasis 
concerned governance benefited from building links to services. Perhaps the 
clearest example here is Morocco’s LGP, where targets for expanding citizen 
participation in local government affairs were concretized through youth-
related services and engagement. Conversely, as noted above, projects with 
sectoral service starting points improved their prospects for sustainability by 
building in attention to governance and empowerment. Rwanda’s Twubakane 
exemplifies this point. 
Not surprisingly, concrete improvements in service delivery help to 
reinforce empowerment gains and sustain citizen involvement. As discussed 
earlier, abstract normative benefits of engaging with government processes and 
actors are unlikely to be sufficient to sustain citizens’ motivations to engage in 
social accountability actions. Without a positive response from the state, costs 
in time and resources and the potential for backlash to social accountability 
activities are likely to deter continued engagement. Even if a service delivery 
goal is not explicit (as in HPI/GMR-C), expected changes in service delivery 
can motivate citizen engagement, and actual changes provide a benchmark for 
progress.
In addition to encouraging continued citizen engagement, improvements in 
service delivery can garner political support and change officials’ attitudes. In 
HPI/GMR-C, collaboration and progress toward shared objectives to improve 
services for people living with HIV increased government actors’ willingness 
to work with these stigmatized populations. After seeing improvements 
in services at health centers responding to Kinerja’s social accountability 
mechanisms, some district officials rewarded center administrators with 
greater financial autonomy, which encouraged providers to further increase 
responsiveness to citizen needs. 
Focus on Both Elected Officials and Bureaucrats
To connect upward accountability to social accountability, Fox (2015) 
emphasized the need for responsiveness from elected officials. Through 
electoral accountability, he argued, citizens can leverage higher-level political 
support for social accountability. In our cases, we found instances where 
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elected officials buttressed citizens’ efforts, but important support from unelected 
bureaucrats also mattered. In Nigeria, for instance, LEAD made greater 
progress in Sokoto State, where electoral reforms were respected, than in 
Bauchi State, where they were not. However, important concrete changes 
in administrative practices in LEAD (such as more transparent state-level 
budget review) and isolated cases of responsiveness in NEI (such as the greater 
openness of the Bauchi State Universal Basic Education Board after resolution 
of a teachers’ strike) involved the actions of bureaucrats, rather than elected 
officials. Similarly, in some Kinerja districts, elected legislators proved to be 
key allies for citizens to bring their needs to higher levels of government. 
However, administrative and structural changes that sustained responsiveness 
relied on the actions of bureaucrats in technical and planning agencies in these 
districts (see also Wetterberg & Brinkerhoff, 2016). 
There were also cases where electoral mechanisms were not supportive 
of social accountability. In Morocco, elected officials perceived some social 
accountability mechanisms as a threat to their own mandate to channel citizen 
voice. In spite of regulatory support for Commissions for Equity and Equal 
Opportunities, these committees’ accountability functions were thwarted by 
elected councilors’ reluctance to incorporate input from them. Most notably, 
Chinese CSOs were able to work with officials at a level of government with 
no electoral accountability to channel needs and improve services. In this 
case, incentives for provincial officials derived from the Chinese national 
government’s public commitments to international protocols regarding 
HIV/AIDS policies and programs, and the resulting pressures from the center 
to adhere to them.
Support Changes in Institutional Frameworks and Relationships to 
Facilitate Social Accountability
In addition to introducing specific social accountability mechanisms, perhaps 
the most significant contribution that interlocutors—such as staff involved in 
international development projects—can make is to facilitate shifts in relations 
between citizen and state actors in sometimes small, but potentially important 
ways. Such contributions underscore that a shift to greater government 
responsiveness to social accountability is not automatic, but that changes are 
required at many different levels to produce lasting change.
Examples of these supportive actions include the identification of shared 
goals between CSOs and officials in China, through research and advocacy 
support; and facilitated connections between Moroccan youth councils and 
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young parliamentarians to identify common ground. LEAD project actors 
worked with CSOs to press for a budget-hearing interface between state 
and local government officials that provided a new opportunity for local 
governments to present and defend draft budgets before final approval—a 
marked departure from prior arbitrary budget review and allocations by the 
relevant ministry. This change proved critical to funding citizen priorities in 
local government budgets.
A common project activity that contributed to changed relations between 
citizens and the government was training for citizens’ groups in how to engage 
with public officials (for example, for Moroccan youth councils, Kinerja’s 
MSFs, and CSOs in Nigeria and China). Such support not only covered the 
functioning of specific social accountability mechanisms but also built skills 
to effectively present ideas, resolve conflict, and communicate in a common 
language with government actors. This type of capacity building strengthens 
citizens’ abilities to connect to external actors and sustain themselves without 
project support (Baser & Morgan, 2008).
Pay (Reasonable) Attention to Context
The cases ratify the essential role of contextual factors in influencing effective 
and sustainable social accountability, which is another robust analytic stream 
emerging from literature and practice (Bukenya et al., 2012; Grandvoinnet 
et al., 2015; O’Meally, 2013). Basic state properties, such as government 
effectiveness, the status of state–society relations, and characteristics of civil 
society all shaped the macro-context for social accountability in each of the six 
cases. Contextual factors stood out most saliently in the China case, given that 
the target of HPI/GMR-C interventions was the enabling environment. 
The cases’ applications in local government settings highlight the degree of 
effective decentralization as a contextual parameter, and raise the importance 
of moving beyond macro-level features of the context to considerations 
of micro-contexts (Joshi, 2014; Wetterberg et al., 2015). Decentralization 
determines the allocation of roles, responsibilities, authorities, and resources 
to subnational levels of government. For example, variations in capacity and 
commitment of Indonesian local government actors influenced both the 
choices of sectoral services to improve, and the responses to Kinerja’s social 
accountability interventions.
Reflecting the role of context in understanding social accountability 
outcomes, research on social accountability has increasingly emphasized the 
importance of taking into account contextual factors to maximize effectiveness 
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(Grandvoinnet et al., 2015; Joshi, 2014; O'Meally, 2013). However, while 
critical for interpreting outcomes, contextual data can be costly to gather, 
because locally relevant and comparable information on political actors, civil 
society groups, and prior social accountability efforts is rarely available for all 
locales. Further, relevant factors are often not readily identifiable before social 
accountability interventions are implemented (Wetterberg et al., 2015). In 
fact, our cases demonstrate that the ability of organized citizens to use social 
accountability mechanisms to leverage power and shift relations with state 
actors is often due to contextual influences that were unanticipated during 
program design. For instance, LGP began in 2010, before the events of the 
Arab Spring could have been predicted. During project implementation, 
however, the uprisings and regime changes in neighboring countries due to 
confrontational social accountability helped to bring about constitutional 
reforms in Morocco. These reforms were not anticipated when LGP started, 
but allowed more political space for youth and civil society participation and 
underscored the urgency for local and national officials to address the needs of 
young people, which greatly helped LGP’s youth councils to flourish. 
A recurring contextual factor across our cases is the role of personal agency. 
Individual state actors’ willingness to engage with social accountability efforts 
proved to be important both in launching and sustaining social accountability. 
For example, in NEI, an isolated case of responsiveness from Bauchi education 
officials resulted from the state-level community education forum’s ability 
to broker a meeting during a teachers’ strike, unrelated to prior social 
accountability efforts. For both LGP and Kinerja, the effectiveness of specific 
social accountability activities varied depending on individual actors, at 
sometimes very local levels.
These types of micro-contextual variables cannot be systematically 
incorporated into project designs (Joshi, 2014). Instead, project designers 
should limit their attention to a circumscribed set of contextual variables 
directly associated with barriers to social accountability and service delivery 
improvements (including variations in local resource distributions, degree 
of effective decentralization, level of civil society development, and past 
service performance) to identify interventions that may prove effective. 
Project implementation should be carried out by practitioners with thorough 
understandings of the local contexts to make adjustments and grasp 
opportunities as they emerge. 
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Considerations for Program Design and Implementation
We see the following implications for program design and implementation 
flowing from the above points. We begin with program design:
• Supply and demand. For program designs that make use of social 
accountability approaches and mechanisms, it is desirable to include both 
supply and demand elements under the “umbrella” of the program. This 
combination can reduce the likelihood that state actors will mistrust or 
reject citizen involvement, and can develop the motivation and capacity 
to be responsive. On the demand side, it can reduce the chances that 
citizens will become discouraged when they find that state actors fail to 
react to their input. 
• Valued services. For governance programs, designs that establish links 
to services that citizens value are more likely to motivate them to take 
advantage of the participatory options that the various types of social 
accountability tools offer, as the above discussion of demonstrating 
service delivery benefits confirms. This connection helps to concretize 
governance in the eyes of citizens, and increases the chances that the 
program can build a broad, demand-driven constituency for governance 
reforms beyond the implicated public sector agencies and actors. 
• Governance context. For sectoral service delivery programs, designs that 
take into account the governance context that creates incentive structures 
(positive and negative) for service providers and facilities are more likely 
to achieve their service delivery objectives, as well as contribute to 
strengthening state–society relations through improved governance. The 
above recommendations to connect to higher levels of government, to 
engage both elected officials and bureaucrats, and to support institutional 
frameworks that facilitate positive state–society relations are relevant 
design options.
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• Local context and program flexibility. Program designs that build upon 
contextual assessments will likely achieve greater success in employing 
social accountability mechanisms and tools than those that treat these as 
“widgets” that can be easily transferred across geographies and locales. 
Because success depends not simply upon the macro-context, but upon 
microenvironments, broad and general assessments (e.g., political 
economy analysis) should be supplemented with targeted local-level 
analysis. At the same time, they must recognize that a priori analysis 
cannot eliminate uncertainty or unpredictability. The implication is that 
building flexibility in choice of governance reforms and social accountability 
tools, and in timetables for achieving results, will make for more effective 
program designs. Menu-based designs are well suited for creating flexible 
and adaptable programs.
• Measurement via intermediary indicators. The theories of change that inform 
program designs need to include intermediary indicators that enable 
assessment of the contributions of social accountability both to governance 
and to service delivery outcomes. This can be difficult given the challenges 
of measurement, but is important to evaluating the merits of social 
accountability interventions and to contributing to the knowledge base 
regarding what works under which conditions (Williamson, 2015). 
We now turn to implications for implementation. While our list centers 
on implementing social accountability approaches, we see the items below as 
applying more broadly to program implementation across a range of sectors. 
We offer the following:
• Incentives. Flowing from the design point above regarding the importance 
of context, implementation needs to be catalyzed by as clear a picture as 
possible of the incentives that drive both public sector actors and citizens to 
engage with each other around social accountability. In Chapter 2, Figures 
1 and 2 and Table 4 provide some rough indications of the macro-context’s 
influence on incentives. Historical patterns of state–society relations often 
play a role in conditioning how public officials and citizens view each 
other, and the discussion above highlights the difficulties in changing 
state actors’ attitudes toward citizen engagement. Within civil society, 
social relations across classes, ethnicities, and geographies influence the 
incentives for collective action on which many demand-driven governance 
reforms, including the use of social accountability tools, are premised.
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• Iterative pressure and persuasion. The different types of social accountability 
illustrated in Table 1 create different incentive patterns for both sides. 
For example, citizens and service providers may be more comfortable 
with coproduction-focused social accountability interventions than with 
compliance-focused ones, which may set up a confrontational dynamic. 
This does not mean that introducing the harder forms of accountability 
is not possible, but it often implies an iterative process of training, 
persuasion, and judicious application of pressure from higher levels of 
government, as noted above, to move in that direction.
• Support for a range of skills. Implementation will be more successful 
to the extent that reformers and assistance providers recognize that 
the skills required to make social accountability (of all types) effective 
combine technical, political, and interpersonal dimensions. For example, 
citizens serving on PAQs in Rwandan health facilities needed some basic 
knowledge about health care, a grasp of the political landscape regarding 
decentralization and government decision making, and the ability to 
interact with their fellow community members that they represented and 
health facility staff.
• Iterative implementation. Implementing flexible program designs with 
menus of choices for public officials and citizens in only partially 
predictable micro-contexts calls for iterative implementation that rolls 
through relatively rapid cycles of trial and error and learning. Building 
real governance reform, beyond empty mimicry of donor-inspired 
democratic governance templates, calls for extended pathways of 
iterative problem identification, adaptation, testing, commitment and 
constituency building, and demonstration of success (Andrews et al., 
2013; Brinkerhoff & Crosby, 2002). These implementation time frames 
are often out of sync with donor-funded program reporting and results 
requirements. Long-term social accountability results may not be readily 
apparent within the life span of an international development project, and 
it may be challenging to tease out where and how sustainability appears 
likely (Wetterberg et al., 2015). 
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“This set of case studies provides a rich background to practitioners interested in  
understanding experiences of social accountability in a varied set of countries and 
sectors. As the title implies, this is a very welcomed practical volume, and the cases are 
made even more interesting by a systematic review of both implementation challenges 
and prospects for sustainability. ”
Helene Grandvoinnet, Lead Governance Specialist, The World Bank
“The six case studies provide a rich and contextually grounded analysis of what has 
worked in efforts to promote social accountability and why. [They] offer compelling 
evidence for why it is so important for development actors to think and work in a more 
politically aware, flexible, adaptive, and iterative manner. The case studies also help to 
highlight the kind of difference that donors can make when they focus on facilitating 
spaces of engagement and interaction between state and society. The book should 
prove invaluable to academics, policymakers, and practitioners alike.” 
Alina Rocha Menocal, Senior Research Fellow, 
Developmental Leadership Program and Overseas Development Institute 
“There are a few recent meta-analyses of social accountability projects, but no  
systematic case comparisons. It is into this lacuna that Wetterberg, Brinkerhoff, and 
Hertz step. Their volume provides critical insights, including: programming should 
flexibly respond to local context; bottom-up approaches cannot work in the absence of 
a government that is willing and able to engage; and even as social accountability can 
improve delivery at point-of-service, wholesale changes in service delivery outcomes 
often depend on higher-level political-economy dynamics. Donors, implementers, and 
academics alike would all be well-served by giving this excellent book a careful read.” 
Erik Wibbels, Robert O. Keohane Professor of Political Science at Duke University
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